THE

INTEREST

Of these United Provinces.

BEING

A Defence of the

Zeelanders Choice.

Wherein is shewne,

I. *That we ought unanimously to defend our selves.*

II. *That if we cannot, it is better to be under England than France, in regard of Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade.*

III. *That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may remaine a Republick. And that our Compliance with England is the onely meanes for this.*

TOGETHER WITH

Severall Remarkes upon the present, and Conjectures on the future State of Affaires in Europe, especially as relating to this Republick.

By a wellwisher to the Reformed Religion, and the wellfare of these Countries.

MIDDELBURG,

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A Summary of the enſuing Treatiſe.

THE PREFACE. *Wherein, the occaſion and reaſon of this Worke. The Authors feares ballanced with others hopes. The neceſſity of unanimity for, and duty of ſelfe defence.*

SECTION 1.

The riſe and State of that great Queſtion, (viz.) whether upon ſuppoſal of inability to defend our ſelves, it is our INTREST *to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.*

2. *Arguments to prove this choice to be agreable to our true Intreſt. The firſt whereof is from our Religious concernements. Wherein is ſhewne how great a ſupport Religion is to a State, and how greatly it concernes us to ſecure our Religion.*

3. *The plea of France's granting us the liberty of our Religion, conſidered.*

4. *Objections from the danger of loſing our Religion under England; from the Kings being a Papiſt, deſigning to ſet up Popery; the increaſe, countenance, and tolleration of Papiſts, as alſo from his joyning with France againſt us, and Church Governement by Biſhops, all anſwered.*

5. *A 2d Argument taken from Liberty. Wherein the different Kinds and degrees of Liberty, under all ſorts of Governement, are declared; and the probability of enjoying greater freedome under England than France, argued.*

6. *The 3d Argument is the preſervation of our Eſtates; in regard of Soldjers violence, Governors impoſitions, Publique Debts by obligation, and Revenues of the Romiſh Church.*

7. *The 4th Argument from Trade. This (viz. Merchandiſe and Navigation) our cheife ſecular Intreſt. And friendſhip with England to ſecure the ſame. England and we Competitors herein, what implyed thereby in point of Intreſt, and Inference. The probability of getting more, as alſo enjoying the ſame with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments, largely debated; and the contrary evinced under England.*

8. *Severall other Arguments and enducements to incline us rather for England, briefly mentioned. With an inference from the whole preceding discourse, that the friendship of England is to be preferd before that of France.*

9. *That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may still remaine a Republick; in regard of our owne strength, and our Neighbors Intrest, Englands especially; that they had better lose Scotland or Ireland, then let the French have these Provinces. This War a Game at Hazard. Being engaged will goe through, and Parliament probably assist therein.*

10. *Compliance with England, the onely meanes of the Commonwealths continuation.*

11. *Conjectures of future affaires. The motions of the ensuing Summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Republick, probably England may get a bridle to curb us, France the sadle to ride us, Colen a Supernumerary girth, Munster a bos off the crupper. Our condition deplored and consolated. A necessary caution for England, another for the Orange Family. The Authors feares of what will at last befall us. The Spanish Netherlands a dying. The friendship of England and France sick at heart, and cannot live long. That of Spaine and England sound at heart, and will recover, &c.*

12. *France's Ambition. Growing greatnes. The causes thereof. We and England in the fault. The Common Intrest of Europe to oppose France particularly declared of the Empire, Spaine, England, Denmarke, and this Republick and Hans Townes. Tea of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzerland. The ballance of Europe to be held even, and by whom.*

13. *The Conclusion of the whole Discourse.*

To the Impartial Reader.

Although in so small a Tractate, it may be thought needless to give an account of the occasion thereof; yet I think my self obliged for your further satisfaction, to do it briefly. The Author having been lately in *Holland*, found what the *Zeelanders* had done in the late Revolutions, misunderstood by some, and variously censured by others; and therefore thought it worth his pains, fairly and modestly to vindicate the same. And the rather, because he foresees various pretexts will be deduced thence, and divers interpretations be made thereof, which the Author hopes by his declaring the true intent and meaning, to free it from. That so all those, whose Curiosity or Interest leads them to inquire, might be acquainted with the true Grounds and Reasons thereof; and that neither the propensity of some to the *French*, nor the prejudice and passion of others against the *English*, might make us run blindfold upon our ruine; but that we may discern our true *Interest*, and pursue it as occasion shall require. For as all affection to that which is not our real Interest, so all aversation from that which is, is madness and folly; which clouds Reason, precipitates Counsels, runs us upon extreams, and drives us into inevitable destruction, many times before we are aware.

I know some will be apt to say, What need of this now? The Storm is over, and the supposition of inability to defend our selves out of doors. If I thought so, I assure you I should neither trouble my self, nor others any further. But whether it be my love to the Countrey, and desire of the welfare thereof; or my jealousie over the Factions of the Rulers, and tumultuousness of the people therein; or my comparing and estimating our own strength, fidelity, and courage with our Enemies; or my observing, that our former Military Discipline (which made us renowned, and our Countrey accounted the School of War) is in a great measure, if not utterly decayed and lost; or my hearing how old Officers, and Forein Forces have been slighted; and such preferred, as are unexperienced for conduct, and untried for courage; or the difference I have observed in the valour of a poor and rich people; Poverty always stirring up and whetting Valour, out of hopes to better their condition; whereas riches makes men fearful of losing what they have, and so falling into a worse. As may be observed not onely in different people, as between the Northern and Southern Nations, but also in the same, yea in our selves. For when poor in our Wars with *Spain*, we made good the old Character which *Tacitus* gives us, *Omnium harum gentium virtute præcipui Batavi, &c.* Of *De Mor. Germ.* §. 29.

all the *German* Nations, or People, the *Batavians*, were cheif for valour; but now that we are grown rich, we are affraid to adventure either our Persons or Estates, and readier to open our Gates, then shut them against our Enemies. Or, whether it be my Melancholly temper only; or my fears and cowardise, if you please to call it so; or my fancy from my observation, that the third War (as this is with *England*) hath ever proved fatal to the one side, as is apparent by many examples; or what ever other cause it is, I must profess freely, that I am of another sentiment, this War having so black a visage to mine appearance, that I fear we are rather in the midst of a Tempestuous Sea of Troubles, then discovering of Land, much less a safe Harbour of rest.

I am not ignorant upon how many pins men hang their hopes. Some upon the advancement of his Highness the Prince of *Orange*, hope all will be redrest and well at home; and that his relation to the Crown of *England*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, will capacitate him to remedy all abroad. Others upon conjectures of his marrying with the Duke of *Yorks* Daughter, or some nearly related to the Crown of *England* or *France*; which hath been an usual way I confess, especially among absolute Princes, of accomodating differences. Some upon our sufficient numbers of Men and Moneys to defend our selves. Othersome upon the Assistance of the *Emperor*, and the *German* Princes, *Brandenburgh* especially. And others upon their opinion, that now the Pensionary *de Wit* and his party are broken, so that *England* can confide more in our friendship, that the King will break with *France*, and afford his Nephew and these *Netherlands* assistance; especially because they judge, that it is the Interest of *England* and *Germany*, as well as *Spain*, not to see us fall into the *French* hands, for fear they have only *Polyphemus* his courtesie, to be last devoured. But yet all these grounds, and divers others, which are variously discoursed of, prevail not so far with me, as that my hopes can ballance my fears.

For although I grant the strength of the remaining Provinces to be considerable both by Sea and Land; and the greatest foundation to build our hopes upon, next under God Almighties Protection; yet if we duly consider the state and condition we are in, there is not that just ground of confidence, which may free us from fears; as many are apt to imagine. He is very short sighted that observes not, 1. That there are two different parties amongst us, and that a Commonwealth, muchless then a Kingdom divided, cannot stand. 2. That we might do much more then we do, or (for any thing I yet see) will or shall do for our own defence. 3. That we are destitute of succours from abroad for the present, except from *Spain*; which we may happily pay dear enough for; if we should be drawn into a League Offensive and Defensive with them in a long and tedious War. And 4. that we are full of tumults and distractions at home, which is to me a greater presage of approaching ruine, then all our Enemies weapons of War; and makes me fear that as tumults was the occasion

of

of our rising, so they will be of our ruine. And that *Priols* observation of two only Nations that have stood firm by defection; the *Helvetians* at the rise, and the *Hollanders* at the fall of the *Rhine*; those founding and defending their Liberty by the Mountains, their Poverty, and Equality; these by the Waters, their Riches, and the States with a Captain General; may shortly be contradicted in the latter, if we be not more unanimous, and perhaps ere long in the former also. *Hist. Gal. l.* 2.

I grant likewise, That it is very considerable to have so wise a Conductor as the Prince of *Orange* is for his years, and one of such near Relation to two such great Potentates as his Uncles of *England* and *Brandenburgh*. But yet if we rightly consider, we cannot but conclude. 1. That it must be Power, as well as Policy, that can relieve us; and that in the Affairs of the World, Interest is preferred above all Relations; the whole World turning upon the Hinge of Self-interest; and all Princes, States, Families, and Persons eagerly pursuing that which they apprehend their Interest, although often mistaking it, and oftner the means to obtain it; no wonder if they miss thereof. 2. And that his Civil Dignities come rather to him by Popular Tumults, than Regular Proceedings: Which is found an easie way to rise by, but a hard way to stand by, yea, Morally impossible, if not backed by power. For as it is with sick Persons, so with sick States, if all things be not quickly redressed that is grievous to them, they presently cry, *Turn me again*; and think they have power to undo, that which they themselves have formerly done. It being a true Character which *Livy* gives the Common People, *Plebs aut humiliter servit, aut superbè dominatur.* 3. And that though the *de Wits* be dead, their party lives; and if things succeed not well under his Highness, will have no small advantage, not only from the horrid murder of those two Pillars of their party; but from the declining of Affairs, to cry him down with the people, and make him an *Insignificant Cypher of State.* 4. And lastly, There are so many Papists, and other Sects of Religion and Malecontents, who watch for opportunities to Flieblow the Common People, and set them upon Sedition; that I much question, whether that fresh gale of Affection to the Prince, which hath blown so briskly through all these remaining Provinces, will last long. For if they see that his Highness cannot make Peace, as they expected; and they feel more miserable effects of a stubborn and cruel War, and be forced to greater Taxes (the Common People being always covetous, what ever the cause or necessity be) and find their Trade still obstructed, and Land drowned, to the impoverishing both of Cities and Countrey: I fear we shall find the People so restless and unquiet, that they will neither know what to do themselves, nor be willing to be guided by their Governors that do; but when Extremities press upon us, bring all into Confusion, and consequently Ruine. *Lib.* 24.

For besides the Jealousies which many have of his Highness, which *Bentivoglio* long since foresaw and foretold, That these Jealousies betwixt the State, and their Stadtholder, would become the cause of our Ruine; the needy

multitude, (which are alwaies enemies to good order and Government) when distressed; will seek occasion to prey upon the richer, whom they constantly envie. And the midle sort, which are the true Basis of a State, whose principal aime is Liberty and Plenty, when they see these indangered; grow jealous of their Governours (upon whom all misfortunes are constantly laid) and seeke to pull them downe and set up themseves one after another, to the ruine of all. For the pompe of Government so dasles the eyes of those that know not the Weight of it, that when there is any seeming access thereto, all are apt to contend for it, and every one to thinke himself as capable as his neighbor, and vy with one another without end: till they that were formerly good passengers, now turning Pilots in a Storm; through their continuall contentions and unskilfulness, shipwrack the Common-wealth, whilst they sincerely desire and endeavour to save it. I shall therefore conclude, that although we have a good *Head*, yet except the members be at unity, and unanimously resolved to give assistance to their Head and Governours; it is in vaine to thinke, we can be secured from such potent enemies, (except any be so mad as to expect miracles) or that the Princes name or waying of his Flag upon our Towers can defend us.

For his marrying his Highness the *Duke of Yorks* Daughter, we may speak of it here, and those in *England* of the King of *Sweden*, and both be mistaken. I can see little certainty thereof, and therefore can say less therein; but this I can say, that if a Relation would effect our desires, there is that which is very near already; yea which many perhaps will thinke too neer, if it conduce no more to the procuring our Peace.

For our assistance from the *Emperor* and *Germain Princes*, which is so much talkt of, the *Brandenburgs* especially; if I were assured they designed to serve us, and not themselves of us; I should have more hopes then I have. I know the *Germains* are a great and warlike Nation, and that none almost have warred with them, that have not repented it. And when we see them warr with *France*, though they directly assist us not further, such a diversion to our enemie will be a considerable advantage to us. But at present, we see no more of their intentions, than to defend themselves. The *Emperor* is not onely continually kept waking by the *Turk*; but at present diverted also by the distractions of *Hungary*. And the fears of *Poland*, will necessitate *Brandenburg* to have an eye to *Prussia*. The Princes of the Empire are many, and divided, (several of them declaring for *France*, others wavering and waiting opportunity to close with the prevailing side) which makes their Counsels slow, and more subject to be discovered, the raising men and bringing them together more difficult, the commanding of them more lyable to discord (which hath often proved fatal in their Armies) and the providing for them very uncertaine. And I might ad hereunto (for it is well knowne) that some of the *Germain* Princes have so run out their revenues; that though they have men far more then their proportion, yet have not money to pay the half of their rate. So that it is well, if

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what was said of old of the *Britains*, prove not true of the *Germans*, *Dum singuli pugnant, omnes vincuntur.* *Tacitus in vita Agricolæ.*

As for the Interest of *England*, which we think should incline them to hinder rather than further *Frances* growing greatness, and consequently to Peace with us: I shall only say this, That as we allow all men liberty to judge of their own Interests, so must we much more to Kings and Rulers. And it is but reasonable to think, that they understand their own Interest better then we, that are strangers to their designs; except we think of our selves as the *Persians*, who say that they have two eyes, and others but one. I may think, that the same Reason of State should prevail now, that did formerly with the *English*, in the first War, *To humble us, but not ruine us*; and shall make it apparent, that they cannot rationally have a thought of our ruine, without thinking to follow after; yet circumstances are so different, and the passions of men so various, that I am not certain to what extent and degree of Humiliation they measure their Interest, or how far *England* is ingiged with *France* for effecting of this. We may think, and the *English* Nation may be jealous (as I know they are) that *France* will couzen them at last, and serve them now as *Comines* tells us they have formerly, *When usually they beat the French in their Wars; but then what they had got by their Swords, they lost by their Treaties*, (even as *Bodin* tells us the *French* were serv'd by the *Spaniards*;) but if they will adventure that, who can hinder them? *l. 3. c. 8. & l. 4. c. 9. Bodin de Rep. l. 5. c. 1.*

Should I speak my private apprehension, 'tis briefly this. *England* hath been long jealous of the growing greatness of this State by Sea, and find it an error of Policy in former Governors, to suffer us to arrive at this height of contesting with them. From whence they have met with several inconveniences in regard of Trade, and also been put to vast expences to maintain constantly a Fleet to cope with us. These things they would willingly ease themselves of, which they know cannot be done, but by the Sword. The first War which was occasionally begun, was no time to effect their designs, in regard the Kingdom was harrast and exhausted by a long Civil War, and *Oliver* the Protectors cheif design was to settle himself, and therefore made Peace. The second War advantaged them nothing; for the *French* countenancing us (though secretly in League with them before the War was ended) they were not able to effect what they designed, having lost their opportunity which they had after the first battel in their hands: That being often verified of the *English*, which was said of *Hannibal*, (by whom matters not, for the Learned Historians *Livie* and *Plutarch* differ therein,) *Vincere scis Hannibal; victoria uti nescis.* A Peace is concluded at *Breda*, but the War had a sting in the tale of it, the work at *Chattam*, *Manet alta mente repostum*, and makes them more eagerly wait for an opportunity, both to revenge themselves, and pursue their former designs. And now *France* taking occasion to quarrel with us, they take the opportunity to oppress us, and bring us under; that they may free themselves from those present inconveniences in Trade and Expences, and will see how they can make it with *France*

for

for the future. They know well, that if we be broken, there is no Nation elſe is able to match them at Sea, and being in an Iland, fear not invaſion by Land Forces. I might parallel this with the *Peloponneſian* War, the cauſe whereof was the *Athenians* growing greatneſs, and particularly in Power at Sea; upon whom therefore, the *Lacedemonians* made War, as *Thucydides* tells us, who hath accurately writ the Hiſtory thereof. And yet though Intereſt be the moving cauſe of moſt Wars, what ever the pretext be, (for *Polybius* hath long ſince taught us to diſtinguiſh theſe two by ſundry Examples) yet I am far from aſſerting it alone a juſtifieable cauſe of any War. If any deſire ſatisfaction what is, I refer them to *Grotius de Jure Belli & Pac. lib.2. cap.* 1. & 22. *& ſeqq.* for my deſign permits me not ſuch a digreſſion. Theſe thoughts of the preſent Intereſt of *England*, leads me to conclude.

*Lib.*1.

*Hiſt.lib.*3. *c.*6.

1. That in their League with *France* they have made proviſion for theſe; ſo that if the *French* prevail, they ſhall have ſuch Maritime places, as may be a real ſecurity to them in theſe particulars. 2. That they will never ſuffer *France* (if they can poſſibly hinder it) to have all theſe Maritime Provinces entirely. For if our might alone be ſuch an eye-ſore to them, how much more if it ſhould be joyned with that of *France*. 3. That they will not deſiſt, till they have tried their utmoſt, to obtain theſe ends which they account their Intereſt; having now the advantage of Alliance with *France*, their joynt Power and Prevalency, and our preſent Weakneſs and Diſtractions. So that I cannot flatter my ſelf ſo much as to hope, That either the Princes Relation to His Majeſty can procure, or Money purchaſe our Peace with them, ſo long as they ſee any probability of effecting their deſigns.

But if any hath more certain grounds of hope, which are not yet diſcovered to the World, he needs not loſe his time in peruſing this Treatiſe. It is but my loſing a few ſpare hours in compoſing, and the Printer a ſmall ſum in publiſhing this amongſt thoſe many Pamphlets, which daily flie abroad, through all corners of the Countrey. For I profeſs this once for all, That I pretend not to know (or if I did, ſhould I diſcover) any Intrigues or Myſteries of State; nor deſire to pry into the *Arcana Imperii*, but let them ſilently reſt in the boſome of thoſe who ſit at the Helm of Government; or to make any unworthy reflections upon any, Friends or Enemies, *French* or *Engliſh*. But only as one ſtanding upon lower ground, to take the height of the Tower of Intereſt, which is gazed upon by all, but through paſſion and prejudice rightly meaſured by few. Whether I have miſtaken it with the multitude, time will diſcover, and let others judge by the following Diſcourſe; which I foreſee will meet with as many Cenſures, as I have Hairs on my Head, though I value them all leſs than the leaſt of them; my Conſcience bearing me witneſs, that I have publiſhed the ſame, with a ſincere affection to the Reformed Religion, and welfare of theſe Countreys.

Nov. 30. 1672. *J. H.*

Sect.

Sect. 1. *The riſe and ſtate of the Queſtion*, viz. *Whether upon ſuppoſal of inability to defend our ſelves, it is our Intereſt to be under* England *or* France, *and the* Zeelanders *choice of the former.*

HE is a Stranger to us and our Affairs, who knows not; that the late Revolutions among us, and particularly at *Utrechts* betaking themſelves to the *French* for protection, were attended both with great conſternation, and various deliberations, as is uſual in ſuch diſaſters. When therefore miſery and deſtruction was approaching as a violent torrent, that bears down all before it; Self-preſervation being the Fundamental Law of Nature; every Province, City, and almoſt Village, began to conſider, what they ſhould do to preſerve themſelves, from being drowned in the overflowing deluge.

Some were of opinion, that the remaining Provinces were of ſufficient ſtrength to defend themſelves, and therefore lookt no further. Others were of a contrary judgment; and therefore thought it better, upon reaſonable terms, to put our ſelves under a Forein Power, as *Utrecht* had done, then to be conquered by the Sword. And herein alſo mens judgments were divided, ſome thinking it better to be under the *French*, others to be under the *Engliſh*. Thoſe of *Holland* (as was commonly reported) were more inclinable to the former, in regard of their near approach to them in *Utrecht*; and eſpecially out of an opinion, which many have entertained, That the Intereſt of *Holland*, being principally that of Trade by Sea, was more competible with that of *France* then *England*. Inſomuch, that many believe, if the advice of Monſieur *Pompone* of the Kings ſending *Charte Blanche* had been followed; the Cities of *Holland* had at that time ſeveral of them imitated the example of *Utrecht*; thoſe of *Zealand* were generally inclined to the *Engliſh*. But as opinions are uſually both bred and brought up by Paſſions; ſo here it was manifeſt, That the exceſſive hopes of the former, made them for abſolute defence; and the exceſſive fears of the latter, for abſolute reſignation. In ſuch caſes there are two ways have always been found ſafeſt and beſt for accommodation, *viz.* A due examination of the Grounds of thoſe Paſſions, and a juſt temperament or comprehenſion of the diverſity of Opinions: Which here ſo happily fell out, that it was reſolved upon and declared by many in *Zeeland*, firſt, *That they would uſe their beſt endeavors to defend themſelves*; and ſecondly, *if they found themſelves unable, they would then reſign to the Engliſh*. Hereby ſhewing, that they neither did through vain fears, wholly deſpond of their own ſtrength; nor through flattering hopes were wholly fearleſs of their Enemies. They would try and uſe the beſt means they could, to ſtand of themſelves according to their hopes; and yet alſo provide againſt the worſt of their fears, which was their fall by abſolute conqueſt.

For

For the manner of doing this, I ſhall neither accuſe, nor defend it; though the Magiſtrate led not the Van of Conſent, according to his place and dignity, yet he followed cloſe in the Rear. And though it was done haſtily, yet why may not a haſty Pen, ſometimes be as happy as *Apelles* his Pencil, which in Paſſion being thrown on the Picture, better portrayed the Horſes foaming, then all his premeditated Counſel and Art.

Plut. l. de fort.

It is enough to me, and to my purpoſe, that what was done is agreeable to the true Intereſt of the Countrey; which I hope to make apparent in the following Diſcourſe. But before I do that, give me leave to premiſe a few things, which tend to the clearing of the Matters in queſtion.

1. That we only ſuppoſe this inability for the preſent, to ſatisfie the curioſity of the World, which never think their *teliſcope* long enough, to ſee to the utmoſt end of Intereſt. For we ſhall afterwards make it apparent, that we neither are as yet come to that extremity (through Gods mercy) nor need to fear we ſhall be reduced to it, if we be not awanting to our ſelves.

2. It is above all to be underſtood, that this reſolution is abſolute for Self-defence, and conditional only for Reſignation. It is an approved maxim which every wiſe man lives by, *Alterius ne ſis, ſi tuus eſſe poſſis*, which holds good in Societies, whether leſſer of Families, or greater of Cities, and Provinces, as well as private perſons. If any can be free, it is folly to think, they will be ſubject to another.

3. This reſolution being conditional, upon the ſuppoſal of evident inability to defend our ſelves, it is not to be imagined, that it ſhould take place upon every Danger or Alarm of War, eſpecially ſo long as *Holland* and *Freeſland* are able to defend themſelves: States as well as Perſons, may be dangerouſly ſick, and yet recover. Differences may be accommodated with our Enemies, or aſſiſtance may be afforded us from our Friends; the Scene of War may change, the Water and Weather may be our Walls of Defence, Difficulties, Diſſentions, and Diſtractions, may befal our Enemies: One thing or other may fall out ſo far to our advantage, that we may retrench our ſelves in ſafety, though we ſhould not recover our former Greatneſs.

4. Nor can it reaſonably be thought, that any will give themſelves over to another, ſo as to part with their Religious and Civil Intereſts, and be in no better a capacity then a conquered people; who though they are not made abſolute ſlaves, yet are uſually ſore oppreſt by the Conqueror. But onely to part with their *Supremacy*, and the Appendixes thereunto, under which they may live as free Proteſtant Subjects.

If any object this is not practicable, in regard of the Treaty betwixt the two Crowns of *England* and *France*.

I anſwer. 1. Who knows that, except a few of their Cabinet Counſel? 2. This ſuppoſes that they have divided the Lions Skin before he be ſlain, which to me is very doubtful. For although two ſuch mighty Potentates, might upon rational grounds, think themſelves able to maſter this Commonwealth, before they begin the War; yet ſo many are the un-

unexpected accidents, and the events of War so doubtfull, that few have bene knowne to divide the ſpoile, before they had won the battell, or the Country before they had triumphed in the War: leſt they being fruſtrated of their hoped ſucces, ſhould becom a ſcorne and contempt to the world. We have ſufficient reaſon to thinke, that neither *England* will permit *France*, nor *France England*, to have theſe Countries entirely; and can we then thinke that they ſhould agree upon this before hand? if others will ghues, I have the ſame liberty; whereby I thinke that when time (which is the reveaſer of ſecrets) brings the Treaty to light; it will appeare that the *French* ſhould hold us in by Land, and the *Engliſh* by Sea, till they had brought us to their owne termes; of *France* keeping ſuch places aboye as may be thought moſt conducible, to the inlarging his Conqueſts and keeping us under, and *England* by Sea, as may ſecure his deſired Trade, and Navall expences; and that neither of them ſhould have theſe Maritime Provinces entirely (for that was for the one to make the other his Maſter, and abſolute Soveraigne at Sea, by ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength) nor yet divided; for that would be a continuall bone of contention betwixt them.

3. Thoſe that ſuppoſe this repertition, generally ſay, that *Zeeland* is to be *Engliſh*; and if ſo, the objection is anſwered. For if each muſt conquer their part by their owne Armes, as many imagine; who can thinke that any will be at the expence of ſo much blood and treaſure, beſides the hazard of ſucces, for that which they can have upon honourable termes?

Or if they proceed joyntly with their Armes, to obtaine their deſignes; we cannot thinke the one will obſtruct the other, in that which is agreed upon by them both. And this way I ſuppoſe they take; becauſe in a joynt War the ſucces is common to both, and the advantage redounds to each according to their former accord; and was it otherwiſe here, *England* attacquing us onely by Sea, might get nothing by Land, and *France* all. Which I cannot imagine to be ſo agreed upon, whatſoever the iſſue may be. For I cannot thinke the *Engliſh* ſuch fooles to fight onely for blowes, and to ſet up the *French* to their owne deſtruction.

But let their agreement be what it will for the places they conquer, yet it cannot bind or determine us how to diſpoſe of our ſelves before we are conquered. All free States, and Cities, may upon what conditions they pleaſe, yeeld the Soverainty over them, and their owne ſubjection to whom they pleaſe. And allthough ſuch proffers have ſometimes been refuſed, in regard of Wars and other evill conſequences which might attend them; yet here the acceptance is not to be doubted of, ſeeing this is the *Helena* for which they fight. *v. Grot. de Jure bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 3. §. 8. l. 2. c. 6. & l. 3 c. 20. §. 5.*

If any ſhall ask how this is to be effected.

I anſwer, *Non eſt deliberandum de modo, priuſquam conſtat de re.* If any grant that it is to be done, it is as much as I undertake. If God in his all-wiſe and righteous Providence, ſuffer us to be brought ſo low, that we cannot longer withſtand our enemies: let thoſe in ſupreme authority take

care for the manner of performance, as to the time in which, treating whereby, and conditions whereupon they will yield their *Supremacy* and *Government*. It being my work only to shew, that it is our Interest in such a case, to make choice of *England* rather then *France*, or any other Potentate whatsoever.

Sect. 2. *Arguments to prove the Hypothesis, the first whereof is from our Religious Concernments; wherein is shewn how great a support Religion is to a State, and how greatly it concerns us to secure our Religion.*

HAving now truly related Matter of Fact, and clearly stated the Question, I shall proceed to prove the same, *viz. That in case of inability to defend our selves, it is our Interest to be under the English rather than the French.*

First in regard of Religion. Which as it is of cheifest concernment, so deserves to have the precedence of all other considerations. The very Heathens accounted this their cheif Interest, and therefore above all to be secured and defended. The *Romans* saying was *Pro aris & focis*, therein giving Religion, the preference of all their civil concernments. And if we Christians do not, the more is our sin, and the greater our shame. It is so well known how the Heathens of old, and Turks of later times have valued their several false Religions; how their first Founders, Legislators, and Magistrates have made Religion, both the Basis upon which they founded their Kingdoms and Commonwealths, and the cheif Pillars to support them; and how zealous the common people have been for their Superstitions: That I cannot but wonder that *Christians* should be such *Gallios* for the true Religion and Gospel of Christ, and fear that *Turks* and *Heathens* will rise up in judgment against us, and condemn us for our indifferency herein. But if examples would either sway us, or shame us, I need not go so far for them, our own Ancestors are abundantly sufficient. I am sure (if the History of former times deceive me not) Religion was the cheif inducement to them, to begin that hazardous War with *Spain*. And had such an impression upon them, that they freely ventured their lives and estates for this especially; although I know there were many other grievances insisted on, to justifie that War. Had they thought that their Posterity should have made so light of Religion and Liberty, which cost them so dear (as many we see in those places over, who have so lightly parted with both in a great measure,) I perswade my self they would never have commenced such a War; but the sincerer part of them would have fled with their Families abroad, rather then have endured those miseries at home. Could they now stand up out of their Graves, how would they condemn this unfaithful generation! And how will our Children have occasion to curse us, for betraying the trust reposed in us by our Ancestors,

and

and selling the pretious Truths of Religion at so cheape a rate, which they bought so deare.

If the true Religion which we profes, be not the Polar Star, by which those that sit at the Helme steere the Ship of the Common-wealth, what can we expect, except we be Atheists, and shut out God and his safeguard, but to suffer ship-wrack? Nay if this be not the Pearle of price to us all, which we prefer above all worldly pebles, it will be no wonder, if our enimies spoile us both of this and them. If any be of another judgement, and prefer the *Reason of State* above Religion (although in this case they are conjoyned, as I shal shew hereafter) I wish such would observe from *Lewis* the 11, who first opened the pack of fraudulent polices to the Princes of *Europe*; what dismall ends have befallen him, and the Atheistical Politicians since, those of *Italy* especially; and what disappointments their designs have met withall, and see if they have any reason to treade in their steps. I am jealous (I confesse) that the atheisme and irreligion of the present age is great, which makes me larger herein then otherwise I should be: yet I hope not so great amongst us, that we should prefer Popish superstition before the true reformed Religion, *Belial* before *Christ*: If so, we are fitter to be our enemies asses, to be laden with their trumperies, and lasht at their pleasure, than to be dealt withall by arguments to convince our Consciences.

Serres. in Lewis 11. Bussieres. Hist. Fra. l. 13. §. 9. & 24. Comin. l. 6, c. 7. & 12. Anti-Machiavel, &c.

If we duly consider that true Religion is 1. The Fountaine of all true Piety and Vertue here, and of eternall Felicity hereafter. 2. That which rightly teaches every one their duty, not onely in reference to their particular practise, but publique concerns, Magistrates how to governe, and people how to obey. 3. That which furnisheth us with the strongest Arguments, for mutuall affection and assistance to one another, courage in dangers, hope in extremities, patience in adversitie, and perseverance in our duty. And 4. That which onely can assure a people of Gods favour and being propitious to them, and the contempt thereof on the contrary, of his displeasure and malediction; We must needs conclude, that the Magistrate in the first place as Gods Vice-gerent in Governement, and all others in their severall stations, ought to endeavour above all things by all lawfull means to preserve, defend, and secure the same; as they tender the honour of God, the welfare of his Church, the prosperity of the Commonwealth, and their own and Posterities temporall and eternall happines. I shall not need to enlarge these things, in regard they are so well knowne, and approvedly verified by so many examples, out of Sacred and profane Histories: and none that I know have ever had the impudence to deny them in *Thesi*, though they dispute in *Hypothesi* which is the true Religion. Even *Machiavel*, as wicked as his writings are in many things, yet asserts (as a Politician) that true Religion must above all things be regarded by those that desire to preserve themselves, and that there is no *certius indicium de rerip. ruina* than the contempt of Religion.

Disp. de Rep. l. 1. c. 12.

And for fuller conviction let me ad, that tis not onely an acknowledged truth, but that which all ages of the Word have experienced, *that Religion is the greatest bond and tye of humane society*, and therefore must needs be the maine pillar of support to a State, and the best walls of defence to a people. Hoping therefore what is said in the generall to be sufficient, I shall now descend to particulars briefly.

And herein it is well known, that the *English* and we (I speak of the generality of both Nations, Rulers and people) symbolise; being both of the Reformed Religion. Whereas the *French* are for the greatest part Papists, to be sure all in power whether civill or military: it being the practise now of *France*, to imploy none but such in the management of affaires; so that if we be either Governed or Garrisoned by the *French*, we cannot expect to be so by any, but Papists and professed enemies of our Religion.

But something here will be pleaded for the *French*, and something allso objected against the *English*.

Sect. 3. *The plea of France's granting us the liberty of our Religion considered.*

FIrst for the *French* it may be argued, that the King will grant us the liberty of our Religion.

To which I reply by way of concession, that I verily believe he will; but desire it may be further considered.

1. If he grants this liberty according to the custome of *France*, it will be onely to those of the reformed Religion. Now besides these, there are many others amongst us, Iews, Lutherans, Anabaptists, &c. The common-wealth consisting both of several sorts of people, and severall sorts of Religions: and what shall become of those, which the common-wealth tollerates, though not of the professed Religion of the Land?

2. But let it be further supposed, that provision be made for the liberty of those allso that dissent from the reformed Religion, or for all, and that by Articles, Edicts, or whatsoever way you please: yet we know how slightly these are usually observed, by those that have the execution of them, and how litle Governors and Soldjers regard these. For they well know, that most cannot, many dare not, others will not complaine of them; and if any doe, it will be a wearisome worke, and the remedy many times worse than the disease. So that a patient suffering is the onely solace to the sufferer and oppressed.

3. I might add, that it is a maxim with many Papists (although not all I confes *) *that no faith is to be kept with heretieks*. Now all Papists accounting us such, if those that Governe be of that perswasion; how litle account will they make of what conditions soever are made with us; but as occa-

* *Molanus de fide hæreticis servanda.*

occasion serves, if they dare not openly breake, yet will they secretly evade, all such as serve for our support, and thinke they doe God good service. As allso their tenet of the Popes power of dispensation with all oathes, Articles, Promises and obligations though never so solemn and sacred: or if you please (for it is all one) a power to abrogate Gods laws, nul all the faith and bonds of man-kind, subvert all humaine Society, and in short *ex injustitia facere Justitiam* as the *Canonists* tell us. Now suppose we have Governors that measures consciences by ells rather than inches; who matters no more engagements dispensed with by his *Holines*, than we doe our Almanacks out of date. I should be glad to be informed what we could doe in the case, more then cry and complaine to God Allmighty. For I doubt they will seldome doe that, which *Maximilian* the first did frequently, *Deus aterne, nisi vigilares, quàm malè esse mundo, quem regimus nos ego miser venator, & ebriosus ille ac sceleratus Julius*! Nay if Governors thinke themselves obliged in conscience and honour to keepe conditions; yet it is well known how generally they are influenced by their Clergy: so that in all dubious cases, and the application of generall rules to particular practises, it cannot be expected but judgement should be given on the Papists side, and that the Grandees of the Church should beare them out in it, and *Jesuits* and others Zelots applaude their practises.

De transl. Episcop. c. quanto in glossa.

Morn. Myster. Iniquit.

4. The Papists must have publique places for their Worship, not only in all Cities but Villages, as we may see in the Articles propounded by the *French*. Now there being by far too few *Churches* or places for publique Worship, in most of our populous and enlarged Cities allready; it will not be possible for a great part of our Religion, to enjoy the publique Ordinances of God; but many will run into profane courses, most grow ignorant and careles what Religion they are of, and their posterity absolute *Papists*. By which meanes the number of the Reformed decreasing, and Papists increasing; where at first there was but onely one *Church* for popery; they shall then take more, and so continue to inlarge themselves and straten us. Nor let any judge these, as onely jealousies and feares. For if they begin allready to incroach (as it is credibly reported from severall places they command) and breake Articles heerein, when not onely the commands of superiors, but common policy requires a most religious observance thereof; what shall we thinke they will doe hereafter? If they will not now out of hopes to win those to them, which yet stand out: much les will they, when there is no more hope of gaining thereby.

5. When popery is the Religion of our Governors, who have the disposall of preferments and profits, to allure men to their Religion: We shall find by wofull experience, what by education, converse, marriages, dignities and other worthy advantages; many of the ignoranter and looser sort of Protestants, will change their profession (I say not Religion for that such never had) and turne Papists. Who is such a stranger in the world as knowes not, that by such artifices they have more weakened the Protestants

teſtants in *France*, then by all their wars and conteſts with them. In ſo much that of late yeares, ſome wiſe men of the Reformed Religion there, have bene ſo fearfull of its being utterly ſupplanted; that they have required their children by their laſt will and Teſtament, to leave that Kingdome, and ſetle themſelves in theſe Countries.

6. Let the beſt be ſuppoſed that any rationall man can imagine, yet will it be bad enough. For if the Papiſts have the Civill power to back them, allthough the wiſer and better ſort, it is not to be doubted will be civill; yet the the ruder ſort will be intollerably inſolent. And this begins to appear in ſome places allready, where the Popiſh Inhabitants are more inſufferably inſulting, ſpightfull, and injurious than the *French* themſelves. And if they doe this ſo early while things are doubtfull, and the iſſue of the War dubious; what may we expect when they are in their high Meridian of ſucces and glory?

7. And laſtly, if any one thinkes that theſe are onely needles feares and groundles ſurmiſes, I ſhall deſire them to peruſe the *French* Embaſſadors Speech to the Emperors Council, where he will find this Argument of Religion inſiſted on to divert the Emperor from our aſſiſtance (which is well retorted by the ingenious Anſwerer thereof.) And inform themſelves how faſt the Jeſuits and other Zealots for the Romiſh Religion, fall off from the Houſe of *Auſtria* and *Spaine*, to *France*; in regard of their inability to carry on their deſigns of the Univerſall Popiſh Monarchy, and the hopes they have of *France*'s potency to effect it. And then let them judge, if there be not ſufficient ground, for all that I have ſaid, and much more that might be ſaid upon this Subject.

Gremonville.

Sect. 4: *Objections from the danger of loſing our Religion under England; from the Kings being a Papiſt, deſigning to ſet up Popery; the increaſe, countenance, and tolleration of Papiſts, as alſo from his joyning with France againſt us, and Church Government by Biſhops, all anſwered.*

BUt now on the other hand it is by ſome objected againſt the *Engliſh*.

1. That the King is a Papiſt in heart, and deſignes to ſet up the Popiſh Religion.

Firſt what the King is in his heart, and what he deſignes, is onely knowne to God Almighty, who is the ſearcher of hearts. That he is a profeſt proteſtant, is well knowne. And allthough I will not ſweare for him nor any man alive, that he will not change his Religion; yet to me it ſeems very improbable, upon the following grounds.

1. He that would not in his minority, when under his Mothers educa-
K. Charles tion in *France*, but followed his Fathers inſtructions, of *being obedient to her*
I. Letters. *in all things, excepting the matter of her Religion*; I cannot thinke will now in his maturity.

2. His

2. His withstanding so many temptations wherewith he was environed so long a time together, during those many years of his exile; wherein neither the friendship of Papists, nor unkindness and hard measure he met withal from Protestants could move him; makes me think him much more immovable, now he is free from those. Who that knows those times, knows not what designs the Papists had upon him? What Perswasions and Arguments they used both by word and writing? What Promises they made him of assistance to recover his Kingdoms? What Arguments of Interest they prest him with, which are usually more prevalent with Princes, than the intrinsick Arguments of Religion? And if he stood unshaken in all those boysterous blasts, shall we thinke he will fall in a calme? *Militere's Victory of the Truth, and Bp. Bramhalls Answer.*

3. His rescuing his youngest Brother the *Duke of Glocester* out of his Mothers hands, when her designes appeared for perverting him in his Religion; is an evident proofe of the realty of his Profession. If any one say it was his Interest for regaining his Kingdoms. I say.

4. And is it not his Interest also for keeping them? Did he gaine them so quickly, or are his three Kingdoms so little worth, that he should easily hazard them? Kings are wiser then to venture their Crownes upon every idle Priests pratles. If there were any stronger Arguments now then formerly, either for the Popish Religion, or from his Interest; we had some reason to be jealous that he might change.

But 5. It is apparently against his Interest, not onely in regard of the danger he might incur of losing his Crownes, but the great loss which would inevitably accrew to him by this change.

The danger we cannot imagine to be small, if we rightly consider those Kingdoms. I have had an accompt (having been a little curious in those enquiries) of 1100000 of his Subjects, that by Interest and Inclination were carried counter to the Court. Under these five Heads. 1. The Purchasers of *Crowne* and *Church Lands* that are now restored, and they outed. 2. Soldiers and Seamen, that had fought against him by Sea and Land. 3. Magistrates and Ministers, that were removed and turned out of their places. 4. Commonwealths Men that were Anti-monarchicall in their judgments. 5. Fanaticks properly so called, as Anabaptists, Fifth Monarchy Men, Quakers, &c. And though I could perhaps give as good a guess as another, at the rest of the Substantiall Protestants that are of the Episcopall perswasion, yet that needs not now. These you must thinke, however divided in their Interests, Judgments, and Affections; and many of them, no doubt very Loyal to his Majesty; yet without all doubt would joyne against Popery, and never willingly submit themselves to that yoke of bondage. Nay, some perhaps would be glad of such an Argument, and Plea to the people, and the Demagogues gaine thereby no small number of Proselytes to their Party, if his Majesty was once a declared Papist.

And as his danger, you see is great, so his loss I am sure could not be small.

ſmall. 1. Of his *Honour*, not onely in changing that Religion he hath now ſo long profeſt, and blurring the faire copy which his Father hath ſet him; but in admitting the Popes Supremacy: which hath beene ſo Injurious to the dignities of Emperors, Kings, and Princes; that their complaints how they have beene plagued by the Popes are infinite. 2. Of his profit and revenues, in regard that the *Peter-pence* or Tenths of Livings, and other Contributions paid formerly to the Pope, are by Law annexed to the Crowne, and paid accordingly, to the King. 3. Of his Subjects affections, wherein his ſafety eſpecially conſiſts. For a Prince that hath the hearts of his people, hath their purſes and perſons at his ſervice; and raignes more happily by their love, then all his owne power though never ſo great. If we therefore conſider his education in, and his long profeſſion of the proteſtant Religion, his honour and intreſt ingaging him to perſevere therein: I ſhould thinke no man need feare his changing it for the Popiſh, the ſopperies whereof he hath ſo fully both ſeen and knowne.

Vid. Bodin de Rep. l. 1: c. 9.

I might ad to theſe, that which further ſatisfies me, that having been at *Bruxels*, *Colen*, and moſt of thoſe places, where his Majeſty during his exile did reſide; I can ſay *bona fide* that in all the variety of companies and converſe I was ever in, I never heard any probable grounds, from any one intelligent perſon, that toucht, much les ſtain'd his Majeſties reputation in this particular. But I will not impoſe this upon others, though it moves me to ſay the more, becauſe I am not willing to annex my name to what I have written. Not that I am aſhamed to owne what I conceive to be the reall truth, which I have publiſhed in this treatiſe to the world, and can make good much more largely: but becauſe I know who I am, and that my name can ad no eſtimation to this politicall diſcourſe; but rather perhaps prejudice ſome who knowes me not, and are uſed to judge of writings by their authors; whereas thoſe that will impartially ſearch after truth, muſt have regard to *things*, not *perſons*, and to what is written, and not the writers thereof.

As for his ſetting up popery, I neither thinke that he will, for the foregoing reaſons; nor if he would, that he can, for theſe following eſpecially.

1. The Proteſtant Religion is ſetled in all his Kingdomes by their fundamentall lawes, which the King cannot repeale. It is true he hath the executive power of the lawes, and ſo can ſuſpend the execution of penalties; but cannot reſcind any one law, much leſſe make new ones, without the conſent of Parliament in his reſpective Kingdomes. And abſolute Soveraingty is not there in uſe. For power paramount to all lawes, carries too great a top-ſaile for an *Engliſh* bottom; wherein the Subjects liberties are ſhipt, as well as *Cæſar and his fortunes*.

2. The lands and revenues formerly ſupporting the Romiſh Religion, which are many and great, are in the poſſeſſion of the nobility and gentry for the moſt part; and have beene bought by them of the Crowne at the diſſo-

diſſolution of Abbies, Monaſteries, &c. And the purchaſes confirmed by law. And can we thinke that they will be ever induced to part with them againe? or enact any ſuch lawes as ſhall tend to their owne ruine, and the utter undoing of their families? If there was ſo much danger and difficulty to wreſt them out of the hands of the poore Votaries, (as the Hiſtories of thoſe times tell us) What will there be to recover them from the powerfull Nobility and Gentry? who legally poſſeſſing them will doubtleſs defend them, ſo that none ſhall deprive them thereof, that have not better courage and ſharper Swords then they.

3. The great diſparity in the number of Proteſtants and Papiſts. There being not one family of a hundred in *England* and *Scotland* Popiſh, and in many and great Pariſhes not a Papiſt. Now what greater madneſs can we imagine, than that his Majeſty ſhould adventure to rely upon the Papiſts alone, againſt all the Proteſtants of the three Nations. Though their numbers are greater then formerly, yet are they comparatively ſmall (as we have ſaid) to thoſe that profes the Reformed Religion. So that it can never enter into my braine, that ſuch folly ſhould enter into any Princes breſt, much les one who hath ſuffered ſo much, by the former diviſions of his Kingdoms.

4. The vaſt difference between a people enlightned by the Goſpel, and well grounded in their Religion, and an ignorant and unprincipled people. For the generality of the common people brought up in ignorance, (as they uſually are under Popery) are more ſubject to receive impreſſions from their Teachers, and ſo by degrees change their Profeſſion. Whereas thoſe who are aſſured from the Word of God, that they are in the right; will by no means be induced to the ſame. And uſually the more force is uſed, the more obſtinate they are. For a ſetled Conſcience deſpiſes dainger, and defies all the terrors and torments, that their cruelleſt adverſaries can invent. If in leſſer differences of Church-government, the King hath found it ſo difficult, that after all the coercive Lawes, and other meanes he hath uſed, he tells the world, *'tis evident by the ſad experience of twelve yeares, that there is very little fruit of all thoſe forceable courſes*; what ſhall we think he is likely to gain in the greater and eſſential differences of Religion ſhould he attempt any change therein? Surely not much from the Pious and ſober party of Proteſtants; for I neither matter nor mention the ruder ſort, and ignorant rable. Nay univerſall experience hath taught the World, that where any kind of Religion is powerfull, all force againſt it is weake and contemptible: and much more againſt the true Reformed Religion; as that wiſe and excellent Hiſtorian *Thuanus* ſhewes in the Preface to his Hiſtory, which is one of thoſe three admirable Dedications, to the Crown of *France*, that are worthy to be read by all the Kings and Princes of Europe. Declar. *March* 15. 1672. The other two are *Calv.* to his Inſtit. & *Cauſabon* to *Polybius*.

I might add to theſe, the genious of the *Engliſh* Nation, which I know to be zealous in what way of Religion ſoever they take, as hath been obſerved by ſeverall Authors. In times of Popery ſo addicted thereto, that they had

Anno 7 Edv. 1. 18 Edv. 3. 15 Rich. 2. given most of their means to the Church, if the Statute of *Mortmaine* had not prohibited them. In the times of Libertinisme when a Republick, the Fanaticks were so intoxicated, that it was not enough for them to push down the Pope, but they would break off all Government, for being his hornes, and make every thing Antichristian that was not to their humor. *Polydor. Virgil. l. 17.* When the King return'd and Episcopacy with him, that Party would not abate the three controverted Ceremonies (as a wise and moderate Bishop both foretold and lamented) for the universal Peace of the three Kingdoms. Nay the very common rable would overflow both in drinke and devotion; kneel at a pillar, and reele at a Post. Though I know there are as pious, sober, and serious Christians of severall perswasions (Episcopall Presbyterial and Independants) as any are in the Christian World: but I say this to shew, that what way soever they take, they are not easily diverted.

Surplice, Cros, and kneeling at St. *Brownrig.*

But as groundless jealousie, is both uncharitableness and tolly; so where there is just ground; not to be jealous is stupidity. It may therefore not be amiss for our further satisfaction, to enquire into these Objectors grounds. And they are these, 1. The increase of Papists, at Court especially. 2. The Kings countenancing and intrusting them with power. 3. His tollerating their Religion. 4. Joyning with *France* against us.

For the 1 and 2d I can say little of my own knowledge, it being many yeares since I saw either *England* or *France*. But I shall take reports u. on the publique faith of *England* and *Holland* for this once, though it be none of the best security. 1. Therefore that Papists increase, through the Queens Court, the extraordinary correspondence with *France*, the dissentions of the Protestants, the Atheisme and irreligion of the Age, and other wayes and meanes which might be mentioned, is not to be wondred at: but rather that there are no more. Allthough I am well assured, that their number is comparatively small, and their Intrest in *England* and *Scotland* inconsiderable to effect any change. And were they more, this will not infer the King is one.

2. And much les his countenancing and intrusting them. For who ever concluded that the *French* Kings for their kindnes to Protestants, (who have served them most faithfully heretofore in their wars) were Protestants? Or the States Papists, for employing the *French* and others in their Armies? A Papist may be a loyall subject, a wise Statesman, a fit Embassador, a good Soldjer, and merit his Princes favor, though of a different Religion.

3. Nor will the Kings indulgence of liberty to those of that Religion conclude more against our assertion, then for the States of *Hollands* being of all the Religions they tollerate, or for *Amsterdam's* being Jewes. There may be reasons of State, sometimes to connive, and sometimes to tollerate that, which we neither approve, nor would willingly allow: even as *Moses* did divorce to the Jewes. Or there may be Articles, promises and other engagements upon us, whereby we are forced to do that, which we would not if free: as *Joshua* to the *Gibeonites*; and our Ancestors

to

to Papists, Anabaptists, &c. who assisted them in the defence of the Countrey against *Spaine*.

There are two things doe wonders in the world, and are the ordinary pretexts and best apologies for the greatest exorbitances, viz: *danger and necessity*. And yet where these are reall and not feigned, they are considered both by God and good men. Nature dictates, that we should hazard the hand rather then the head, and lose a part, rather then venture the whole. I have for above 20 years observed, both where I have lived, and where I have travelled; that *Moderation* is rather a speculative notion, than matter of practise: like a vertuous and beautifull poor Lady, that all will commend, but none will marry. Parties that are under, call for it eagerly; but when they are upmost, neglect it shamefully. Seeing then the passions of men, and iniquities of the age are so great, that I expect nothing in Religion, but either an *inquisition* or *tolleration*; I am more for the latter, and would rather reside at *Amsterdam* or *Constantinople*, then at *Rome* or *Madrid*.

v. Grot. de Jure bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 4. §. 7. l. 2. c. 2. §. 6.

But to come closer to the particular case. If his Majesty therefore had no obligation upon him to do this, or were it a liberty to Papists only, or a liberty for their worship in publick; I should grant the objection was very weighty; but it is the quite contrary. For he tells the world he was obliged in point of gratitude to the Papists, for their service to his Father; and to the Presbyterians (who had been so instrumentall in his restoration) in point of promise allso, severall wayes made to them both before and after his returne to his Crowne; severall times declaring that he would grant indulgence to them and others of tender consciences. And we know that if his Majesty had followed his own inclinations, they had been better performed. And now that he gives a concession of liberty, it is neither soly nor principally to those of the Romish Religion, but to all others as well as they, and that with this manifest difference, that it is to the *Protestants publiquely, and to Papists in their private houses onely*, and this revocable at pleasure. All though some wise men are of opinion, that the King and Rulers will not onely find such ease and safety therein; but such eminent advantages many wayes, and the people generally such content, that it will scarce be revoked.

Declar. March 15. 1672.

4. His joyning with *France* against us, is matter of *Intrest*, and not *Religion*. And if we judge impartially, will no more conclude him a Papist, then the *Emperor* and King of *Spaine* Protestants because they joyne with us. Herein let us eye and owne the Providence of God, who changes times and seasons, and makes friends become enimies, and enimies Friends. Would not this have been thought incredible to our Ancestors, that *France* and *England* who raised us, should endeavour our ruine? And that *Spaine* and *Austria* who sought our destruction, should ever seek our preservation? And all this out of Intrest, (as I shall shew hereafter) those formerly to ballance *Spaine's*, and these now *France's* greatnes; and neither Religion or affection. For whosoever thinkes that *Spaine* and *Austria* have any kindnes

for us more than themselves, hath a faith far larger than my fancy.

There is another Objection against our closing with *England* for Religions-sake, from their *Episcopall Church-Government*; which if it were not mentioned by some to the prejudice of my assertion, I should have passed over as inconsiderable. For.

1. This is onely an accidentall difference in the same Religion, and not a different kinde of Religion, as Popery is. And a difference in the externall forme of Government onely; not in the substantialls and vitalls of Religion. For we both agree in the same Confession of Faith, and in all the essentialls of the Reformed Religion.

2. A very great part of the King of *England*'s Subjects are Presbyterians, as is well knowne.

3. Although Episcopacy be the Church Government, setled by Law in the three Kingdoms, yet his Majesty indulges publique liberty to Presbyterians, and other Non-conformists. So that we need not doubt but he will much more to us, that Church Government which is setled amongst us.

4. *New-England*, and several other Plantations belonging to his Majesty of great *Brittaine*, have allwayes enjoyed, and still do their own Church-Governement freely; and therefore we need not feare that ours should be denied us.

5. Although the Church Governement of these Provinces be Presbyterian, yet as to its vitall power and administration in severall places, it hath for sundry yeares last past rather been *Erastian*. The Magistrates frequently assuming that power here, which the Bishops do there. In so much that I question whether the Presbyterians may not have more hopes, that their discipline should be raised; then feares that it should be ruined under *England*. What crying up the Magistrates power *circa sacra*, and what decrying the Ministers, both by word and writing. *Antistius* tells us in the frontispece of his booke, that whatever right divine or humane is attributed to the Ministers or they assume to themselves, is either falsely and impiously ascribed to them, or is onely from the Rulers of the Republique or city where they are setled. What applauding of *Hobs's Leviathan*, now translated into *Latin* and *Dutch*. What frequent interposing in Ecclesiasticall affaires, and how miserably the honest Minister in the *Hague* was handled, may be seen in *Aitzema*. Many were afraid of a storme falling upon the Ministers, if our enemies had not faln upon us. What crossing the Churches in the Election of their Pastors, and exercise of their Governement hath been at *Rotterdam*, and other places, is too well knowne, and being reformed, I wish whats past might be buried in oblivion. And thus I have vindicated my first Argument from *Religion*, and shall endeavour to compensate my prolixity heerein, with more brevity in the rest. Concluding, that if we cannot defend the true reformed Religion we profes, nor will not secure it the best we can, we may call our Country *Ichabod*, for the glory is departed from these *Netherlands*.

Grallæ, contra Apollodium 1646. *Lucii Antistii de Jure Ecclesiasticor. l.* 1665. Politike discourse l. 4. over Kerkelike Saaken.

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Sect. 5. *The ſecond Argument taken from Liberty. Wherein the diffſerent kinds, and degrees of Liberty under all ſorts of Government, are declared; and the probability of our enjoying greater freedome under England than France, argued.*

IT will further appeare our intereſt, to be under *England* rather than *France*, in regard of our *Liberty*. Which next to true Religion and life, is the greateſt bleſſing beſtowed on man-kind. Now for our clearer proceeding herein, we muſt 1. Shew what kind of Liberty is here meant. 2. Wherein it conſiſts, and the meaſures thereof. 3. Accommodate theſe to the matter in hand.

For the firſt. We meane not here *Perſonall Liberty*: either morally conſidered in oppoſition to *coaction*; or *civilly*; either in oppoſition to *confinement*, as we uſually take it; or to ſlavery, as the *Civilians*. 2. Nor *Civil Liberty*, as oppoſed to *Monarchie*; as the Greeke and Latin Hiſtorians frequently: with which *Tacitus* begins his Annals, *Urbem Romam à Principio Reges habuere, libertatem & conſulatum L. Brutus inſtituit.* For I well know, that to whomſoever we ſubmit, this liberty is loſt. Much leſs 3. For *Licentiouſneſs*. For ſubjection to Lawes and Government, is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with liberty; that it is the onely means of its preſervation. For without this; what are Kingdoms and States, but great *butcheries of men, and publick robberies of propriety*, where the ſtrongeſt arme and longeſt ſword ſweeps away all? So boundleſs is mans villany, and his luſts ſo ragingly reſtleſs: that we have no other choyce left us, but either be ſubject to Law, or ſlaves to licentiouſneſs. As *Tully* ſayes well, *Legum idcirco omnes ſervi ſumus, ut liberi eſſe poſſimus.* But 4. That *publick liberty* which a people have under their Government, (of what kind ſoever it is) as it is taken in oppoſition to *publick oppreſſion*. Which is of divers ſorts, and different degrees, in regard of our perſons, priviledges, and proprieties. When a people are neither oppreſſed by uſurpation, without colour of Law; nor by extortion, under pretext thereof. Which is an invaluable mercy to thoſe that injoy it: though rightly valued by few, except thoſe that want it. And hath been ſo highly praiſed by all ſorts of writers: that it is better to be ſilent, then briefe in its commendations.

Inſtitut. l. 1. tit. 3.

Pro Cluent.

Now Secondly wherein this conſiſts, and how to meaſure the ſame, is harder to diſcover and determine; in regard we can meet with no guides, that have gone this way. For the Civil Law, which is copious concerning all other Dominions, is ſilent in this of *Soveraignty*; and being calculated for the Meridian of *Monarchs*, leaves them free to make their Subjects ſo, more or leſs at their pleaſure. Hiſtorians onely relate what freedom ſuch and ſuch people had under ſuch and ſuch Rulers: and the Writers of Policy, and particular Republicks, compare the peoples liberty under the ſeveral forms of Government, and commend this or that State for the ſame. And theſe are all the helps we have: which are in the next degree to nothing.

We

We will therefore paſs them all by, and freely follow our own judgment; in ſhewing joyntly both the nature of liberty, and the meaſures thereof. But we muſt neceſſarily here premiſe.

1. That though all ought to pay the homage of ſubjection, to that lawful government under which they live; yet none ought ſo to be wedded to any forme, as to think the ſubjects of all others not free. Which *Ariſtotle* long ſince obſerved, to be the vulgar error in Democracy. For though it well becomes a vertuous Wife, to eſteem her own Husband, the beſt head ſhe can have; and accordingly to be guided by him: yet if ſhe will cenſure all other Wives, for meer ſlaves; all her neighbours round about her, will ring her a peale of indignation.

Politic. l. 6. c. 2.

V. Arniſæus de rep. l. 2. c. 7. §. 2. n. 75.

2. That the beſt way to judge of peoples liberty is by conſidering it in reference to Soveraignty. For all ſubjection and government being relatives; and Subjects liberty conſiſting, in ſuch a manner of ſubjection to the Supreme Powers, as is free and not ſlaviſh; the one is eaſily knowne by the other. So that if we duly conſider Supremacy, we may diſcerne, whether the Subjects be free or no by the manner, and the degrees of their freedom, by the meaſure of their ſubjection.

3. That we muſt diſtinguiſh between *actual liberty*, or freedom from oppreſſion; and *legal liberty* by conſtitution. For freedom may be conſidered either in regard of morall power, or government which is the exerciſe thereof; and that both ſeverally, and joyntly. For a people free by Law, may be oppreſſed by their Rulers; and a people not legally free, may be actually ſo by their Governors grace. So that actuall liberty alone, is onely under abſolute Powers, legal under limited and mixed, and both under Governments which proceed regularly, in the Sphere of Power wherein they are placed, and are not planetary in their motions. Having premiſed theſe things; we ſhall now proceed to lay down certain rules, whereby every vulgar capacity may judge, of the nature of liberty and the degrees thereof, under any kind of Soveraignty whatſoever. Whether it reſide in a ſingle perſon, or in a plurality; either abſolute, or limited in regard of its meaſure; or for the manner ſimple or mixed; either of two or three eſtates, equally or unequally, and from whatever priority or predominant part denominated, Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, or Democracy, according to the conſtitution of every Nation.

And the general rule is this. *The greater power in the Soveraignty, the leſſer liberty in the Subjects; and the leſſe power in the Soveraignty, the more liberty in the Subjects.* It is not my preſent work to determine, whether of theſe is better for the whole. The Politicians pens have ſufficiently ventilated that queſtion; uſually aſcribing more ſtrength and ſtability to the former, and more common proſperity to the latter; though often concluding, either through favour or fear and flattery, that that Government under which they live, deſerves above all to weare the garland I ſhall therefore onely ſay this, that ſeeing extreames are alwayes dangerous; a golden meane is that

that, which makes a golden age, both to Soveraigns and Subjects.

Now although I judge this rule alone, sufficient for our present purpose; yet in regard some perhaps, may be pleased with so large a prospect, as the liberty of all Nations in all ages of the world; we shall take a fuller view thereof; and the rather, because it will be of use to us hereafter, not onely in this but the following Sections. And for this end will begin at the bottom, that so ascending by degrees, we may behold both it and them the better.

1. A people under *absolute power*, are not truly and legally free, but onely permissively and precariously. Because their liberty is not from Law, but onely founded in their Governors favor. So that they are liable to all oppression, although they are sometimes as actually free, and little oppressed, as those that live under other Governments.

And this liberty, as to the certainty thereof, is more or les according to the degrees of absolute power. Where the Rulers will, is the peoples Law; freedom is an *Embryo*, rather than formed: when they make Laws, whereby Subjects are at more certainty; it then becomes a *fœtus*: and when they oblige themselves, to rule by those Laws; the *child* is borne, and may cry out of violence and oppression. This *liberty*, how small soever, and uncertaine of life, hath yet many witnesses to avouch its name; which we find also registred in Antiquity. So that whosoever denies the same; must call all those *slaves*, who lived under the Eastern and Roman Empires of old, and the Turks and Persians at this day.

2. Under *limited power*, the people have a legall liberty, which is greater or les, according to the Laws, constitutions, or contracts, whereby the power is limited. Whether originally and antecedently; or by after condescent, betwixt those in Supremacy and them in subjection; is not much materiall. This liberty being supported by Law, not voluntarily made by the Governors themselves, and alterable at their pleasure (as in absolute power) but necessarily condescended to by them that will governe, makes the subjection of a people tolerable And if the Fathers in power please to foster them, they want not for necessaries, though they abound not in superfluities. But I confes, if this freedom meet with a churlish stepfather, and hath neither guardian nor friends to maintain its right; then its forced to keep private at home, and dare scarce appear in publike; which makes their present condition miserable. For liberty once lamed by power, is not unlike to a labouring man, that hath his leg broken; who till it be sound, Is thereby confined to his own cottage, or cralls but abroad to beg with his crutches.

3. Those that live under a *mixed power*, have more or les liberty according to the temperament thereof.

If mixt of Monarchie and Acristocracy onely, the common peoples liberty is according to their Laws. And is more secured by this composition, than in a simple governement, though limited; because one is a check to the exorbi-

exorbitancy of the other. For though every mixt power be limited, yet every limited power is not mixt. In this Government, though the Nobility, should as Cedars shelter the undershrubs, from the storms of the superior order; yet both Historie and experience shews us, that often times (I say not allwayes) the Peeres care not to be their Princes Vassalls, that so the rest of the people may be theirs.

If mixed so that the common people have a share in the Supreme Power, they are *absolutely free*; and their liberty is more or les, according as their share is. Whether it be mixed of all the three kinds of Government, *viz.* Monarchie, Aristocracy, and Democracy; or onely of the two latter; for I never read or heard of a State compounded of the two extreames.

Now the Supreme Power consists especially (I say not onely) 1. In enacting, interpreting, and repealing of Laws. 2. In electing and appointing subordinate Magistrates and Ministers of State for Government. 3. In judging and determining all crimes and controversies amongst their Subjects, ultimately without appeale. 4. In leavying of taxes to defray publick expences. 5. In the power of Armes for defence of the whole. 6. In making War and Peace with others. So then as a people partake in these, their freedom is accordingly to be accounted of. And here liberty is come to maturity; and if she be modest, and keep within her bounds, and fall not into wanton licentiousnes; ravishes the eyes of all spectators, filling their mouthes with her praises, and their mindes with admiration.

But it is high time that we hasten unto the third particular proposed, which is the accommodation of these, to the subject matter we have in hand.

First then, it is well known, that there is a very vast difference in the liberty of the Subjects of these two Crowns. The common people under the King of England have 1. A part in the legislative power, which is the chief authority in all Governements. For the Commons make a third State in all the three Kingdoms; and have their representatives freely chosen by themselves in all Parliaments; which are the true Conservatories of publique liberty and particular propriety. Whereas the common people in France either never had this priviledge; or if they had, have long since lost it. That they had it formerly, *Hottoman* endeavours to prove, which *Arnisæus* denies, (and answers his reasons,) nor that only, but all mixture in the French Monarchy either with Princes of the Blood, Peers, or any other State whatsoever. But whatever was the Governement, under the two first lines of the Kings of France; it is generally agreed, that in the beginning of the third under *Hugh Capet*, (who cantond out France about the yeare 990) the peoples liberty was devoured by the Dukes and Earles of the Provinces, and the Monarchie allmost turned into a Toparchie, by reason of their hereditary right. Which the after Kings soone perceiving, to be too great a ballance to the Crowne, broke down by degrees; and so became the only *Atlas's* that have ever since sustan'd that Government. For the Assembly of the three Estates, which were the only bulwark of the pub-

Franco-galliæ. c. 10. 11. 15. De republ. l. 2. c. 6. §. 6.

publick liberty, that was left undemoliſhed by deſpotical powers; if they ever had any ſhare in the legiſlative, loſt it long before *Capets* time, (for from *Charles* the great the Kings Edicts have paſt for Laws.) and being diſcontinued in their Wars with *England*, and their remaining power (whatever it was) broke down by the policy of *Lewis* the eleventh; they were finally laid aſide by *Lewis* the laſt. And although *Philip* the fourth fixed that Court of Judicature at *Paris*, that was formerly ambulatory and uſually accompanied the Kings Court, which became a pattern to the reſt of their Provincial Parliaments; yet both that and theſe have only the name and ſhadow; not the nature and power of the Parliaments under the Crown of *England*. The Members being neither choſen by the people, nor repreſenting them; but Lawjers, that uſually either purchaſe theſe places of the Crown, or pay an annual penſion for the ſame; having no legiſlative power, nor indeed any other but derivative from the King, and alterable at his pleaſure. They tell the Academy of *Paris*; *ſe à Rege juſſos promulgare leges, quas ipſi viſum fuerit ferre. Apud illum authoritatem eſſe, &c.* But theſe things are ſo well known, that I will not ſtand to alledge Authorities to prove them; although, if it were neceſſary, I could bring as many as would fill the page even to oſtentation. But let us briefly run over the reſt. Thoſe 2. under the Crown of *England* have the election of Magiſtrates generally in Corporations, and ſome under Officers in the Country, which cannot be removed without due proceſs of Law. 3. Have a ſhare in the Judicature, by the Juries (in *England*) for matter of fact, together with the Kings Judges for matter of Law, and their laſt appeal to Parliaments. 4. The original power of raiſing Taxes. For the propoſal and grant muſt come from the Commons, and the other two States only conſent. 5. The liberty of bearing Arms. Whereas in *France*, all Promotions, Governments, Judicatures and Taxes, are in the Kings power; who permits not the vulgar uſe of Arms, or a ſtanding *Militia* in his Kingdom; but only ſuch as are in his pay, and thereby entirely at his devotion. So that there is no Communalty that lives more happily than that of *England*, nor none more miſerably than the *poor paiſantry* of *France*.

Guagnin. in Ludovic. 12.

2. Hence we may infer a fair probability, of enjoying more liberty under the Crown of *England* than *France*. I know our freedom will not neceſſarily follow from the premiſes; for that which is *legal*, will depend upon ſuch conditions, as ſhall be either previouſly agreed upon, or after conſented unto: yet I leave every one to judge, which is likelieſt to grant us the beſt; not only for our Religion, but liberty in our Perſons, Priviledges and Eſtates; as alſo whoſe Government is moſt likely to defend the ſame, and make us thereby alſo *actually free*.

If it be argued, that the *French King* may give us more liberty than his other Subjects; and the *King of England* leſs. The reply is eaſie; that we reaſon not from the power of either, or what they can and may do; but what in all appearance they will do. Although thoſe that hold it for a

fundamental in the *French* Government, that whatever is conquered by them or acquired, muſt be incorporated with the Kingdom of *France*; and that this is as indiſpenſable for the body politick, as the *Salick Law* is for the head; ſcruple much, whether the King *de jure*, can make us freer than the reſt of his Subjects. But we neither deſire to diſpute the Prerogative of Princes, much leſs of ſuch a mighty Monarch; nor indeed are we of their opinion herein, and therefore take it for granted, that he as well as the *King of England*, may grant us as full and ample liberty, as He ſhall think fit in His Royal pleaſure. We only profeſs our fears what he will do, and ſuch as are rational and becoming men; not groundleſs fancies, or frivolous reports, which are the uſual *Bugbears*, that affright only fearful women and children.

1. We cannot flatter our ſelves into hopes, that our condition ſhould be better than either of thoſe two Kings (which ſoever we ſubmit unto) natural Subjects. If it be equal, it is well; and all that we can rationally expect. And therefore we judge, that *England* will eaſier be induced to this, which is ordinary unto that Government; than *France*, to indulge us of extraordinary favour, unleſs we had merited ſuch a priviledge, as to be made an exception from the general rule. And that Governors under them will willingly and readily maintain, that which they are accuſtomed unto; but very hardly ſuch immunities, as tranſcend the bounds which are ſet to others.

2. The many examples we have before us, of ſuch Countries as *France* hath gained, keeps our fears continually waking. For by whatever Title they have been acquired, we find them all generally in the ſame condition. Whether by right of donation, as *Daulphiny* and *Provence*, or purchaſe as *Berry*, *Montpelier*, *&c.* or marriage, as *Bourbon*, *Champagne*, *Languedock*, *Bretaigny*, *&c.* or by conqueſt and powerful ſeizure, as *Normandy*, *Aquitane*, *Poictou*, *Anjou*, and whatſoever held on *England* by *Charles* the ſeventh, and *Burgundy* with thoſe that depended thereon, by his ſon *Lewis* the eleventh; all theſe being incorporated with *France*, (what ever their former immunities were, and whatever leſſer they ſtill injoy) are all equally ſubject to all Laws, Governments, and Impoſitions from the Crown, without diſpute and contradiction. And can we then be ſuch fools, as to think, that though we come under *France*, yet we ſhall be free? But now on the contrary we know, that whatſoever acceſſion hath been made to the Crown of *England*, either by marriage as *Scotland*, or conqueſt as *Ireland*, that they have all their Laws, Priviledges, Governments, and Immunities remaining entirely, as inviolable from the Crown, and unalterable without their own conſent. Nor do they only injoy theſe, but make Laws for ſupporting them, according to their particular intereſts; yea croſs and oppoſite to the other, which yet are ratified by his Majeſty, or at leaſt by his Royal authority and pleaſure.

3. If any have neither liſt nor leiſure, to look into the Hiſtories of former times; the preſent age will furniſh them ſufficiently, with examples both

both foreign and domeſtick. Let them enquire of *Lorraign* and *Flanders*, how they fare with their new Maſters. Or let them but paſs into the adjacent Provinces, and inform themſelves of the *French* Governments; and then they may ſee as in a Glaſs, the face of their own future condition. And if any be reſolvedly blind, that they will not ſee, except they be deaf alſo, or ſtop their ears; they may hear enough, (if the tenth part of reports be but true) to warn them ſufficiently to look to themſelves. But if they remain ſo incredulous, that all the Beacons that are fired about them, makes them not fear; and that they will believe nothing; which they themſelves do not feel: I wiſh that experience (which wiſe men call *the Miſtreſs of Fools*) convince them not of their folly, when it is too late; and their condition become ſo miſerable, that its fitter to be drawn covered with a ſorrowful veil, by ſome *Timanthes*'s Pencil, than to be lively ſet forth in its ſad colours, or deſcribed by the Pen of an impartial Hiſtorian. For my part I profeſs that none honours the worth and gallantry of the *French* Nation more than my ſelf, yet I would loth come under its power: for the reaſon which the Fox gives the Lion in the Fable,

—quia me veſtigia terrent, Omnia te adverſum ſpectantia, nulla retrorſum. *Horat. Epiſt. l. 1. Ep. 1.*

4. We think we have reaſon to be afraid not only for our perſons, and purſes; but even for our lives, and all thoſe things which may make us miſerable; not only in regard of the *French*, but our *ſelves*. For we know that a people accuſtomed to liberty, who have had enough given them and taken much more, when once they come to be reſtrained, and ſtrictly held in by the rains of Government; are very apt to break out into mutinies and miſchiefs; and like wild Colts in their firſt managing, ruſh deſperately into ruin, that they may throw their Riders. Yea when *Conquerors* think they have ſo harnaſſed the multitude, that they dare not but draw their triumphant Chariots; and doubt not but they themſelves ſit ſo faſt, that they may drive them out of breath, and ſo tame them at their pleaſure: they uſually *Phaëton* like, ſet all on fire; and if they eſcape the popular fury by running away in the ſmoak, meet with his fate, to be ſtruck with the Thunderbolt of their Soveraigns juſtice. Innumerable are the examples for the confirmation of this; but we will confine our ſelves to our own Country; and content our ſelves with two only. When *Philip* the fourth had beat the *Flemmings*, united *Flanders* to *France*, and ſet Governours over them; who erected Citadels in their ſeveral Towns, Garriſoned their Cities to keep them in aw, and arbitrarily charged them with great contributions; the people that were uſed to Freedom, would not be brought into this yoke of bondage; but deſperately revolt, maſſacre the *French*, and involve all in confuſion and miſery. Nor is this all; for, (though the baſer ſort begin, yet great men uſually end ſuch quarrels) a War followed, which coſt both *France* and *Flanders* dear, in the vaſt expence both of blood and treaſure. And when *Duke d'Alva* attempted the like upon our Anceſtors in theſe *Provinces*, who were a free people and not uſed to *Serres in Phil. 4.*

ſuch ſeverity; how did the ſparks of mutiny in the beginning break out into great flames at laſt, which ſet the whole Country on fire? No pen is able to expreſs the miſeries of thoſe Times; nor Tragedy repreſent the things that were perpetrated. How were moſt mens hearts filled with *fear*, many with *horror*, and ſome with *deſpair*; to ſee their Country become an *Aceldama*; and ſo many thouſands forced through *a Red Sea of blood*, to find their paſſage to the Land of *Canaan*! I conclude therefore, that if they who enjoyed leſs liberty than we, could ſo little endure Servitude; we ſhall be much leſs able to endure it, who have enjoyed far more freedom then they. So that we may eaſily foreſee, without any Prophetick Spirit, what a *flood of calamities* is likely to break in upon us; when ever any ſhall break down the *banks of our liberty*.

Sect. 6. *The third Argument which preponderates for* England, *is the preſervation of our Eſtates: in regard of Souldiers violence, Governors Impoſitions, Publick Debts by Obligation, and Revenues of the Romiſh Church.*

WE proceed now to ſhew, that its better to be under *England* in regard of our *Eſtates*. Both in reſpect of *getting* them, (as I ſhall ſhew in the following Section) and the *keeping* thoſe we have gotten already, or by the bleſſing of *God* may get hereafter. And to this I give the precedency, becauſe the enjoyment of Riches is the end for which, and Trade only the means by which, we labour to obtain them. Now if it can be made apparent, that we can neither get, nor keep ſuch *Eſtates* under *France*, as we can under *England*: there are none ſo regardleſs herein (whatever they are of *Religion* and *Liberty*) but will eaſily grant the truth of our *Concluſion*.

1. Then let us conſider that except we can keep that which is our own we are never the better for it, but a great deal the worſe. Had we a grant of *Midas*'s wiſh, that all we touched ſhould be turned into gold; or were we inſured that all our adventures, ſhould bring us returns as rich as the *Eaſt-India* Companies; what ſhould it profit us, if we could not keep them? Nay, were we not a great deal worſe than without them? What toil and anxiety is there in getting! What fears and troubles are there in keeping! and what ſorrow and vexation in the parting with riches! Not that I think any civil Authority, will ever take away our Eſtates, except we forfeit them through miſdemeanors; but when the *Sword* brings ſuch a *Commiſſion*, I would gladly know who dare deny it? And whether the poor man then, that hath all his money in his purſe-pocket; be not both ſafer in his perſon, and more ſecure of his Eſtate; than the rich Merchant, whoſe *bags* and *warehouſes* are filled with his wealth? *Cræſus* was rich even to a Proverb, yet ſhewing to *Solon* all his Treaſures, *Solon* told him, *that if any came with better iron than he wore, they would be maſter of all that Gold.*

Now

Now in regard of plundring, depedrations, and all manner of violence by Souldiers both to our perſons and eſtates; I think we are far more ſecure from the *Engliſh*, than *French*. And for this, I ſhall appeal to the *Common experience* of all ages and places where their Armies have come; which bear witneſs, to the great exorbitances of the latter, more than the other; in the violation both of womens chaſtity and mens eſtates, and frequent deſolations by fire and ſword. Yea I will make their own Hiſtorian *Comines* judge of the controverſie, who having ſhown, how unjuſtly great ones govern, and the innocent people are oppreſt, both by them and the Souldiers, whoſe flagitious lives, petulant carriage, and violent rapines are intollerable; profeſſes that he mentions theſe things for *France's* ſake, which of all the Principalities he had known, was moſt afflicted with them. Whereas on the contrary, he ſays *England* excel'd them all, in theſe three particulars; *reſpect to the common good, the peoples freedom from injury, and the little ſpoil their Souldiers and Armies made in their Wars*; the laſt whereof he repeats, and enlarges a little after in the ſame Chapter. *Lib. 5. c. 18.*

2. But we will ſuppoſe the beſt in all *uncertainties*, and therefore hope we ſhall eſcape all plundering, and violence from the Souldiers in a time of confuſion; and make no doubt thereof, in a ſetled condition. But yet we know we ſhall not eſcape paying ſuch Taxes, as indeed juſtly deter us, both in regard of their *greatneſs*, and alſo the *arbitrarines* of their Impoſition. In both which we know no people in *Europe* more miſerable than *France*, nor none happier in the contrary, than the Subjects of the Crown of *England*. Which partly occaſioned that known ſaying of the Emperour *Maximilian* the firſt, that he was *Rex regum*, the King of *Spain Rex hominum*, the King of *France Rex aſinorum*, and the King of *England Rex diabolorum*. For he could have nothing but what the *Germain Princeſs* conſented to, *Spain* only what the Laws allowed him; *France* all that he pleaſed; and *England* nothing that pleaſed not the people.

As touching their *greatneſs*. 1. I willingly grant that Subjects muſt afford their Soveraigns aſſiſtance; and in times of extremity, and utmoſt dangers, it is hard to determine, how far their power may not lawfully be extended. Secondly, I know that the *grandeur* of the *French* Court is great, which is lately ſhown us in our own Language. That their *Armies* are often numerous; and ſome always neceſſary, both for defence of the Government from their domeſtick enemies, and of the Frontiers from foreign, in the adjacent Countries. And that theſe require vaſt ſums to ſupport them. Yet notwithſtanding, thirdly, *Moderation* ought to be uſed, ſo that the common people may enjoy the fruit of their labours. But to ſhew how far the Government of *France* hath been from this, would be an endleſs work. We ſhould but tire our ſelves to read, what their own Hiſtorians have related; and be weary with the rehearſal, of the many tumults and rebellions that have ariſen from their *gabels*. It would fill any one with *ſorrow* to hear of the great *complaints* and *out-cries*, that the people have made in former *Politiicke Weetſchaal. l. 3. c. 3. 4. & 5.*

Ages;

Ages; and fright us to hear thoſe of the preſent: which yet their Governors are ſo uſed to, that they count them but the old *faſa* of *France*, and oppreſſion the ſin of the old World. What remorſe of Conſcience ſeveral of their Kings have had for their extortion, is well known to thoſe that have read their Hiſtories. Some in their life time as *Charles* the eighth; ſome at their death as *Philip* the fourth, who remitted the Taxes he had unjuſtly required, and commanded his Sons to eaſe the people. But above all *Lewis* the eleventh, who reſolved to reform, but it was too late; and therefore charged the *Dauphin* againſt that oppreſſion he had practiſed. And indeed it was highly neceſſary; for he had reduced the common people to ſuch poverty, that many of the Farmers were forced, with halters about their necks to draw their own Plows; except they would ſteal, and once for all, ſtretch both themſelves and ropes on the Gallows. But I ſhould not once mention any of theſe things, if I thought it not better for us, both to know and believe them before hand, than experience them afterwards to our coſt. For I fear if we come once under the *French*, there will be no end of paying contributions; until we be brought into the condition of the *Andrians* of old, who when *Themiſtocles* demanded money telling them he had brought two *Goddeſſes* to require it, *perſwaſion* & *power*; anſwered that they had two great *Goddeſſes* alſo who taught them to deny it, which were *poverty* and *impoſſibility*. And then the *Hollanders* may do that living, which *Saladinus* the Emperor of *Aſia* did dying; ſhew their winding ſheets and ſay, *Theſe are all the rich Hollanders have left*.

Plut. in vita Themiſtocl. ex Herodoto.

Procopius decad. 6. lib. 6.

But ſhould we part with ſome of our Eſtates, though it were a good ſhare; ſo we were ſure to enjoy the reſt, it was leſs matter: but when we are always obnoxious to an arbitrary power, ſtill to be ſqueaſed like Spunges at the pleaſure of others; we can ſcarce call any thing our own, and are rather *procuratores* than *Domini divitiarum*. I know well, that ſome of the *French* Kings, have like good Shepherds, fleeced not ſlead their flocks, (according to *Tiberius* his ſaying, *Boni paſtoris eſt pecus tondere, non deglubere*) eſpecially *Lewis* the twelfth: who therefore (as the *Jeſuite* well obſerves) had no rebellion in all his raign, which is a rare bleſſing (as he ſays) and extraordinary in that *Realm*. And the great wiſdom and generoſity of his preſent *Majeſty*, puts me out of all doubt of his *clemency*; but a good, a great, a wiſe *Solomon* may have a *Rehoboam* to his ſon and ſucceſſor, whoſe *little finger may be heavier than his Fathers loyns*. By which example in Sacred Hiſtory, we are ſhown, that what ever Prince will force his Subjects to open their purſes to his pleaſure, ſhall quickly find their hearts ſhut; and though for the preſent they may ſupplicate, and outwardly ſeem to adore him (as the *Indians* their dieties *ne noceant*) yet they hate him worſe than the *Devil* himſelf; and upon the firſt occaſion tumultuouſly cry, *every man to your Tents*; whence open diviſions, lawleſs rapines, bloody wars, and all the miſerable effects that follow them, break in upon a Nation beyond controll. But let us be frank in conceding (as it becomes us when we ſpeak

Sueton. in vita Tib.
Buſſieres Hiſt. Franc. L. 15.

of

of Kings) that there ſhall never ariſe a *Rehoboam* out of *Lewis*'s race; yea that this is as impoſſible, as for a Vulture to riſe out of the Phœnix aſhes: yet we know the beſt of Kings may have bad Governors under them; and that they muſt often, both ſee with other eys, and hear with other ears than their own. Yea let us ſuppoſe, that we ſhall never pay more Tribute to the fair *Lillies* of *France*, than we have done to the *Belgick Lion*; except that of reſpect, which we acknowledge his due: yet there ſtill remains a vaſt difference, betwixt a *legal* and a *permiſſive exemption*, and of the ſame payments made by *publick conſent*, and thoſe that are commanded by abſolute *power*; though not in regard of the money, yet in regard both of the authority that requires it, which if abſolute and arbitrary is alterable, although it ſhould not be altered; and the different impreſſions which they make, and effects that follow in the minds and affections of men. For when a people know the neceſſities of State, and freely vote their own Contributions, they account themſelves free and uninjured though the Taxations be never ſo great, (according to the rule, that *volenti non fit injuria:*) and look upon them as a gift rather than a debt, and therefore pay them willingly, and generouſly bear their parting with their ſhare, Whereas on the contrary, when they are ignorant of the grounds of ſuch impoſitions, they are always jealous, that they are not ſo great as is pretended; and when they have no ſuffrage therein, look upon themſelves as wronged and oppreſſed; and though they pay them, yet it is with reluctancy; and becauſe they muſt and cannot withſtand it, their minds are dejected, and their ſpirit and courage ſtrangely depreſt, as I could ſhew by many examples. The difference of theſe two authorities, and their various and different effects, is well obſerved by two Noble Lords, *Bacon of Verulam*, and *Comines of Argenton*; both of them famous for their wiſdom, one in the Theory and the other in the Practice thereof; ſo that if the former had had the latters *Prudence*, and the latter the formers *Learning*, no Age could have paralel'd them. That of publick conſent the Learned *Bacon* obſerves, doth not ſo diſpirit a people and diminiſh their *Martial courage*, and inſtances in theſe very *Provinces*, ſhewing how cheerfully they have born the great burthen of *Exciſe*, becauſe it came from themſelves and their own authority. And that of arbitrary power, is ſhewn of *France*, by that great States-man *Comines* Counſellor to *Lewis* the eleventh; whoſe Hiſtory is ſo much eſteemed by the *French*, (as *Buſſieres* the *Jeſuite* tells us) that they neither envy the *Greeks* their *Thucydides*, nor the *Romans* their *Livy* or *Tacitus*. Wherein he ſo frequently inveys againſt theſe impoſitions, and complains of the peoples miſeries thereby; ſo freely expoſtulates with the *Kings* and *Governors*, and is ſo honeſt an *Advocate* for their Subjects; that I wiſh all *Princes*, would make this excellent Hiſtorian, as familiar to them, as did *Charles* the fifth, that great and wiſe *Emperour*. In the 18. Chapter l. 5. He ſaith, that neither the King of *France*, nor any other, hath power to exact of their Subjects without their own conſent;

Eſſay (or Sermo fidelis) 29.

Hiſt. Franc. l. 13.

Et Bodin de rep. l. 6. *c.* 2.

except

except they will tyrannically use their power contrary to all right both divine and humane. And chapter the seventh l. 6. that *Charles* the seventh, who in the *English* wars had introduced, this imperious way of taxing the people, without the consent of the *States*; had burdened both his own Conscience, and the successive *Kings* with great guilt, and most cruelly wounded the *Kingdom*, of which it was like a long time to bleed. Nor doth he only thus declame against the unlawfulness thereof, but also shews how ungrateful it is to the people, as well as injurious. And on the contrary how readily and unanimously without tumult or contradiction even in the Kingdoms greatest poverty, the *States* consented and people paid to *Charles* the eighth. But if Princes will forget, the good advise this *Historian* there gives them; yet I wish they would remember at least old *Pythagoras*'s Symbol, *Sudorem ferro abstergere, tetrum facinus*. Which *Plutarch* (as a learned man tells us) expounds, *That none should take away that with the sword, which others have earned with the sweat of their brows.* If they will only use their own absolute power, yet let it be so attempered with equity and moderation; that the cries of the poor, and the curses of the people, may never bring Gods vengeance upon them. But if we should speak the sense of our Souls, we must needs (alas!) say, that moderation is so rare a jewel in the Crown of absolute Monarchs; and the Governors under them so used to hunt, and hawk at all game to enrich themselves: that though we may all hope to escape, yet we have more reason to fear: that if the fate of the other Provinces befal us, we shall all (as the beasts said in the fable) *meet at last at the Furriers shop*. If any can flatter themselves with fancies, that our *Common-wealth* shall under *France*, become like *Plato*'s *Republick*, wherein violence and *oppression* shall not be known; and that their Governors will be like those in *Utopia*, Fathers to our fortunes as much as their own: I must confess that I am not so *Mercurially* made; and do no more expect to see the world so happy, than to see the great *Platonick year*. But on the contrary, that great Impositions will be added, to the great Excise that is upon us already; whereby the number of the *Poor* will certainly increase, and the *provisions* for them daily decrease. Yea it is well, if the maintaining of the *land* against the *water*, be not neglected; and so our *Eden* be laid waste: and that our rich and pompous Cities, return not in time to their old condition, of poor and despicable Fishers Villages. However, seeing the blessing of *Judah* and *Issachar*, can never befal the same people, as *Bacon* observes in the forementioned place, if we and our Estates shall come under arbitrary power; then let us deface the *Lion Rampant*, that was the Arms of *generous Judah*, which our Ancestors and we have hitherto born: and set up *sluggish Issachar*'s of an *Ass couchant* between two *burdens*, that is to say the *Popes trumperies*, & *France*'s *tribute*.

Cyrald. Symb. Pythagar.

3. There is another consideration, which is of great importance to the Inhabitants of these Countries and that is concerning their *Debts*. For mentioning Estates, we mean not only that in our own, but also that in other

other mens hands. As for *Private debts*, we know they must needs be very many and great in places of such Merchandise; seeing the greatest part of trade is all over, and here especially, driven upon credit. Now how these will be gotten, if bad times come on, so that many remove, and more be impoverished; I leave those to consider, whose concernment it is. Concerning *Publick debts*, (which are yet more desperate, whatever change happens) they are such as are contracted, either for *Service* to the Common-wealth, and *Commodities* delivered for publick uses; or for *Monies* upon obligation; all which ways many thousands are greatly concerned, especially the last. There being very many, who have lent, some a good part, and others the greatest part of their Estates, upon the *publick faith* of the *Land*, *Cities* and *Lombards* of these Provinces. So that if this *publick faith* prove *faithless* like the *Punick* of old, a great number of Families, and (which is most deplorable) Widows and Orphans, (who being uncapable to imploy their Estates thus intrusted them) will be wholly ruined and undone. Herein I think all that have any sense of justice and equity, will conclude with me.

1. That it is very unreasonable and unjust, that if the present Government cannot discharge these debts, or a change happen; that those who have credited the Republick, should sit down with all the loss, and others not bear their proportion. 2. That seeing they were lent to the Publick, and Obligation accordingly given; and that for publick uses, and so imployed, (or if other-ways converted, yet without the Creditors fault:) it is all the reason in the world, that the Publick should faithfully pay the same. 3. That if the Republick stand, care ought to be taken to satisfie these Creditors: and that if a change of Government happen, the people remaining the same, are both in Law and equity liable to pay these debts. For though it is a great question how far Subjects are obliged to pay their Soveraigns; yet it was never questioned by any, but that such as are made for the Publick by the peoples tacit, and much more express consent; must be paid by the people, what ever change be made in the Government. Whether from a Monarchy to a Republick, as the Communality of *Athens* paid the 100 Talents which their 30 Tyrants had borrowed of the *Lacedemonians*; and these very Provinces, that which the King of *Spain* was indebted to the people: Or from a Republick to a Monarchy; *Non definit debere pecuniam populus rege sibi imposito, quam liber debebat; est enim idem populus, & dominium retinet eorum quæ populi fuerant; imò & imperium in se retinet, quanquam jam non exercendum à corpore sed à capite*, &c. *Grotius de jure belli & pacis, l. 2. c. 9. Sect. 8.* See also *Aruisæus de rep. lib. 1. c. 5. Sect. 4. Quatenus acta Reip. obligent civitatem*, and the Civilians *de rebus creditis, Digest. lib. 11. tit. 1. l. 27.* *Demosthen adv. Leptin. V. Disquisit. politic. 53.*

All the *difficulty* therefore will be if a *change come*, how the *payment* of these just debts may be procured. And here we need no other *Counsellors* advice, than our own reason, which will inform us, that the freer any people are

and the more they participate of power; the more probable it is,and alſo the more facile for them to obtain their rights. Now that we are likely to have more freedom under *England* than *France*,I have ſhewn ſufficiently in the former Section. Yea common experience as well as reaſon hath learnt the world this leſſon; that when inferiors can only pray and petition, they may daily get fair promiſes, and perhaps be ſprinkled with ſome *Court-holy-water*; but performances and payments are ſtill the work of to morrow, and continually kept as *reſerves* in the *rear*. Nor can they bring more arguments for their expedition, than Superiors have excuſes for their delaying: and if at laſt their patience be worn as thread-bare, as their clothes with attendance; ſo that they become importune in requeſting; then *Grandees* grow deaf in hearing, and reſolvedly peremptory in denying: whence both ſides frequently fall to irregular proceedings; the one for recovering, and the other for defrauding them of their rights. Whereas thoſe that can, not only requeſt, but alſo legally require, that juſtice be done; have ground to hope, that when the touchines of times is over, and the boiſterous paſſions of great ones are laid; ſome happy conjuncture of affairs may prove a proſperous gale to bring them at laſt, their hazardous adventures home in ſafety.

4. and laſtly, (that I may draw this arrow to the head) I ſhall deſire that we may conſider a little of the Lands and Revenues,formerly belonging to the *Romiſh Church*. Which to defend our ſelves in our Wars with *Spain*, were ſold to ſeveral, and are ſince parcelled out into many more hands. Now the very mentioning of this I ſhould think ſufficient; the difference between *France* and *England* herein, being ſo well known: Do we hear what the former hath already done, in all thoſe places ſubject to him,and how they have ſet up all the Romiſh rable; and can we think that they will not in time recover(what ever promiſes they paſs for the preſent) that which not only they themſelves, but all of their Religion account their right? Can we imagine that their *Biſhops*, *Abbots*, *Priors*, and other Superior Orders, will live like *Parochials* or *Mendicant Friers*? Who is ſo ignorant as knows not,that where ever the *old Gentleman of Rome* comes to rule, he brings with him many attendants to bear up his train; and that their pomp muſt be ſupported,though many *Gentlemen* thereby be ruined? Whereas on the contrary, *England* is by them, in the ſame condemnation with our ſelves; neither permitting his headſhip and dominion over them, nor his members and followers any demains among them. So that we may ſafely conclude, that all thoſe that poſſes ſuch Eſtates, as the Church of *Rome* doth challenge; can neither rationally hope to keep them under *France*, nor fear to loſe them under *England*.

We;

Sect. 7. *The fourth Argument from Trade. This* (viz. *Merchandiſe and Navigation*) *our chief ſecular intereſt: and friendſhip with* England *to ſecure the ſame.* England *and we Corrivals herein, the probability of getting more, as alſo enjoying the ſame with greater Peace under* France, *with other Arguments: largely debated, and the contrary evinced under* England.

WE are now come to the *Acropolis* of the cauſe; *Trade* being the great *Tower of ſtrength*, to which the Adverſaries of our opinion, having deſerted the former out-works, uſually fly unto our refuge. We ſhall therefore perſue them; but orderly, firſt making our *approaches* by degrees; and then raiſing ſuch batteries, and planting ſuch *reaſons*, as are forcible, either to beat this down, or at leaſt make ſuch breaches therein, as ſhall render it untenable for their defence; and ſo compel the moſt pertinacious of our enemies, either to ſubmit, or to fall before us.

But before we begin this work, we muſt acquaint you, that when we mention *Trade*, we mean not every particular kind of negotiation, wherein the ſeveral ſorts of Artificers and Shop-keepers are imployed: to ſpeak of which would be both an endleſs, an a bootleſs work. Herein perhaps ſome might fare better with the *French*, the *Mercers* and *Tailers* eſpecially; for the *à la mode Monſieurs* when they have money, affect to change their faſhion as often as the *Moon* doth her face; and to wear as many ribbands on their breeches, as ordinary Pedlers bear on their backs; as if all the fortunes of *France* hung at their ends, and all their own happineſs followed their heels. And happily *Butchers* and *Cooks* would fare better with the *Engliſh*, for a *piece of good Beef* or a *Shoulder of Mutton*. And we might inſtance in many others with merriment; but we have no mind to be pleaſant upon ſo ſerious a Subject. In ſhort therefore, we mean *Maritime Trade* (as our Adverſaries do) this being the great *Diana* of the *Netherlands*, which brings them in their Silver Shrines.

1. Then we ſhall lay down this as a fundamental and undoubted *Maxim*, (which all I think will take for granted) that *trade by Sea is the great ſecular intereſt of theſe Provinces, the Maritime eſpecially, by which they moſt flouriſh, and without which they cannot ſubſiſt.* Let *Amſterdam* and the other *Cities* be as rich, or richer then they are imagined; yet will they in a few years, if their Trade be obſtructed, become as poor as their Neighbours at *Gant*, or *Antwerp*. For who will build at ſuch exceſſive charges (where the foundation ſometimes is half to the ſuperſtructure) or pay ſuch rents for their habitation, and live in ſuch expenſive places, if there be not freedom of Trade? But thoſe that can, will remove; ſome hither and ſome thither, as their intereſt and affection ſhall incline them; rather then ſpend their *Capitalls* here. If ever Merchants were, or are in any place of the world, the *vena porta* (as *Bacon* ſtiles them) of any publick body, it is certainly the *Eſſay* (or *Sermo fidelis*) 19.

Belgick. If they fraight not their Ships, whereby the Mariners may be imployed; if they furniſh not the Tradeſmen ſhops, whereby they may follow their Vocations; if they lade not the poor mens backs, whereby their Families may fill their bellies; finally, if they diſtribute not their Merchandiſe through the various Seas and Rivers of the *Univerſe*: we may linger a while, but it is as impoſſible we ſhould live long, as for a body deprived of food, whoſe parts languiſh for want of nouriſhment, which ſhould be brought them in the veins, by the bloods regular *circulation*.

2. Merchandiſe being our chief concernment, it will neceſſarily follow that that Nation that can moſt obſtruct the ſame, can do us moſt injury. Now that *England* can do this more than *France*, or any other whatſoever, I think none will deny; if any do, there is enough ſaid hereafter, that will make it ſufficiently apparent.

3. Of all our neighbouring Nations, *England* being moſt potent by Sea, and *France* by Land, it will clearly follow, that a Peace with theſe two above all others, is our great concernment, With the former for getting, and with the latter for keeping and enjoying our Eſtates. But if we cannot have this from them both, which of them is to be preferred comes next in conſideration.

4. This Common-wealth conſiſting of *Maritime* and *Inland Provinces*, the former being by far the moſt conſiderable, the friendſhip of *England* is more to be valued than that of *France*. And this the wiſeſt men that this *Republick* ever had, formerly never doubted of. Prince *William* the Firſt founder of this Common-wealth, laid down theſe three principal maximes of State, which were approved by all, as ſound and rational beyond contradiction. 1. *To do juſtice to Strangers.* For great Nations may be upheld by Power, but ſmall Territories muſt be maintained by Juſtice. 2. *To hold a fair correſpondence with France.* For *Spain* being then the grand *Monarchy* of *Europe*, and our dreadful enemy; the aſſiſtance of *France* was greatly neceſſary for our ſupportation. 3. *To preſerve an inviolable Peace with England,* In regard that this is abſolutely requiſite for our freedom of Commerce by Sea; and the *Engliſh* were our friends in affection as well as Intereſt, whereas the *French* only upon the latter account. For the greateſt obſtacle that ſtood in the way of *France*'s greatneſs, was the *Spaniſh* power in theſe *Netherlands*; which being once broke down, they well knew they could dilate their Empire at their pleaſure, as we ſee it now to our ſorrow. It is true of later times, the *Loveſteiners* to free themſelves, from the Headſhip of the *Orange* family; which ſought (as they imagined) either an abſoluteneſs, or at leaſt to infringe the liberty of the Common-wealth, have been rather inclined to *France* and *England*: but they were not ſo blinded with paſſion, but that having a Peace with *Spain*, and being ſenſible of *France*'s prevalency, and raiſing their Fortunes upon the *Spaniſh* ruines, it was their Intereſt to comply with *England* rather than *France*. Which plainly appears, in that no ſooner was thoſe unhappy differences between us and *England* compoſed

compoſed at *Breda*, but immediately the *Tripple Alliance* was deſigned and concluded upon by that great States-man *de Witt* the Head of their party, and *Sr. William Temple*, on purpoſe to put boundaries to the boundleſs ambition of the *French* Nation.

5. To the reaſon of State already mentioned, together with the judgment of our greateſt *Politicians* both in former and later times, let me add; that Terreſtrial war hath always been accounted more eligible than a Naval; yea by ſome our abſolute intereſt, as the *Duke* of *Rhoan* obſerves. In ſo much that *Zeeland* never to this day conſented unto, but abſolutely proteſted againſt, theſe *Provinces* making Peace with *Spain*. And here it is obſervable, how our Adverſaries prevaricate; in granting this Aſſertion, and yet preferring *France*. I foreſee their evaſion, of conceding a Land-war with a leſſer Potentate, & denying it with *France*. But this is both eaſily obviated and outed; for as I am well aſſured, that if *England* had not aſſaulted us by Sea, *France* had never done it by Land; ſo I have reaſon to believe, that if he had, we ſhould have found him ſufficient work. If we had the Sea free for our inferior *Provinces*, the charges of a Land-war for the ſuperior were eaſily borne. And we ſhould not want men enow for our money, to fight for them with *France*, or any other whatſoever, ſo long as we ſhould think them worth the fighting for. Nor let any wonder that I inſert ſuch a conditional; for I ſhall afterwards make it appear, how the Common-wealth may be well ſecured, though theſe Provinces ſhould be let go or loſt. And as for the inferior, they are ſo ſituated in the water, and thereby ſo inacceſſible; that we need not fear, what all the force of *France* can do, if we be reſolved to defend them. It being therefore apparent that Traffick is our principal concernment, and *England* of all others moſt able to obſtruct it; we may conclude in point of intereſt, as Prince *Maurice* (I have heard) uſed to ſay, that *were the Engliſh Devils, we muſt have peace with them.*

l'Intereſt des Princ. & Eſt. diſcourſ. 6.

Theſe being the *Approaches*, (which I think) no ſallies of our Adverſaries can prevent; we ſhall now, being got nearer them, take a better view of their ſtrength. Were we free and had our choice, whether we ſhould war with *France* or *England*, you ſee our intereſt ſhould carry us againſt *France*. But the caſe (alas!) is far otherwiſe with us, for they both make war upon us: by what error of policy one of them, which could beſt, was not taken off and diverted, if it had been poſſible; or whether it was impoſſible, and ſo no error or omiſſion in us, is not now our enquiry. But ſeeing they both threaten us with deſtruction, upon ſuppoſition that we are unable any longer to reſiſt them both, whether of them we ſhould chooſe to be under in regard of our *Trade*.

This then being the Queſtion; our Adverſaries give their ſuffrage for *France*; and think themſelves impregnable in this point of intereſt. Let us therefore impartially repreſent the ſtrength of their reaſons, and weigh them duly in the true ballance of intereſt, and then we ſhall find them you ſhall ſee, not only many grains but ounces too light.

1. It

1. It is better for us, ſay they, to be under *France*, becauſe *England* and and we are Competitors for Trade.

It is very true, *England* and theſe Countries by their ſituation, genious, and intereſt are ſet for Trade: and this naturally begets an enmity between us, and a vying with one another for the ſame. But this was always, and will be ſo whilſt men are men: and what will follow hence? Surely one of theſe things; either that we muſt willingly yield to them, or they to us, which is madneſs to imagine; or that we muſt fight with them for the whole, which it they mean of our ſelves, is the next degree to dotage, ſeeing we are about matches, and Peace in their trade is always the intereſt of a trading people; if they mean jointly with *France*, we ſhall ſpeak to that in the following Argument, and ſhew what a hazard even that will be, and much more ſingly: or that we muſt compound with them for our ſhare, that ſo each Nation may have, what Gods bleſſing may give, and their own induſtry may procure them. And this in my opinion will have the vote, not only of all the Cowards, but all the wiſe men of both Nations. But becauſe this Argument is much inſiſted on, both in former times and this juncture of affairs; we will more particularly conſider the ſame, in reference to this Common-wealth as to *England* abſolutely without reſpect to *France*. And thereby we ſhall ſee what corrivals in Trade implies in point of Intereſt, whether the power be about equal, (as we ſhall here ſuppoſe *England* and this Common-wealths) or unequal, and in point of inference. Now in regard of Intereſt, we ſhall find in my judgment, that 'tis clearly this for us as equal in power.

1. That we muſt vigorouſly defend our Trade, as that on which our temporal welfare depends.

2. That we muſt for this purpoſe, maintain a naval power, equal at leaſt to theirs. That ſo we may hold them up, to the juſt and due terms, and bounds, of Commerce and Navigation.

3. That for this end the league of the Maritime Provinces be kept inviolable. If the band of the bunch of arrows be either cut or broken, ſo that they fall out of the Lions paw; he will ſoon have his skin pull'd over his ears. So that to make ſeveral Common-wealths of them, is but to make them ſo many morſels to be the eaſilier devoured by their enemies. And therefore I wonder at the Author of the *Intereſt of Holland* herein, who, *c.* 41. 42. *&c.* aſſerts the power of that Province ſufficient by Sea, and jointly with *Utrecht* by Land, to wage War with all other Potentates. Seeing theſe Maritime Provinces entirely conſidered, are but the match at Sea for *England*. And the reaſons that he gives, *c.* 37. are now refuted by experience. I acknowledge it alſo an error in policy, for *Zeeland* to break this bond of Amity, if poſſibly they can help it. But if their Enemies ſword cuts this aſunder, what ſhall they do? And this is the caſe only that I defend.

4. That we ſhould rather yield to them in *Punctillioes* of honour; that being

being a *Crown*, this only a Common-wealth. Such I mean as the *Flag*; although I reckon not that any dishonour to us, seeing they have not only always challenged it, but our Ancestors also given it: and other Nations as well as we, pay the same acknowledgment to that *Crown*. The first time that we have ever refused it, was in the time of King *James*; the circumstances whereof Sr. *Anthony Welden* in his *Court* relates, and the effects both their and our Historians. It is not my design to speak of this particular, which would swell to a discourse larger then this whole Treatise; but only instance therein, as a known example; concluding that if they will War for it, it is our wisdom to yield it, and except we were far stronger than they, folly to fight for it.

5. Rather to dissemble lesser injuries than seek to revenge them. Which holds in all equalities of power whatsoever.

6. But if they will unjustly incroach upon us to ruine our Commerce, then to War with them. For 1. Our traffick being our subsistence, who ever would spoil us thereof, necessitates us to defend it, and gives us a just cause of contest, 2. We being a match for them in power, may in point of wisdom as well as justice, try it out with them, and leave the issue to Gods Providence; Wars being the last appeal to Heaven, when justice cannot be had on earth. 3. If success attends our Armies, we secure our selves at least, if we better not our condition; and if the contrary, we do but drown and die a little the sooner. A destructive peace and unsuccessful War are both fatal in the issue; the former being a *Chronical*, the later an *acute* disease of State. It is not so material, whether by a lingring Consumption of Peace, or by the Hectick Fevor of War, the gray hairs of Government, be brought with sorrow to the grave.

7. Yet if we can enjoy the freedom of Commerce, and fruit of our labours, upon reasonable terms; it is better to sit down contented with our share, then to War for the whole. For 1. What wise man ever doubted, but that Peace is the interest of a rich and trading People; if it can be had upon tollerable conditions. 2. Is not a competent certainty preferable to a greater good that is wholly hazardous and uncertain? for how often doth that happen to men, which did to the greedy and covetous dog in the Fable; who let go that he had, to catch at the shadow thereof in the water, and so lost all!

I know some that have more of *Mars* than *Mercurie*'s temper, are all for fighting, and therefore I shall desire them calmly to consider, these few particulars following.

1. What either we or *England* have gotten by our former Wars, when matcht in power. I partly know what it hath cost us both, in treasure and blood: and can demonstrate that if either hath gotten, 'tis *England*, though not to countervail the cost. Let's but reckon (as we must if we go rightly to work) the *lucrum cessens*, and *damnum emergens*, or the profit that ceases, and loss that accrues, and what we have got, we may put in our eye, and not see much the worse.

But

But if any one ſay who can reckon that, or how?

I ſhall freely acknowledge that to pounds and perſons we cannot, nor no man alive; yet in the general we may, ſo far as to make a judgment. I have done it for my own ſatisfaction, and ſhall tell you how; that ſo thoſe that are curious may ſatisfy themſelves therein, and not take it upon my credit. By the publick Cuſtoms; the Number of ſhips, the Capital where-with Trade is driven; and by the riches of the Merchants. Of theſe, the two former are more eaſie and certain, wherein *England* hath increaſed: the two latter more conjectural, wherein this Republick hath the ſuperiority. But hath not gotten it by the wars, but ariſes from ſeveral other cauſes, (which I could mention) and eſpecially from theſe two following, which I think will ſatisfy any intelligent man. As to the Capital, ours comes to be greater, in regard that as the Merchants grow rich in *England*, they buy land, and breed up their ſons to be Country gentlemen; whereas we, eſpecially in *Holland*, continue the ſtock and our children in the Trade. Land being here at 35 and 40 years purchaſe, and in *England* at 15 or 20 ordinarily. And that the Merchants here ſhould be richer than there, is no wonder to me; who know ſo well the frugality of the one, and the prodigality of the other.

2. Let it be conſidered how difficult and hazardous it is for equal powers, to deſtroy one another; and therefore how litle likelihood there is, of any thing to be gotten by conteſting. Nay there are ſeveral circumſtances in our ſituations, imployments, and people, that render abſolute conqueſt almoſt impoſſible. We may like Cocks fight, and breath, and fight again, and crow over one another for ſome victories, but far from a conqueſt. And this we might both have ſeen long ſince in the glas of policy: which clearly ſhows, that ſuch equal powers fighting for profit, is but like *Nero's* fiſhing with a golden hook, wherein more is adventured, than ever is likely to be gotten. We have had a Comick-tragedy, and a tragick comedy of two wars, and *England* the contrary; wherein our enemies indeed have been pleaſant ſpectators, and ſatisfied their envious eyes, but what have either of us got, but blowes? Paſſion and prejudice are ſo prevalent in the World, and ſo blind the eyes of men, that often they will not ſee the truth; till dear-bought experience makes them even to feel it. And this we now both ſee, and therefore *England* takes this opportunity of breaking down the equality of power, and bringing us lower, that ſo we may truckle under them, and they be at reſt in the bed of ſecurity.

3. Thoſe that are ſo much for *Mars*, might do well to conſider, the advantages and diſadvantages of both Nations, for carrying on, and ſubſiſting under long wars. In ſome things we may happily have the advantage, as in bearing the charges, number of ſhipping, Caping by Letters of Marque &c. And in others *England*, for they have a great and rich Inland Country, an Iland that cannot be eaſily diverted by a Land-war, ſo that as the *Duke of Rhoan* ſaith right, *l' Angleterre eſt un grand animal, qui ne peut jamais*

l'Intereſt des Princes. Diſcours 7.

jamais mourir, ſ'il ne ſe tuë luimeſme. We ſubſiſt wholly on Trade, and fetch all things from abroad, they have ſufficiency of neceſſaries from their own growth at home. When Trade ſtands ſtill, they have cloths for the back, and meat for the belly, better cheap for the poorer people: here not only ſuch accommodations are far dearer than there, which can well be born when Trade flouriſheth; but when that is ſtopt, and it can worſt be endured, then are they deareſt of all. Our Seamen which come moſt from the Northern quarters about the *Baltick* Sea, to ſerve us in Navigation; when they ſee no hopes of gain, but only venturing their lives for the pay of the Wars, will remove and ſerve other Nations: whereas the King of *England* hath three Kingdoms to preſs out for his aſſiſtance, according to the cuſtom of the Crown there, which is not practiſed nor indeed practicable in this Free State. And although at the firſt ſuch as are preſt be averſe to the Wars; yet we find and feel by experience, that what through the Officers and Gentlemens careſſing and encouraging them, what through company and converſing with others before-hand, this reſtineſs is worn off by degrees; and through the principles of ſelf defence, and ſome ſparks of the honour of their Country, they fight well enough, whatever the cauſe or the quarrel be.

4. I wiſh both Nations would well conſider, whether whilſt we two are ſo eagerly conteſting for Trade, others may not carry it away. I have reaſonably conſidered what Nation can bid the fareſt for this, in regard of their *Situation*, *Havens*, *Genious*, *&c.* the advantages of the *Mediterranean* and *Baltick* Seas, and let my thoughts ſtretch themſelves as far as both the *Indies*: have obſerved the *French* Fleet, the darling of the King and Kingdom, their hopes with the grounds of them, and the probable ſucceſs thereof, as alſo the communication of *Spain* with *America*; and find no one Nation alone capacitated to carry away our Commerce; but ſeveral to have greater ſhares than they have at preſent. Yea, to ſpeak my mind freely, I have had far further contemplations, and of a far different kind from theſe upon this Subject, in reſpect to future times. And indeed ſuch as have often made me both very ſorrowful to ſee the Chriſtian world ſo mad and quarelſom about their Commerce, and very fearful that God would either blaſt it to us, by taking it away and giving it to *Turks* and *Heathens*; or not bleſs us with it, giving us herein our hearts deſire in his wrath, and them the Goſpel in exchange thereof. As I clearly ſee he hath done to the *Jews*, the generalleſt and greateſt Merchants of the World: and as I think he threatens us Chriſtians in ſeveral places of *holy Scripture*, if they be duly conſidered. But becauſe I love not dogmatizing, or to be poſitive in things I am not ſo fully ſatisfied in; I ſhall at preſent ſay no more of this, but leave it to every good Chriſtians conſideration.

Having thus declared what corivalſhip implies as to equal powers, we ſhall now ſee it in unequal. And here *Intereſt* ſhews us,

That if we decline and become inferior in ſtrength, if they were ſo injurious

rious to us, that we had a juſt cauſe of War, yet muſt we not adventure it at fighting, but uſe policy to procure a Peace. And in my opinion this Piety and Wiſdom is taught us by our Saviour Chriſt in the Goſpel; for where Soldiers are alike, and no advantage of ground, &c. what is it but tempting of God & mere folly, for *ten thouſand to encounter twenty thouſand?* Yea though the diſparity was not ſo great; Wars being always hazardous to the weaker ſide, though they often be victorious: it being frequently found (as *Pyrrhus* ſaid of his warring with the *Romans*) that their very Victories do undo them. In ſuch caſes, old mens heads are better helps than young mens hands. To ſhew the refuges of weaker powers when threatned with Wars, would be a large diſcourſe. I ſhall therefore only hint ſome few generals, of many which I have obſerved. 1. To gain all time poſſible. 2. Therein to break down the ſtrongers deſigns, and weaken them at home as much as may be. 3. To raiſe them up enemies abroad by making them jealous of their power. 4. By alliance with others to ballance their might. 5. To prepare for a divertive rather than a direct War. 6. By propoſal of Marriages, &c. to make up the breach. 7. By procuring foreign Potentates mediation, and appealing to their Arbitration. 8. To make the beſt Peace they can, when beſt provided with power for War. For otherwiſe nothing is to be expected, but either an unſafe or a ſhort Peace, little better than a Truce or Holy-day of War.

Luc. 14. 31.

Allen.

Beſt is that Peace, whoſe Articles are made
Under a Shield, and written with a blade.

Now all theſe have many particulars conteined in them. For example in the firſt to gain time, by ſending Embaſſadors, and ſo ſtill that as one is returning another may be ſent: whereby a fair pretence of ignorance of tranſactions may be pleaded, and time ſpun out in further debates. By conceding one thing after another by degrees, ſtill reſerving the principal point of Intereſt entire, &c. And ſo of the reſt within the bounds of honeſt Policy. The reaſon of the caſe is ſo clear, that were it not for mens paſſions, inferiors in power would not be ſo ready to fight. For let them either be beaten or beat, it will redound at laſt to their own deſtruction. If the former, why ſhould they ſpend their blood and treaſure to make themſelves more miſerable? and if the latter, they do but enrage their enemies the more, who being more powerful will not for two or three Battells end the War, and come to a Peace to their great diſhonour. So that we may lay down this as a general rule for the weaker ſide, *That ſelf defence muſt be firſt for preparation, but laſt for execution.* Of all the Princes of *Europe* in our age, the Duke of *Lorraign* hath been the cunningeſt gameſter, but the fouleſt player with ſtronger powers. But oh, how is he catched in his own craftineſs! Although I confeſs I could not ſee him and his Court (as I have done ſince his diſaſter) without great commiſeration; to think that one of the ancienteſt Families and greatlieſt allyed of all *Europe*, ſhould fall into that condition. Of the former age the *Venetians*, who being

being oppreſt by their Neighbours the *Venetians*, that were more powerfull, would notwithſtanding needs War with them; wherein though they were often victorious, yet it proved their ruine at laſt, for which they are ſtigmatized for Fools to all ſucceeding Generations. And many other examples might be produced, but I think them needleſs in ſo plain a caſe.

And thus you ſee what our being competitors for Trade implies as to Intereſt in regard of War and Peace. Which I have been the larger upon, becauſe I know what work fools make wiſe men in both Nations. I have many times been put to it for patience, and ſometimes into a Paroxiſm of paſſion, to hear the ſenſleſs clamors of men. We are Competitors for Trade! It is our Intereſt! Our Intereſt! Down with the *Dutch!* Down with the *Engliſh*! Let us but conſider who theſe are, and we ſhall find them. Men that have a pound of paſſion, for one ounce of reaſon. Men that never ſaw, or at leſt not well obſerved both Nations. Men that never beſtowed one calm hour to ballance their powers. For wiſe men that knew both well, was but grieved to hear, or pleaſantly merry with ſuch madneſs. I publickly decryed ſuch folly in the firſt Wars, and had ſeverely chaſtiſed ſuch fools in the ſecond, if I had not been ſeveral ways hindred. Let me ſay it freely (I think I have ſome reaſon, for I believe there are few men that have better viewed both Nations with their eye, to that end which I have had, nor ballanced their power with greater accuracy) that if either the King of Great *Britain*, or the States, or both require it: I am ready to demonſtrate, that for theſe 20 or 30 years laſt paſt, there was nothing of advantage rationally to be expected on either ſide, that can countervail a War: nor as both might manage their power, likely to be, ſo long as both continued in that condition, for in powers about equal, all the difference is in the management thereof. And becauſe I ſee what work is made in the world, if I live to ſee the ballance come ſo even again, (though I think I never ſhall) I do here engage, for the publick peace of Proteſtants, and good of both Nations, to ſatisfie all rational men herein, I hope even to curioſity. And ſhall, if God ſpares me life and health, defend the ſame, againſt all the State-tinkers of both Nations; although I well know, they have great ſtore of ſmall Tools, with which they make a ratling in their Budgets.

Let us now proceed to ſuch inferences as our Adverſaries make from this competition in Trade.

Some argue thus, the *Engliſh* minding Trade more than the *French*, they may come and live among us and carry away our Commerce.

In my apprehenſion, there's more fear of their Souldiers coming hither than their Merchants. But ſuppoſe more Merchants did come, would that be any worſe for us? I have heard ſeveral of the greateſt Merchants of both Nations ſay, the more in a place and better, though I confeſs it is not ſo for Shopkeepers. But for this they may reſt ſecure, thoſe that knovv the cheapneſs of living in *England*, in compariſon of theſe Countries, will

abundantly satisfie them that fear this. Yea I shall shew hereafter that the *English* would have more reason to fear, that we should come thither, and deprive them of their Trades. Yet to say the truth, I see not that either need fear, were we under the *English*, that either Nation should suffer hereby; seeing all have had freedom that will to remove formerly, and that hath made so small an alteration as to the ballance of Trade, that it is inconsiderable. For if I make my calculation right, there is not much difference, of the *English* here, and the *Dutch* in *England*.

Others argue we are Corrivals for Trade, that is the Mistress we both Court, and therefore one must marry it.

But this is but a toyish Sophism, when men will compare Commerce to a Mistress, that one only can marry. For 1. The world is wide enough, and the Sea large enough for both Nations to exercise their skill and industry. 2. If we think to betroth all Trade, and ingross it to our selves alone; other Nations will come in and forbid the banes, as well as *England*, as I shall shew hereafter. 3. If we two could so happily agree, and so settle Commerce as it might perhaps be setled; we might bid fair for carrying it, or at least for retaining it betwixt us. And so far as my short sight can reach, this seems to me the mark aimed at on both sides, by those who have the direction of affairs, which I do not despair to see effected.

Seeing then we are in as much danger, that I say not more, to lose that part of Trade we have, as to gain more by our contesting; I hope all rational men will grant it our Interest, that *England* and we so compound for it, that each of us may have what *Gods* blessing, and justice, and equity gives to eithers industry. And this I am sure was the wisdom of former times. I have shown it already in part on our side, and could much more largely both for us and the *English*. In Queen *Elizabeths* time we were not grown up to our present greatness. In King *James*'s time, who all the world knows was no Martial man, but in his temper as well as *motto* truly pacifick, the Cautionary Towns that *England* possest in these Countries, were A. 1616. ransomed, and we grew up to that greatness of being an equal match for them in power at Sea. And this the *English* account the great error of Political Interest; although they must needs acknowledge it but fair and honest dealing. King *Charles* the First, that Prince of blessed and immortal memory, seeing how he grew up, not only kept a fair correspondency with us, but having experience how cross Parliaments were to the Court, so that no War could be carried on, did by a fair correspondence keep friendship with us; and not only so, but married his eldest Daughter to the *Prince of Orange* for this reason of State amongst others. For being jealous of this Common-wealth's favouring that party in his Kingdoms, which was then called by the Court *Puritans*, and seeing the growing greatness of this State by Sea, did for these two reasons of State, engage the Prince and this Common-wealth by that Marriage. And this was also the reason of State in *Oliver*'s time when Peace was made, that we must accord

accord for our mutal Trade. How it hath been ſince we all know, and therefore I need not mention it. And this is the firſt weapon our enimies uſe, which you ſee if we meaſure rightly, is too ſhort to touch, much leſs mortally to wound, the truth of that cauſe that we maintain.

Yet we muſt do our Adverſaries right: the wiſer ſort of them upon the ſuppoſal of equal powers, (as we have formerly been, and which is that I have hitherto ſpoke of) are for peace, and judge it the Intereſt of both Nations; but they think our coming under *France* will render *England* ſo unequal and inferior a match for us, that we cannot in all humane appearance miſs of marrying our beloved Lady *Trade*, and clearly carrying her from our Corrival. And I confeſs ingenuouſly if there be any thing of moment to be ſaid for *France*, 'tis this.

2. Therefore our Adverſaries are for *France*, becauſe thereby we ſhould be able to beat *England* out of their Trade, and ſo become maſters of the whole, or the greateſt part at leaſt of the Sea-negotiation.

Now becauſe they ſo much triumph in this, though before the victory; we will examin it thorowly, and ſee what probability there is of obtaining the greateſt part of Trade by this means.

1. We grant that *England* and this *Republick* being about an equal match at Sea; the acceſſion of *France* would clearly make us an overmatch for *England*, if all was true which they ſuppoſe.

2. But therein is their miſtake, that they take theſe two things for granted, which are both falſe. Firſt that theſe Maritime Provinces ſhould entirely become *French*. And ſecondly that all other Nations will ſtand neutral; ſo that we ſhall have no more to do, but *France* and we entirely to deal with *England* alone.

Now how far this is from truth, we ſhall make abundantly apparent, and by ballancing of powers how little probability there is, of theſe their deſignes becoming practicable, and ſuch as will effect their deſires.

1. Hereby they ſuppoſe a War, and ſuch a long and tedious one, as perhaps we may not live to ſee ended. For we cannot rationally imagine the *Engliſh* ſuch tame *animals*, that they will eaſily part with their Trade: but muſt ſuppoſe they will ſet all at ſtake, before that jewel of the Land be loſt. Now let us but calmly conſider, how deſtructive ſuch a War will be to our Trade, and what advantages they have above us of ſubſiſting under a long War, ſome of which we have before mentioned; and I do believe no wiſe man will think this our Intereſt, except there was a greater likelihood of a ſudden ſubduing them, then is rationally to be expected, as we ſhall preſently make apparent. Now on the contrary, if we come under *England*, there is no fear of a War with *France* at Sea, that Kingdom being ſo much inferior in maritime power to either of us, and much more to both. And ſhould we have a Land-war with *France*, yet that is more eligible for us than one by Sea, in the opinion of all wiſe men, as we have formerly ſhown, and ſhall have occaſion hereafter more fully.

2. A War

2. A War with *England* being ſuppoſed, as it muſt, (for we muſt either ſay we can and will have the Trade alone or the greateſt part thereof *invitis Anglis*, or we ſay nothing to the purpoſe) the readieſt way to ſee what probability there is for conquering them, and conſequently carrying the Trade; will be firſt by ballancing of powers, and then by ſome other Conſiderations. The former of theſe we ſhall do with reſpect to *Zeeland*, and then with reſpect to other Nations.

For the firſt it muſt be conſidered that *Zeeland* hath expreſly decared *that they will not come under France, but that if they cannot defend themſelves, they will then ſubmit to England.* It is true (as I have ſaid) it is the intereſt of theſe maritime Provinces to keep their League; but if their enemies Sword cuts it aſſunder, and they will not venture the loſs of their Religion and Liberty under *France*, who ſhall hinder them? They are free ſurely to diſpoſe of themſelves as well as *Utrecht*, or the other Provinces. For in coordinate Powers, when their confederacy is broken, either by themſelves or their enimies; each are at liberty, and in their former freedom, to diſpoſe of themſelves, as they ſhall think fit. And though *Freeſland* hath not declared, ſo that if they ſhould come to the utmoſt extremity, we know not but they might happily incline to *England* alſo; yet becauſe that is uncertain, we will be liberal in granting our Adverſaries even that which they cannot prove, and take to our ſelves only that we can, and ſo proceed upon infallible grounds.

Nor let any one here ſtop me, and ſay that in taking it for granted that *Zeeland* will be *Engliſh*, I may be miſtaken, for they may beat off their enemies and defend themſelves. I grant it, although by the way let me ſay it, I ſee but little likelihood of that; for of above 100 Companies they pay, there is as yet not one in their principalleſt Ilands (though how it comes ſo, becomes not me to enquire) but the thing is to me matter of admiration. But I will ſhew you how I reaſon; not from the War, that *England* will conquer *Zeeland*, nor from the Agreement betwixt the two Crownes, which yet is generally ſaid brings us under that: but upon ſuppoſal that we are tired out with the War, and come to treat with our enemies (for I hope no man is ſo mad, as to think theſe Provinces will as *Utrecht*, call them in, and after make what tearms we can get, but treat with them with our weapons in our hands) *Zeelands* not only *Declaration*, but *Inclination* carries them for *England*. So that which way ſoever we take conqueſt by our enemies, their diſpoſing of us, or our own diſpoſal of our ſelves, *Zeeland* is ſtill *Engliſh*. So that upon the ſuppoſition of inability to defend our ſelves, we are morally certain, that *Zeeland* will fall to *England*: and our Adverſaries uncertain, that *Holland* and *Frieſland* will chooſe *France*. But we will grant them all they can reaſonably deſire, *viz.* that theſe two Provinces make ſuch a choice, and thereupon proceed to the ballancing of Powers.

Now in Naval ſtrength, *Zeeland* hath the proportion of a ſixt part in this

this Republick; there being 5 Admiralities, wherein *Amſterdam* hath a double rate, we will ſuppoſe any number for a Fleet greater or leſs to be ſet out by them. For example, the States equip a Fleet of 72 Sail herein.

The Admirality of	*Rotterdam* and the *Miſe* is	12
	Amſterdam	24
	North Holland	12
	Zeeland	12
	Frieſland.	12
		72

Yea in the laſt War I find in the Liſt A. 1666. (which by the way, I wonder any Admiralities ſhould publiſh, and perceive there is none now) that *Zeeland*, was a greater ſhare than *Frieſland* both in Ships and Men.

Zeeland 15 Ships. 676 Canon. 2268 Seamen. 807 Souldiers.
Frieſland 11—— 638 —— 2748 —— 260——

Although I know in the *quota* or Tax to the Publick, *Frieſland* is more: but that is becauſe of their greater ſhare in the Land, which is a certain revenue, and Trade only a contingency. In ſtrength then at Sea we ſee, that *Zeeland*, at leſt ballances *Frieſland* if not more, ſhould that Province prove *French*, and this is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe.

Now let us look abroad, and we ſhall as clearly find, that *Spain* comes into the *Engliſh* ſcale. For which way ſoever *France* takes, *Spain* muſt take the contrary. Nay in this caſe, *Spain* is as much concerned as *England*. For if *France* have theſe Provinces entirely, how ſhall they alone be able to bring home their *American* Treaſure? They know to their ſorrow, what they have loſt formerly by the *Dutch* taking their Plate-fleets; and what an extraordinary charge and hazard they had to defend them. And ſhall we not then think, that they will rather venture to the utmoſt with the *Engliſh*, than let us intercept their Treaſure, and after ſome years be maſter of their Mines? It is true, if I was led as the world is uſually, to judge by news, which hath been for ſome months that *Spain* and *England* are breaking, all this was frivolous; but I make my meaſures from reaſons of State, which tells me, that they will not, becauſe they muſt not, and they muſt not, becauſe it is their mutual Intereſt, and it is their Intereſt, becauſe otherwiſe they cannot ballance *France*, but will both in time be ruined. So then you ſee clearly, that upon ſuppoſition that *Holland* be *French*, it will be *England* and *Spain* againſt *France* and *Holland*, and ſo we are again ballanced.

We are thus far upon ſure grounds, we ſhall now proceed to that which is not much leſs certain, if we rightly conſider. And that is, that *Denmark* in all probability will become alſo our Enemies, if we take *France* ſo far for our Friends, as to make him our Maſter. Let us but well obſerve a few fundamental *Maxims of State*, which every Nation according to their Intereſt frame for their Government, and it will much help us to make a right

right judgment in all such cases. Now this is one of that Kingdoms, *Not to suffer any one to be absolute Soveraign of Trade and Navigation, if they can possibly prevent it.* For the revenues of that Crown mostly consisting of toll in the *Sound*; we cannot imagine the *Danes* such dullards, but they know who ever is so, will soon open that passage, and make it as free as the water it self between the *North and Baltick Seas*. And then the King may sit in's house at *Gluckstadt*, and take toll of Boats that pass in the *Elve*; instead of *Copenhagen*, and his Castle of *Croneberg*, where now he takes toll of all ships in the *Sound*.

I foresee it will be said, that *Sweden* will ballance *Denmark*, if that should be so. But see then what work this *Trade* will make in the world. And this is wholly uncertain: nay, Interest will rather incline to the contrary. For though *Sweden* be none of the richest in Trade, yet have they their share to lose as well as the rest. And the Revenues of that Crown consisting much in Copper, (which hath occasioned their Armies spoiling all the Mines of that Metal in *Germany*, and wheresoever they could, on purpose to enhance their own) they know very well that pains might have been spared, if Commerce should have an absolute Monarch; and that with all the *Chimistry* that they can use, they shall not be able to extract silver and gold out of that Mettal, when one only Chapman comes to the market. Besides their *Bremish* and other Territories on this side the *Baltick*, will soon lye a bleeding, they know; if *France*'s Sword comes to wound the Roman Eagle, and his race. It may be some may say the *Dane* dares not for fear of losing that we are indebted to him. But who knows not that it is better to lose a part, than the whole. And if blows be a way of paying of debts, we may happily have *Portugal* so to pay us.

3. Having thus ballanced the apparent strength of both sides, we shall proceed to some other considerations, concerning the same. For it is not enough to consider power absolutely, but also the management thereof; for less powers well managed, are usually prevalent above greater. And herein are many things, which in my judgment, were we an over-match for them, which you see is not so, would render our ruining their Naval power, and consequently their Traffick impracticable. As 1. Supposing we are under *France*, shall their whole Fleet constantly be here, and leave the *French* Coast naked, or shall they from thence come to joyn with us for our Sea expeditions? If the former, *France* is subject continually to be molested and diverted from *England*; and if the latter to be intercepted, by reason of their situation. 2. Who shall have the direction of Naval Affairs, is to me very considerable. Whether the *French* alone, or conjoyntly with the *Dutch*; for that the latter only should be intrusted, is not to be imagined. The former way is liable to miscarry through unskilfulness, the latter through jealousies and dissentions. 3. Where shall Mariners be had for our Fleets? shall the *French* press here as in their own Kingdom? If so, I foresee, we shall soon lose our Sea-men. Or shall they only use Volunteers?

Volunteers? Then their number will be ſmall, becauſe the *French* pay is not great. I might mention other particulars, as the *French* and *Dutch* Officers diſcord. The manner of payments, and from whence, &c. But theſe are enow to ſhew us, that which way ſoever we look there's nothing but difficulty and danger ſtares us in the face.

4. But we have yet that which is more momentous, and that is the ſituation of Great *Britain*. For could we knock their men in the head, as eaſily as our *Borinne*'s their eggs; and ſink their Ships, as if they were ſhells; yet we cannot poſſibly remove the Iſland. Which is, 1. Not only nigh unto us, but over againſt us, ſo that we cannot look out, but we are upon them. 2. So ſituated, that ſhould we bear them and their Aſſociates, (which is not eaſie in equal powers) they can ſtill manage a War deſtructive to us. And what good will it do any but the envious, to ruine others, if they be ruined themſelves? For with a few Ships in the Chanel, wherein they have Harbours all along, to go in and out at pleaſure; they will force us continually to ſail with great Convoys, or we ſhall be forced to fall into their hands. And the like may be ſaid of the Northern paſſage by the *Oreades*, where a few Ships will obſtruct our Trade. Now how great a prejudice this is to Traffick, I leave all knowing men to judge. For by this means. No ſingle Ships, nor ſmall numbers can ſail. Reſtraint will be laid upon going out but in great Fleets, and with ſufficient Convoys. Many will be neceſſitated to lie idle, and at great expences to wait for their Company, whilſt they could ſometimes have performed their voyage. And Merchants loſe particular deſigns, which are uſually the greateſt profit, to ſuch as are able rightly to manage them. 3. In ſtorms and tempeſts we ſhall be frequently forced into their Harbours, and ſo fall as a prey into their mouths.

5. *Britain* and *Ireland* being *Iſlands*, are not eaſily invaded, and ſo diverted by a Land War, but that they may ſolely attend to a Maritime, when they are once engaged therein. Whereas *France* being on the Continent, is ſubject to invaſion from *Spain* on ſeveral ſides. Which was one reaſon, why our Anceſtors preferred the guardianſhip of *England*, before that of *France*.

6. *Tangier* in the mouth of the *Streights*, will be no ſmall prejudice to our *Mediterranean* Trade. Which if the mould or harbour can be made firm, will prove of great concernment to the *Engliſh* Crown, and a ſtrong curb to all their enemies Traffick. And here I might adde, *Cadiz*, and all the Coaſt of *Spain*; for if we be *French*, no wiſe man (I think) will doubt, but we ſhall have *Spain* our enemies again.

And theſe things I think are abundantly ſufficient to diſmount our Adverſaries confidence, of carrying away the Trade from *England*, if we ſhould come under the power of *France*.

3. Another grand Argument againſt us is, that we are more likely to enjoy Peace under *France* than *England*.

Peace (I confeſs) is an invaluable bleſſing. How many and great miſeries doth it free us from! Bloodſhed, violence to our Perſons and Eſtates, unquietneſs, and almoſt all manner of troubles. How many and great mercies doth Peace bring along with it! It is both the mother that bears, and the nurſe that brings up all our temporal bleſſings. It gives us mercies, the freedom of enjoying them, and ſweetens their enjoyment. It contains liberty, plenty, equity, tranquility, pleaſure, and ſafety. So that he was a mad man that ſhould not chuſe Peace. But I fear our coming under *France*, is neither the way to procure Peace, nor the means to preſerve it. And that we by ſo doing, ſhall but have *Ixions* fate in the Fable, embrace a cloudy and tempeſtuous War, inſtead of the fair and beloved *Juno* of Peace.

1. Let it be conſidered; that if we have Peace by Land, we have War by Sea: which is to leap out of the frying-pan into the fire. It is an old and a good political axiom, *Ex duobus malis minus eſt eligendum*; Theological it was never, for in Divinity, *Nullum malum eſt eligendum*. Now if we rightly meaſure our Intereſt, we ſhall find a Land War much more eligible for us upon many accounts, which I need not here to mention, they being eaſily imagined by all wiſe men. For ſhould it be granted, that for the preſent the two Crowns accord and we have Peace: it will either be ſuch a one as will ruine us, or cannot be laſting to be ſure; but in a very few years will neceſſarily come to the ballance I have mentioned of *Spain* and *England* againſt *France* and *Holland*.

2. Let us therefore examine their grounds; that ſo we may ſee before us, and not run our ſelves blindfold into deſtruction. Which ſo far as I can diſcern are theſe four. *The power and prevalency of his Arms. His treaſure to maintain them. His nearneſs to us. And his Allies.*

Firſt for the *power and prevalency of his Arms.* 1. It is true his numbers are great, both in Arms and in the Kingdom of *France*. The great advantages he hath, by the largeneſs, compactneſs, ſituation, and ſoil of his Dominions; the infinite number of Nobility and Gentry for Cavalry, and the populouſneſs of his Cities and Provinces for Infantry, which capacitate him above all the Princes of *Europe*, to enlarge his Empire; I well know, and willingly grant.

But what relates to the Kingdom of *France* concerns not us *Netherlanders* in this caſe further than as to his Arms and power to defend us. Now in my reaſon the greater power in the *Soveraign*, the leſs liberty in the *Subject*, as we have already ſhown. So that the more numerous his Armies, and ſo much the worſe. Doth not *France* groan under this burden, and ſhall we deſire to do ſo, or help to eaſe them by bearing part thereof on our backs? If we be ſo kind, I dare engage we may have it all, and a thouſand thanks from that Kingdom. Which is ſo wearied with it, that above one half of them (if my intelligence greatly deceive me not) would rejoyce to ſee it leſſened, though it were with ſome loſs to the honour of the Nation. But becauſe I write not to be known, but to better the world, and with my

Sect. 5.

my bucket of water to help to quench the Flames, that threaten deſtruction to the Proteſtant Intereſt; I ſhall deſire all intelligent perſons to enquire of thoſe that underſtand *France*, or have come lately thence; and then let them conſider if their condition be deſirable. If a numerous Army lies quartered upon us, ſhall we not both be kept under by them, and eaten up of them? And although they be paid in the Kings name, yet muſt not we find our ſhare of the money? I never yet read or heard of any wiſe people, that deſired their Prince ſo potent, for fear he ſhould oppreſs them. A due Mediocrity hath always been counted beſt. Let any one read the *Greek* and *Roman* Hiſtorians, or any others that are wiſely writ: and he ſhall find, if he duly obſerve, that the *Princes Potency hath always been the peoples jealouſie*.

2. It is alſo true, that he hath been ſucceſsful in his Arms againſt us, beyond moſt mens imaginations, and perhaps even his own hopes and expectations. But if all things be rightly conſidered, it is no ſuch wonder as the world makes it. Our Wars by Sea; our inteſtine Diviſions; the cowardiſe of ſome; the corruption of many; and our multiplicity of Garriſons, whereby our Forces were ſo parcel'd, that fighting ſeverally they were eaſily vanquiſhed; together with ſeveral other cauſes which concurr'd under the hand of *Divine Juſtice*, makes it no wonderment to wiſe and conſiderate men. Nor is it any new thing in the world, but that which hath befallen moſt of the Nations in *Europe*, as all their Hiſtories abundantly witneſs.

3. Nor will this evince our defence. For it hath often been experimented, that thoſe that have won much in a little time, have loſt it again in leſs. How did the ſame *French* Nation under *Charles* the 8. over-run moſt part of *Italy* in a little time, and quickly loſt it, as the many Hiſtorians of both Nations relate! And in our days, how did the *Swede* like lightning paſs through *Poland*; which was quickly extinct and came to nothing! And ſo may this (if it pleaſe God, and we manage our work wiſely) like a thunderclap and ſudden flaſh of lightning, affright and aſtonith us, more than hurt us, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

4. If *France* goes on, the world grows ſo jealous of their greatneſs, that they may poſſible have work enough; when their hand is againſt every one, and every one againſt them; and then where ſhall be our peace and defence? It is known by all that know former times, how in the *Roman* Monarchy when they were diſtreſſed at home, they ſtill called their Forces from abroad, and left their conquered Provinces to ſhift for themſelves, as I might inſtance in *Spain*, *France*, *England*, and many others both Eaſtern and Weſtern. And indeed it always is thus; ſo that ſhould *France* be fallen into by *Spain*, or *England*, or the *Empire*, or *Italy*, or other ſeveral of theſe joyntly, or ſhould they fall into Civil Wars, which are more frequent there than any, yea I think I may ſay all the Kingdoms in *Europe*; in what condition ſhould we then be? Truly I will tell you, I think fighting

with the *French*, and more eager to be rid of them, then many are now to receive them. If any one ſay, but would you have us entertain the *Engliſh*? I ſay no, but preſerve our own freedom by complying with them as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

5. If we will eſpouſe all the quarrels of *France* we may poſſibly have more than enow; and ſuch as may prove our ruin, rather than ſafety and ſecurity. Our Marriners have their Wars by Sea, our citizens and Souldiers by Land. Our Merchants Trade to pay their money, and all to raiſe *France* to the univerſal *Monarchy*, to the ruin of the Reformed Religion, and alſo the greateſt part of Chriſtendom. And though now his friends be many, yet if he once comes to receive a check his enemies will be more.

6. I ſee no need we have to fear all his power and prevalency, if we will do our duty, and quit our ſelves as men for our Country. And if we do, upon our friendſhip with the Crown of *England*, we may haye Souldiers enow out of thoſe 3 Kingdoms, which are as good Infantry ſurely as *French*, by their own *Hiſtorians* Confeſſion, and it is *Foot* we want (if any) for the defence of our Garriſons. And beſides that they are not ſo likely to be remanded, as thoſe of *France*; thoſe Kingdoms being Ilands, leſs liable to invaſion, and leſs likely to be engaged in foreign, or to be involved in Domeſtick Wars.

Secondly, for his treaſure, it cannot be denied to be very great. But this is rather againſt, than for our Adverſaries. For *the richer the Soveraign the poorer the ſubject*. And I never knew any people yet, that deſired to have their Prince ſo rich, eſpecially when it comes out of their own pockets. I will not meddle with the diſpute of the *Greeks Oſtraciſme*, nor that of Politicians, whether poverty or riches in the Soveraign be better for the ſubject. A due mean wiſe men have allways accounted beſt. When neither the Prince may be jealous of his people for their *Riches*, nor they of him for his *Treaſures*; but that they may mutually depend on each other, for the good of the whole. For as it is difficult to determin, what the Magiſtrate may not demand, in caſe of neceſſity; ſo is it eaſie to conclude, that he ought not to impoveriſh his people when there is none, and make himſelf rich by their ruins. That being tollerable, but this intollerable oppreſſion.

Nor is it imaginable, that he will make *France* poor, to make us rich. Nor is it credible that if they remain poor, we ſhall remain rich. For in all Princes there remain ſome jealouſies of a conquered people, that they may, upon ſome revolution of affaires or other, revolt. And therefore it is their uſual practice, by all ways poſſible to drain them, and draw their riches home; as the *Romans* into *Italy*, and other Conquerors their own Kingdoms; either by bringing it into their own Treaſuries, or Native ſubjects purſes, or rather both, that ſo they may command it upon all occaſions.

Thirdly, for their nearneſs unto us, we know it too well. And if the ſubdued

ſubdued Provinces remain in their hands, ſhall find what it is to have ſuch neighbors. But otherwiſe *England* is nearer us than *France*, and can eaſilier come to our aſſiſtance. For the *French* have not only a long march, but through part of the Empire, which is their enemie, and ſo liable to obſtruction. As to the Prince of *Liege* (or Archbiſhop of *Colen*) *Duke* of *Newburg* and others that have permitted this paſſage, they may pay dear enough for it hereafter; as their ſubjects, are paying for it at preſent, even to the *French* themſelves. Who are ſo weary of their Company, that I perſwade my ſelf, they will be the firſt that will endeavour, to drive them out, when they ſhall find an opportunity.

But we are not affraid of all our Adverſaries weapons, and therefore will enforce their Argument, by ſuppoſing all they can deſire; That *France* will keep theſe conquered Provinces, and in all probability make new acqueſts, by ſubduing of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*. So that if we be not ſubject to him, we ſhall never be at quiet, but they will continually be as Thorns in our ſides.

1. And why may we not as well ſuppoſe, that if we be under him, we ſhall never be at reſt for others? For no Potentate in Chriſtendom hath more jealous eyes upon him, nor likelier to be continually imployed in Wars. Now what will changing help us, if we better not our condition? For we may eaſily foreſee, that if we come under *France*, we ſhall have *England* and *Spain* againſt us by Sea (as we have ſaid) and the *Germans* and *Spaniſh* Provinces by Land, and ſo ſhall be in the ſame condition, though not by the ſame enemies, that we are now; ground like Corn betwixt the Mil-ſtones. Yea it is more than probable, that knowing the tickliſh condition and mutinous temper of the *French* Nation, he will bring his Wars into theſe Countries and their confines, and ſo we ſhall again become, the Cock-pit of War for all *Europe*.

2. I doubt not but he will attacque the *Spaniſh* Provinces and ſeek to connect them with his conqueſts, and then incorporate all with *France*. But it is uncertain what time this may require before they be all under his power. We know not the Articles between the two Crowns, nor are we ſure that *England* and *Auſtria* will ſee this work. Many things may fall out, which no mans eye can foreſee. The King of *France* is mortal and may die, and the *Dauphin* young and ſo uncapable to carry on ſuch mighty deſigns. Or he may meet with a check in his enterpriſes, and be ſtopt in his further progreſs of glory. *France* is harraſt, and weary of Wars, may fall to their former mutinies. The King of *Spain* may grow more potent. *England*, *Sweden* and the *Cantons* of *Switzerland* may think themſelves concerned, as well as the *Empire* and *Spain*, to ſtop the growing greatneſs of *France*. The *Spaniſh* may divert him in *Catalonia* and elſe where. Sickneſs and mortallity may ſeize upon his Armies. Factions in his court, diſcontents in the Country, tumults in his Kingdom, and many other Accidents may happen, to call him off us, or at leaſt neceſſitate him to give us rea-

ſonable

ſonable conditions, and confine him to his own Kingdom. So that 'tis madneſs to avoid a preſent miſchief, to run our ſelves upon certain ruine.

3. If we had the friendſhip of *England*, we might ſoon be in a capacity to defend our ſelves againſt *France*, and need not fear the power of their Arms. I do not ſay that we alone are able to recover at preſent what we have loſt, without the aſſiſtance of others: But that theſe remaining Provinces are able to defend themſelves, and either let go the other, or in time poſſibly regain them, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

Fourthly, For his *Allies*, they need not fright us. For all friendſhip of the World, and eſpecially publick, proves often times like winter brooks, which run freely when we have leaſt need of them, but fail us in drought when we want their Water. If the fortunes of *France* ſhould once decline, we ſhould ſee thoſe that now adore them, readily renounce this their idolatry, and not only confeſs their former fault, but help to turn the *Wheel* about, and bring them under whom they now exalt.

And thus we ſee what ſmall grounds there are of enjoying ſuch great Peace under *France*, as our Adverſaries flatter themſelves withal, and would perſwade the World of; which will never find credit with wiſe men, who are uſed to judge by Reaſons of State, and not by the vain arguments of fancy.

4. The fourth argument for *France* is, their having the *upper Provinces* already, which are of ſuch concernment to the *Nether*, that they affirm we cannot want them, and therefore we muſt call in *France* that he may have them all, that ſo they may be joyned under one *Head*.

We cannot want them ſay they. 1. For our *Security*, and 2. for our *Commerce*.

Let us therefore examine theſe things, and having ſo done, we ſhall give a releaſe to your patience in this great Argument of our Adverſaries concerning *Trade*.

Firſt that we cannot want them for our *Security*, is apparently falſe. Nay upon a *Politick account* we had better part with them, though not in point of *Honour* and *Religion*.

1. They were a continual charge to thoſe inferior *Provinces*, which yet was willingly born, in regard of their being an out Sconſe to us, which many ſuppoſed ſufficiently ſtrong for our defence. Which yet others have always doubted of, and now we find they had ſufficient reaſon. Seeing then ſome of them willingly deſerted us, and others ſlightly defended themſelves, and us conſequently, and thus laid us open to the invaſion of our enemies: if we let them go, and they ſuffer thereby, they may thank themſelves, and we muſt otherwiſe ſecure our Country.

2. I wonder men ſhould think they can ſecure us, when we ſee the contrary by our experience. Nay indeed this was the great miſtake that had like to have ruined us all. For we relying on them, was unprepared for our own defence, whereby the whole was greatly endangered. Yea ſo greatly.

greatly, that if the *French* had fallen into *Holland*, when they came to *Utrecht*, I tremble to think, what work they might have made amongſt us.

3. It was apparent that the boundaries of the Common-wealth, was too great, and our Garriſons too many, to defend againſt ſuch powerful Armies. Which at the ſame time are not only Maſters of the Field, but able to aſſault what Places they pleaſe. This War being far different from our former with *Spain* (or leſs Potentates) wherein we had an Army to ballance theirs, for relief of ſuch Garriſons as were at any time attackt by them. And this the *Author* of the *Intereſt of Holland*, hath long ſince well obſerved, and experience now ſhews us. Wherein I dare be his ſecond, againſt any combatants that dare encounter him.

4. Let any man but recount our Garriſons with their greatneſs, and compute what number of men is requiſite for their defence; and he will ſoon ſee, whether I have not clear reaſon on my ſide. I ſhall not now ſtand to do that, though if any be obſtinate, I can do it ſufficiently to convince him: that though the *States* in times of Peace maintain 60000, and in this War above 100000 men by Land; yet were they not half enow to defend all our Garriſons, and keep an Army in the Field to relieve them. And therefore I never expected any better ſucceſs of the War, than now we ſee; though my judgment was entertained by many with merriment, and of others with fears it might prove Prophetical. For we muſt either have diſmantled moſt of the weakeſt, and ſupplied a few of moſt conſequence for a ſtrong reſiſtance; or it was never likely it ſhould be otherwiſe than it is; it being always found true by experience, that *multiplicity of weak powers prove none againſt ſtrong*, for *dum ſinguli pugnant, univerſi vincuntur*. And therefore we ſee our enemies, had the wiſdom to wave *Maeſtricht*, that was provided with men to give them work; and fell upon ſuch places, as they either knew their money had, or their Swords could moſt eaſily conquer.

5. Many of our outmoſt Garriſons lying in a champaign Country, cannot be relieved, without a powerful Army of Cavalry. And theſe Countries are very uncapable many ways both for keeping and marching great numbers of Horſe. In theſe lower Provinces Land being ſo dear, and more profitable for Cows than Horſes; and ſo many great Rivers, which cannot be paſt with Bridges, except we make them of Boats continually, is ſufficient demonſtration that they cannot be here. And in the upper Provinces there is not forrage for ſuch a body of Horſe, as we muſt have if we will relieve our outmoſt Garriſons. And this thoſe that know them knows. Let us from *Bergen op Zoom* paſs along the coaſt of *Brabant* by *Breda* and our other Garriſons even as far as *Maeſtricht*, and from thence back to the *Buſs* which is the greateſt part of the open Country we have (for *Gelderland*, *Utrecht* and *Overiſſel* are full of Rivers) and we ſhall find that which belongs to us, inconſiderable for this purpoſe; the greateſt part of that Country being heath, and barren ground.

I know well that moſt of the Cities lie upon Rivers, but I know alſo and ſo do all of ordinary underſtanding, that a Fort on either ſide commands them, and ſo bars our paſſage by water to them.

But let us inſtance in one for all. I wiſh mine adverſaries would ſhew us any way to relieve *Maeſtrecht* if it ſhould be aſſaulted and diſtreſſed by the *French*. I mean that is practicable, for we are not now diſcourſing of *Mathematical powers*, which demonſtrate motions as ſwift as the Sun's, and the plucking up Oaks with a ſingle hair, and ſuch like curioſities that can never be done; but of *Martial powers*, which are not for ſpeculative notions, but practical performances.

6. Let us but conſider who hath paid thoſe great Armies we have conſtantly kept, and muſt pay many more both Foot, and Horſe (which are much more chargeable) that we muſt keep, if we will defend theſe out-Provinces againſt powerful enemies; and we ſhall ſoon ſee that we muſt pay very dear for their uncertain and weak defence of us. For this purpoſe I ſhall ſatisfie the curious with inſerting the proportion of Taxes which each Province pays to the Publick for the Armies and other expences: whereby it will appear that the *quota* of theſe ſuperior Provinces, *Gelderland*, *Over-Iſſel*, and *Utrecht* (which the *French* now poſſeſs) is very inconſiderable, wherein alſo they have often been behind, and will be much leſs able now to pay it, being ſo much impoveriſhed.

Gelderland	5	12	3
Utrecht	5	16	7½
Over-Iſſel	3	11	5
Holland	58	6	2½
Zeeland	9	3	8
Frieſland	11	13	2½
Groening	5	16	7½

7. If they be regained, we muſt pay for it, they being now under our enemies. And what an infinite of blood and treaſure that will coſt, if our enemy will not quit them on reaſonable terms in treaty, I leave any man to judge.

8. If we rightly conſider, great Territories are for Kings, ſmall only fit for Common-wealths. This we may obſerve in the Hiſtories of former times, in the *Grecian* Republicks and their neighbour Kingdoms. For the *Roman* was mixt of *Monarchy* and *Ariſtocracy*, by the great power of their *Conſuls* ruling as Monarchs by their turns, and eſpecially in dangers by *Dictators*. Yea our own experience hath ſhown us this in the neighbouring Kingdoms. But what ſhall I ſay, many men are like the Judges Statues at *Thebes*; have their eyes blinded and hands lamed, though not for Juſtice but for judgment, they can neither ſee nor feel before them. In 59 being then in *England*, in ſome Gentlemens Company, where there were ſome zealous Republicans, and I from Hiſtory and obſervation

ſhewing

ſhewing them, that in great Dominions, eſpecially, where there are many Nobility, a Common-wealth could never ſtand long; that if there, it muſt be from the City of *London* managing it as *Rome* had done, and not as they went to work, and ſeveral other things, ſhewing the impracticableneſs of their notions, (which I have reaſon to remember, for I was complained of to *Lambert*, and was in danger of being called before the *Council of State*) In the year 60. ſome of them took me for half a Prophet, and ſo perhaps may ſome hereafter, for what I ſhall now ſay: *That if we affect great Territories by Land we ſhall loſe all.* It is our Sea affairs, that we are ſet for by our Country, made for by our genious, and fit for eſpecially, by our imployment. And we may as well think to turn our Rivers, as change theſe things, nay, indeed, if we could, it would quickly turn to our deſtruction: Traffick by Sea, as I formerly have ſhown, being our chief ſecular intereſt.

But I foreſee what will here be ſaid, that a weak defence is better than none, and how all theſe *Inferior Provinces* be otherwiſe ſecured.

And it is very true indeed, *better a weak wall, than none at all.* And if we could not build a ſtronger, and at leſs charges, and with far leſs coſt for reparation and defence againſt the violent ſtorms of our Enemies, (for none can ſecure us againſt Heaven) we ſhould be aſhamed to have thrown down the old, which (in my judgment) is by the former Conſiderations levelled with the ground. For as it is folly to pull down before we conſider how to build better, ſo we muſt take heed that therein we commit not thoſe errors which many wiſe men (though that was none of their wiſdom) have frequently (as I have often obſerved) fallen into in their building, *To beſtow as much in piecing and patching an old houſe, as would build a new one far ſtronger and better: and when they have built either old or new, to find ſeveral inconveniencies therein, which a provident fore-ſight might have prevented.* As the ingenious Mathematician Dr. *Wren* hath demonſtrated (as I hear) in *England*, that they had better build S. *Paul*'s in *London* anew, than repair the old. So I think I am able to demonſtrate, that we had better make a new defence for theſe inferior Provinces, than that of the ſuperior. But it muſt be well conſidered of, leſt we find inconveniences therein afterwards. And as in *Architecture* I pleaſantly play with dice and cards alone (which others do in company) making my walls of the former, and floors and covering of the latter, to ſee the conveniences and inconveniences therein, better than in plain figures; and eſpecially to demonſtrate the ſame to others that will adviſe with me therein, and are no Mathematicians: ſo here I muſt confeſs I have ſeriouſly pulled down and ſet up ſeveral defences for us, which are too long to relate. But I will briefly touch of ſome things, which are ſufficient (I think) to ſilence mine Adverſaries.

There are 5 or ſix ways of Natural Fortification and defence of a Country.

Seas for Iſlands, which are the beſt. For though they are thereby incapacitated to enlarge their Empire abroad, being by the Sea as it were confined to home, yet have they great advantages thereby, not only of

Maritime Negotiation, but alſo ſecurity from Invaſion. So that they are at ſmall charges for maintaining Armies; which thoſe that live on Continents, muſt conſtantly do for their defence: otherwiſe the door ſtands open for the firſt that comes, to enter in and take poſſeſſion.

Great Mountains that are unpaſſible for Armies, or ſuch paſſes as the famous *Thermopyles*, which are eaſily defended, and theſe are next to Seas the beſt defence.

Vaſt Wilderneſſes where Armies can have no Proviſion to march, but what they carry along with them, as in *Africa*.

Peninſular Countries, which are eaſily retrencht within lines of ſecurity, as the famous Wall in the North of *England*, firſt made by *Agricola*, *Nero*'s General there, repaired by *Hadrian*, and after by *Severus* againſt the *Picts*, the ruines whereof are ſtill apparent. And *Scotland* often alſo againſt *England* hath thus retrencht themſelves, even in our days with great ſafety againſt the *Engliſh* Army; which if they had had the wiſdom to have kept within, they had ſaved themſelves and the Kingdom: but their adventurous folly in forſaking them, was dearly paid for by the loſs of both.

Great Rivers which cannot eaſily be paſt. As *Euphrates* in the *Eaſt*, and the *Rhyne* in the *Weſt*, defended thoſe Nations beyond them, from the great power of the *Romans*.

And laſtly inundations by Water, mariſh and boggy grounds, *&c.*

I might be large in examples of all theſe in ſeveral Kingdoms of the World; and alſo in the wonderful Providence of God, who hereby ſets bounds and limits to the mighty *Nimrod*'s of the World, ſaying unto them by the voice of Nature as to the great Seas and Waters, *hitherto ſhall ye go and no further:* but I will confine my ſelf to our own Country.

Now theſe Provinces if we conſider them aright, are naturally fortified moſt of theſe ways. Not by Mountains, for we live in a level Country; nor by Deſarts and barren Wilderneſſes, for we have a fruitful Land, like *Canaan* flowing with milk and honey. But all the other ways we are defenſible; ſo that if we can but defend our ſelves by Sea, and keep that for our Commerce; we need not fear all our Enemies by Land. We have the Sea to guard us below, mighty Rivers not only within, but on both ſides theſe Provinces to defend us: we are either Iſlands as *Zeeland*; or Peninſular as *Frieſland* and *Groeningen* together, and *Holland* and *Utrecht*, by reaſon of the Sea and great Rivers that almoſt ſurround them. And let it come to the utmoſt extremity, we can by Water drown our Enemies, and ſave our ſelves in our Cities. So that they that talk of conquering us, muſt either be fools, or ignorant of the Country: and thoſe that fear to be conquered, puſillanimous and frighted with vain bravadoes.

But we will be a little more particular, in running over briefly the ſeveral Provinces.

Zeeland conſiſting wholly of Iſlands, is thereby well fortified, and the Inhabi-

Inhabitants ſo uſed to the Water, that they are not eaſily maſtered therein.

Frieſland and *Groningen* together, are almoſt ſurrounded with the *North* and *South* Seas, together with the River *Emes*, and ſcarce acceſſible by Land in regard of the mariſh or boggy grounds, if *Coeverden* and ſome other ſtrong places on the paſſes be kept.

Holland will prove the greateſt difficulty, and of moſt conſequence; that Province being the Head and Heart of this Republick. For this end I muſt ſuppoſe that we muſt have part of the Province of *Utrecht*, which we muſt either regain by Treaty, or by ſtrength, let it coſt what it will, both for our communication, and future ſafety. And then we have theſe two again almoſt environed with the *North* and *South Seas* and ſeveral branches of the *Rhyne* and *Maes*. Only one neck of ground between the *Leck* and *South Sea* of 5 or 6 miles, where a River might be cut to carry water from the former, as ſomething higher, into the latter: from between *Viana* and *Twael*, from whence downwards the River is deep, and hath the Tyde flowing up, by *Houten*, *Heer*, *Melis waert*, *Melaeten*, and ſo along the low grounds to *Pynenborch* into the [illegible] *Eem* to the *South Sea*. Which will make the whole adjacent Count[illegible] being low, ſtagnate with water, and ſo defend theſe two Provinces from their enemies incurſions. And the reſt are done to our hands, by the ſeveral foldings of the Arms of thoſe two great Rivers, the *Rhyne* and the *Maſe*, whoſe ſeveral denominations I need not mention, nor the places where, theſe being ſufficiently known to thoſe that know theſe Countries.

But oh *Utrecht*! *Utrecht!* I foreſee there will ſo much depend upon that one City, that I fear the greateſt Affairs of *Europe* will hang, and turn upon that ſingle hinge. I know we flatter our ſelves they will part with it, and I wiſh we may not be deceived; but I fear far other things, not ſo much from what I have ſaid, as from other reaſons of State. But if any will ask what thoſe are: I ſay *Ho-la*, I am ſo far from publiſhing them, that if the ſhirt on my back knew the thoughts of my heart herein, it ſhould be my firſt work to burn it.

But our Adverſaries will fight it out to the ſtumps both of their ſtrength and weapons. They ſay the *French* in the Superior Provinces hath the command of our *Rivers*, and ſo will be able to ruine our *Trade*.

Truly I am tired with this long diſcourſe of Trade, and therefore for a divertiſement I will tell you a ſhort and pleaſant ſtory. Upon a time King *James* of Great *Britain*, was angry with the City of *London*, and ſent for ſome of the Aldermen and Common Council, whom he firſt chid, and then threatned that he would take away their *Charters*, ſpoil them of their Priviledges, and ruine the City, that he would. An old Fox that ſtood behind, perceiving the King in a paſſion, and the reſt of the *Ruffs* in a ſilent fright, pretended deafneſs; and induſtriouſly that his Majeſty might obſerve him, enquired firſt of one and then of another; *What ſays his Majeſty? what? Doth he ſay he will turn the River of*

Thames? The King perceiving it, would needs know what he ſaid, and being told, burſt out into laughter, and ſwore in his Scottiſh dialect he was a *fauſe louue*, and packt them away. So let me merrily ask mine Adverſaries one after another, what? will the King of *France* turn the *Rhyne*? will he turn the *Maes*? Will he cut off the arms of thoſe mighty Rivers? Or will he riveletiſe them into more hundred furrows than Hiſtorians tell us *Cyrus* did *Gyndes* when he went to take *Babylon*? Will he chaſtiſe the South Sea, and fetter it, as *Xerxes* did the *Helleſpont*, making *Harderwick* and *Hoorne* as *Seſtus* and *Abydus* of old, now the ſtrong Caſtles the *Turks* have made in the *Dardanels*? Let the old rich Merchants that have more money to loſe than I, fear that, I do not. And except he can, ſo long as we keep the mouth of the Rivers where they exonorate themſelves into the Sea; let the *French* keep them above, and ſee what they can make of them.

But to be ſerious. I had thought our Trading had been in Ships at Sea eſpecially, and not with Boats in Rivers. And that it is theſe inferior Provinces, and our Sea Traffick that *France* aims at; though in regard of our Naval ſtrength, he comes down upon us by Land; thinking that way to carry the Country. For his ſtopping the Boats paſſing up and down the *Rhine* and *Maes*, there is no fear if we rightly conſider, that that will ruine the *French* themſelves more than us. In regard we can ſubſiſt without this, and they cannot. We have Corn in abundance from *Dantſick* and other places, with which we ſupply others in want: but they muſt have theirs from above, by theſe Rivers. How can we think that he ſhould ſtop the Commerce betwixt *Germany* and theſe Countries by the *Rhyne*; and they not ſtop his Proviſions at *Colen* and other places? Or that he intercept the Traffick by the *Maes*; and *Leige*, or at leaſt *Namurs* under the *Spaniſh*, ſhould not prohibit his ſupplies from *France*? There are two ways of dealing with Enemies. If ſmall to beat them, if great to pine them. They dare not but leave a conſiderable Army in thoſe Provinces, for fear of the former; and they muſt be ſupplied from abroad, for fear of the latter. Now if they be not from us beneath, they muſt be by theſe from above; for thoſe Provinces alone are not able to provide for them; and why then ſhould we trouble our ſelves with ſuch fantaſtical fears? Were it not that I thought theſe things ſufficient, and that I have been already ſo prolix in this Argument; I would ſhew at large that thoſe above depend on us for our Money and Commodities, more than we on them for theirs. But to do this ſatisfactorily, would be a large diſcourſe, and therefore I diſmiſs it, at leaſt for the preſent.

Our Adverſaries having thus ſpent their Cannon upon us ineffectually, will needs try a Volly of ſmall ſhot: That we muſt have theſe out-Provinces, for the quartering our Army, that ſo our Cities may be free from their diſturbance in Trade.

But this reaches us not. For we have out-Garriſons enow upon the Confines of theſe inferior Provinces, as *Sluys*, *Bergen op Zoom*, *Breda*, *Buſs*,

Buſs,&c. well known, that are of leſs Trade, and capable to quarter 100000 men if need was, as I can eaſily make apparent. Nor do I imagine Souldiers prejudicial to any trading City, if they be not too numerous; but rather helpful, by the Exciſe they pay, the work when off the watch they cheaply perform, the ſpending their money with the poorer ſort, and ſeveral other ways which might be mentioned.

And thus you ſee in point of profit, or worldly Intereſt, that we can want the ſuperior Provinces, (excepting the City of *Utrecht*, and a little of the Circumjacent Country) yea had better quit them upon ſeveral accounts; and though our boundaries be leſs, yet if we be more compact and ſtronger, that will abundantly compenſate our greatneſs: beſides the vaſt expence which is ſpared thereby, not only of blood, but treaſure, in maintaining conſtantly ſo great an Army as we muſt, if we will recover and defend them. The only advantage that I can foreſee by them is, to have bad neighbours further off: but whether that will Countervail the coſt, may be a queſtion to others, but is none to me.

But if we value our honour at ſo high a rate, and will pay ſo dear for it, that if the *French* will not part with them upon fair terms, we will wage war for them; I heartily wiſh we never repent it. For I have obſerved *that Common-wealths are fitter for ſelf defence, and Kingdoms for conqueſts.* Which is ſhaddowed out by the *Venetian* Statue, holding a Shield in the right hand: that ſome unskilful Travellers condemn, as an error in the Statuary. Whoſe yet ambitious ſwerving from this Common-wealths maxim, coſt them very dear: and ſeeing it is the neareſt parallel to our caſe I know, I ſhall briefly relate it, becauſe I think it may be uſeful for us. The *Venetians* having long warred with the *Genoueſe* at Sea, afterwards caſt an ambitious eye on the Continent of *Italy*, and by one means or other (too long to relate) became Maſters of many conſiderable places. This made them envied by their neighbouring Monarchs, who entred at *Cambray* A. 1508. into a league to war againſt them. *Maximilian* the Emperor, firſt of that name, recovered *Padua, Vincentia, Verona, &c.* belonging to the Empire: the *Pope Ravenna, Cervia, Ariminum* and *Faventia: Lewis* the 12. then poſſeſt of *Millain* in right thereof, *Bergamum, Crema, Cremona* and *Brixia*: *Ferdinand* the King of *Spain* in right of *Naples, Manfredonia, Trano, Barlet* and *Monopoli*, all of them Havens on the *Adriatick*: the Duke of *Ferrara, Rovigo:* and the Duke of *Mantua, Aſula*: in ſo much that the *Venetians* were forced to betake themſelves to the *Iſlands* and Mariſhes of their City. And yet in a ſhort time by compliance with the *Pope*, they broke the confederacy, and by one means or other regained the reſt, except thoſe belonging to the Realm of *Naples.* The queſtion is debated in the Senate, *whether they ſhould war for theſe or no?* And wiſely concluded in the negative, *That although they were commodious Havens for them, yet better to part with them, than war with ſuch a potent Prince as Spain.* And let me ſay it freely of our ſelves, that had we ſerved God, followed our Trade, and kept our ſelves

more

more off the Stage of *Honour*, as our Anceſtors did: We had leſs occaſioned our neighbours envy, and not been reduced to thoſe Strates we are in.

But if our Senators be of *Naſica*'s judgment, and would have this foil for our *Martial valour*, and this exerciſe to rub of the ruſt, our Arms have contracted by their long reſt. If our Cavalry are ambitious to have the Trumpet of Fame ſound their praiſes, and the Infantry to have their marches beaten, through ſucceeding Ages and Generations. I wiſh that the eccho of Fame may follow them, with a clearer ſound than the hoarſe clamour of the People; and hope that the imbellick Bores that are ready to ſtart at the report of a Gun, and ſtoop at the whiſtling of a Bullet, may, by having dangers familiarized to them, become (as the Fox did with the Lion) undaunted at laſt, and under their brave General and Commanders regain our reputation; and ſhall heartily pray both for our Senators proſperity, and Souldiers ſucceſs.

The only conſideration that ſways with me for conteſting for them, if we cannot have them otherwiſe, is that of *Religion*. If therefore this policy, I have pleaded ſhould prove Apocryphal; and that our League and Alliance with them, obliges us for their recovery; or that the rules of Chriſtian Charity require us, to adventure our own loſs for their ſafety: God forbid that I, or any man elſe ſhould be againſt it; and I hope there are none ſo degenerate, but will contribute their beſt aſſiſtance both in purſe and perſon to ſo good a work. If the *Turks* will redeem the caged birds to ſet them at liberty, let us much more willingly our Chriſtian Brethren, and ſo committing our cauſe to God, paſs thorow the *Temple of Vertue*, that we may happily come to that of *Honour*.

Having thus ſhewn the impregnableneſs of the truth of our cauſe, againſt the aſſaults of its Adverſaries; and fought it out with them, in their repreſenting the *Advantages of being under France*, *and diſadvantages of being under England*, and our Replying: It comes now to our turn to be *Aſſailants*, wherein we hope to obtain an abſolute conqueſt, by ſhewing them the quite contrary.

Now herein we might be very large, if we would argue from all the *ſuaſory* and *diſſuaſory topicks*; as the *Honeſty* of being under *England* rather than *France* for the common Intereſt of the Proteſtant Religion; the *Honorableneſs* thereof for the common good of Chriſtendom, whoſe Intereſt it is to oppoſe the greatneſs of *France*, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter: the *Equity* of this for aſſiſting our *Allies* againſt *France*: the *poſſibility* or practicableneſs of this only, now that his *Highneſs* is both *General* and *Stadt-holder*: and alſo from the contrary of theſe if we ſeek to come under *France*. But we ſhall only inſiſt upon that of *Utility*, becauſe that is moſt perſwaſive; and that with reſpect to our ſelves only, the moſt part of men being ſo ſelfiſh, that they prefer their *particular* before the *publick good*.

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The diſadvantages of being under France, *and advantages of being under* England.

1. Our being under *France* brings us infallibly unto a War with *England* and *Spain*, in ſome ſhort time at leaſt, if not preſently, as we have already ſhown. Now how deſtructive ſuch a War is to our maritime Negotiation, I leave all wiſe men to judge, and Merchants eſpecially who have the experience thereof.

Whereas on the contrary our being under *England*, gives us *Peace* and freedom of Trade *by Sea*; at leaſt inconſiderable diſturbance in compariſon; yea very probably by *Land* alſo; in regard we can ſpoil *France*'s Trade, diſturb his coaſts, divert his deſigns, and ballacne his power. For *France* cannot fight with all Europe. If we be under *England*, we have *Spain*, the Empire &c. with us: and if *France* will fight, we need not fear him. But if that which is ſaid be not ſufficient (as I ſuppoſe it is) I am ready to make it apparent, that a Land War is more eligible for this Republick, then one by Sea with ſuch potent enemies, and take the utmoſt interruption *France* can make of our Sea-traffick into the ballance.

2. If we come under *France* we ſhall either do it *entirely*, or *partially*.

If the former we are ruined in a great meaſure in our Commerce, for ſuppoſing that the *Spaniſh Netherlands* fall under *France* alſo, as in all probability they will, and that ſpeedily, as even our Adverſaries themſelves take it for granted; the *Scheld* will be open and free, and ſo *Antwerp*, *Bruxels*, *Mechlin*, *Loven*, *Lier* and the other Cities of *Brabant*, by this means recover part of their former Commerce; which now we deprive them of by *Vliſſing* and *Rammekens* below, and *Lillo* above on that River: and *Ghant*, *Cortrick*, *Riiſſel* and other Cities of *Flanders* a part, by the former River being free, and by opening the other paſſage to them, which is now obſtructed at the *Sas van Ghant*.

Now of how great conſequence this is to us, eſpecially in regard of *Amſterdam*, which bears now a double proportion in the Admiralties, and almoſt the half of the burden of the Taxes of *Holland*, which is almoſt the half of the whole Republick, I leave any one to judge, and eſpecially thoſe that know the principles of Intereſt for that great and flouriſhing City. I could be very large upon this, in ſhewing how the fall of *Antwerp* was the riſe of *Amſterdam*; how this City prevailed that the other ſhould not be taken by the Arms of this Republick; as alſo what ſome ſay it coſt them to prevent it; that this was a great inducement to the States, not to enlarge the Republick on the ſide of *Flanders* and *Brabant*; and what a great motive it was to make peace with *Spain*, that ſo they might prevent ſo Potent a Prince as *France*, from coming ſo nigh them upon that quarter, and doing it by power; and how *Holland* gave ſecurity for maintaining the peace, when *Zeeland* proteſted againſt the ſame: But theſe are ſo well known in *Holland*, and the objections againſt it ſo anſwered, that I need not lanch into this *Ocean*. Now who is ſo purblind but he may foreſee *Schaikius de Pace.*

foreſee, that if we come under *France*, the *Flemiſh* Merchants, eſpecially Papiſts, will return and carry their Trade to *Antwerp*, and many *French* alſo ſetle themſelves there; the River being much better, the City fit for traffick every way, and having the Popiſh Religion publickly profeſt, ſo that it will ſoon conteſt with *Amſterdam* for Trade, and carry it ere long; and then *Amſterdam* may ſay of *Antwerp*, as the Ice of the Water, *Mater me genuit, mater mox gignitur ex me.* For we muſt think thoſe Cities, and particularly *Antwerp*, are nearer the Confines of *France* than *Holland*; and will be more confided in, being Papiſts; ſo that they will become both the care and Crown of that King and Kingdom, for their Trade in theſe Northern parts of the World. Yea let me ſay it, for I know it to be true, this is that the Trading *Flamens* long for, ſeek for, and ſhould above all things be glad to ſee: ſo that in ſtead of hindring, they ſhall help, all they dare, *Frances* conqueſt for this their Intereſt.

And if ſome of theſe Provinces only come under *France*, and otherſome under *England*; what a miſerable condition ſhall we be in; by having two ſuch potent Princes continually conteſting in the midſt of us, ſo that by ſuch ſtrong fits of Colick in our bowels, and Convulſions in the whole body, our diſeaſe muſt needs become mortal, and our wounds incurable. Let us ſuppoſe that which is likelieſt, both by the beſt intelligence, inclination of the people (as we have ſaid formerly) and intereſt as we ſhall ſhew hereafter, that *Zeeland* become *Engliſh*, and *Holland* ſhould chuſe *France*; and conſider the ſituation of *Zeeland*, neer the Sea, and allmoſt right over the River of *Thames*, and both between *France* and *Holland*, and betwixt *Holland* and the Chanel; the Harbours of *Vliſſing* and *Ter Vere*, into which, the latter eſpecially, all Winter long, notwithſtanding the *Ice*, is ſafe arrival; their genious as well as commodiouſneſs to Cape: and then judge in what a perilous condition the Trade of *Holland* will be under *France*, and what miſerable work will be made amongſt us. Or let it be ſuppoſed that there is friendſhip between *France* and *England* in the enjoying their ſeveral ſhares (for we will grant all poſſibilities, and much more probabilities, our Adverſaries can reaſonably deſire) and how will our mutual traffick be ſpoiled, by the impoſitions of both Crowns upon commodities; if we ſhould pay to the one in *Holland* and the other in *Zeeland*, as undoubtedly we muſt. For it is a certain truth, *that multiplicity of impoſitions, eſpecially when great, ſpoils merchandiſe.* And will it not be in *Englands* power, to open the River, and make it free for *Antwerp*, *&c.* as we have ſaid? and in that caſe, where will the vaſt Commerce of *Holland* then be?

Whereas on the contrary were we either of theſe ways under *England*, we exclude *France* and *Flanders*, and preſerve our Trade to our ſelves.

If we be entirely under *England*; we may ſave the *Spaniſh* Netherlands, whoſe Governors are contented with what Commerce they have, rather than loſe all; we may preſerve our ſelves from the *French* neighbour-

bourhood; and thereby alſo our Trade from them both.

Or if we be but in part ſo; we preſerve the friendſhip of theſe Provinces, the Trade betwixt us, ſecure our intereſt both at home and abroad, and command the Commerce of *Europe* at our pleaſure.

3. If we come under *France*, we have not only *Spain* our Enemy by Sea and Land (as we have ſhewn) but the loſs of our *Spaniſh Trade*, and the hazarding of our whole *Levant Traffick*: And if we rightly calculate, that amounts to no ſmall part of our Commerce. The *Spaniſh Netherlands*, *Spain*, and their Dominions in *Italy*, taking off much of our *Eaſt India* and *Weſtern-wares*. For as *Muſcovy* and the other *Northern Nations* conſume much of our *Pepper*, and ſome hotter Spices, ſo the *Southern*, and *Eaſtern* in the *Mediterranean*, much of our other Commodities. Now with what ſecurity can we either carry them through the Sea, or bring our *Silks*, *Camels-hair*, and other of the richeſt Commodities we have, from *Aleppo*, *Egypt*, and our other *Factories* for the *Turkie Trade*, and maintain our Traffick with *Venice*, *Leghorne*, and other places in *Italy*: Seeing the *Spaniards* beſides the ports of *Spain*, have ſo many *Havens*, and ſome *Iſlands* in the *Adriatick*; *Sicilia*, *Sardinia*, *Majorca* and *Minorca* in the *Midland Sea*; and *Cadiz* ſo commodiouſly ſituated at the mouth of the *Straits*; ſome of which have been famous in all Ages for the Archeſt *Pirates* in the whole World. Betwixt theſe therefore and the *Turks*, we are certain of nothing, but of bad *Trading*, and they good *Caping*. So that I may conclude with the *Poetical Proverb*, that he that deſires to flie from *England*, and fall under *France* for Traffick, *Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdim*.

Whereas on the contrary, if we come under *England*; we certainly ſecure our Commerce with *Spain*, and all the *Territories* belonging to that *Crown*. And not only ſo, but againſt the *Turkiſh Pyrates* which infeſt thoſe Seas, which would be of no ſmall advantage to us. For beſides that *England* is at peace with ſome of thoſe places on the *African Coaſt*, and is in friendſhip with the *Turkiſh Empire*; how eaſie a thing was it for us joyntly, to bring the reſt to our own terms? Yea, ſo to ſubdue them all, and keep them under, that they ſhould never be able to diſturb us, no nor *Chriſtendom* more by their *Caping*? And how generous a deſign this is, and how deſtructive to that great and common Enemy of all *Chriſtians*, I leave all wiſe men, and well-wiſhers to Chriſtianity to conſider and judge.

4. Our *Eaſt India* Trade, the richeſt jewel of this Republick, which hath occaſioned us ſo much envy, and cauſed ſo many quarrels and conteſts; if we come under *France*, will run a great *Risko* to be ruined. Hath not this been their great deſign of late years? Have they not for this end erected a *Company*? And now got footing there, and follow it further, even in this laſt year, as we hear, with their greateſt endeavours? Nay, is not this the principal motive, which induces them to make this War? I know we need not fear them there, nor all *Europe* if we have peace here, and can ſend them ſupplies: We are ſo far advanced in that Negotiation;

ſo ſtrong in Forts, Shipping and Souldiers; our men ſo accuſtomed to the heat of thoſe Countries; our Mariners to thoſe Coaſts; and Merchants to the Languages and Trade of thoſe parts. But if we come under *France*, will not *England* and *Spain* ſeek continually to intercept our ſupplies thither, and our Returns from thence? Will not this put us to vaſt Charges of Convoys to defend our Ships going and coming in ſecurity? Will not ſome through ſtorms and other accidents when ſeparated, unavoidably fall into their hands, as we have often experienced? And will they not always be in one hazard or other from them for ſafety? Yea let us ſuppoſe that all ſtands well there, and none of our Ships miſcarry through our Enemies, but ſafely Arrive both there and here; where ſhall we vent thoſe Commodities from thence at the prices they now yield us; when we have ſuch Enemies at home, and ſuch dangers in carrying them abroad, as we have formerly ſhown? Nay, can we rationally think otherwiſe, than that the Kingdom of *France* will have ſhare with us there, and the Crown the greateſt profit here? So that our *Eaſt India Actions*, as high as they are now may in a little time come as low as thoſe of the *Weſt India Company*; which was once thought equal with the other, and are now next to nothing: and then many of us, who have moſt of our eſtates adventured in the *Eaſt-Indies* Trade, may loſe that we have left, as we have formerly loſt by the *Weſt-Indies*; and no remedy but patience, for we muſt ſit down in a ſorrowful ſilence. Herein I have reaſon to ſpeak feelingly of my fears, being ſo concern'd according to the proportion of my ſmall eſtate; how much, matters none but my ſelf, but were it ten times more, I muſt tell you; that though the *Actions* at this preſent are conſiderably above three hundred, I ſhall the firſt day I ſee we come under *France*, ſell mine willingly for two, rather than keep them, and render many thanks to the buyer into the bargain.

Whereas on the other hand if we come under *England*, they have formerly had, and ſtill have a conſiderable ſhare in the *Eaſt India Trade*. Their *Company* and ours accord well, and frequently accommodate each others correſpondence. His Majeſty in the former War, in his Declaration, and the Papers paſt between the *States General*, and his Envoy Sir *George Downing*, inſiſts upon *Poleron* one of the *Banda Iſlands*, ſatisfaction for injuries paſt, with deduction of what we had ſuffered, and regulation of Trade for the future; and his *Majeſty* in his *Declaration* of this preſent War only mentions the laſt, *The Regulation of Trade in the Eaſt-Indies*. Now I perſwade my ſelf, that neither the *States*, nor *Eaſt-India* Company will ſtick upon theſe. For *Polleron*, if they have it, it can now neither be any great profit to them, nor prejudice us: For a juſt accompting with them, what juſt man can be againſt it? Or againſt a due and equal Regulation of Trade? that ſo all occaſions of conteſts between the two Nations may be cut off, and wholly prevented for the future. It is true, that reaches not the ſuppoſal of our being under them, but only ſtanding upon equal terms

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with

with them for Trade: and therefore we will come close up to the supposition in hand.

And herein we shall proceed with such frankness, that we shall grant more than our Adversaries can reasonably be jealous of; and that is, that the *English* should have half of that Trade with us; and yet shew that it is better for us then to take in *France*. For, 1. The *English* have a considerable part already, and *France* but an inconsiderable: so that we must, in all probability, part with much more to the latter, and need part with less to the former. Our first capital of the *East-India Company*, is 64 Tun of Gold, and the *English* 40. It is true we have Traded both longer and more, and so have a greater improvement: suppose 70 Tun of Gold there, which ordinarily is reckoned about three times in the value when returned hither; and suppose as much or more here in goods or money; which vastly exceeds the *English*: yet it must be considered that we are at greater expences there several ways than they; that we have money at interest, though inconsiderable to what formerly, having pay'd off the last year above 50, some say 60 Tun of Gold. I must here ingenuously confess, that I have but the forementioned calculations from the curiosity of discourse, and the credit of others; not upon the authentick authority of the books of both Companies; which I have not leisure now, nor indeed pleasure to enquire into; and yet I think I am near the truth, having had these things from very good hands. I will therefore proceed, and here we are certain, that besides a great sum of money, our Company hath lent the States to carry on this War, which I reckon as an honourable gift, we are like to part with a far greater to purchase our peace. And though our *Actions* be far more worth than theirs, for example, a capital *Action* that gives right to a suffrage, in the election of the Directors of that Trade being originally 100 l. Vlamish, (or 600 gilders) is now in these bad times worth above 300 l. Vlamish, (or 1800 g.) and in times of peace 400 l. Vl. (or 2400 g.) and sometimes 500 l. Vl. (or 3000 g.) and with them not worth two, or twelve: yet this arises not so much from the great emolument, that the Participants here receive more than there; as from the plenty of money here, which several have and know not how otherwise to improve, the small Interest (usually under 4 per Cento to those of good credit) and the dearness of Land; all which are contrary in *England*. So that I leave it to any competent and impartial man to judge, (should it be so, which yet, I think, none need to fear) whether it is better for us to supply the *English* with a less part, or the *French* with a greater of that our Trade. For I dare say, that if *England* hath a fourth of ours, *France* hath not an eighth part thereof.

2. How easie is it for us and *England* to beat *France* out of the *East-India Traffick*? if we have Wars, or if the *French* seek to incroach upon us.

3. Under *England* we keep our own *Chambers of Trade*; whereby thousands of Families subsist in our *Cities*. All manner of Trades for Shipping

and navigation, Carpenters, Smithes, Sail-makers, &c. All manner of Tradeſmen for victuals, Bakers, Brewers, Butchers, &c. by their labours at leaſt. All manner of Shopkeepers for ſelling them Proviſions that are ſent, and buy commodities that return. Beſides the poorer ſort, as Boats-folk, Labourers, &c. which are exceeding many that wholly depend on the Company for their livelihood. Whereas if we come under *France*, and the *Spaniſh Provinces* alſo, as we may reaſonably ſuppoſe; a great ſhare will be removed to *Antwerp*, there being ſo large and magnificent an *Eaſt-India* houſe, and that being nearer *France* by far. Whereby our Trade being taken from us, our Cities will be impoveriſhed beyond imagination.

4. The impoſitions of the Crown of *England* is with conſent of the people in Parliament; the rates both inward and outward being ſet by law: and ſo would be here with conſent of the States. Thoſe of *France* arbitrary, and inhanſible at pleaſure. And how great an alteration *Cuſtoms* make in *Commerce*, I leave all knowing Merchants to judge.

I foreſee it will be ſaid, that were we under *France*, we ſhould beat *England* out of the *Eaſt India* Trade, and ſo have it wholly to our ſelves.

If they would make either the Antecedent or Conſequent good, the Argument deſerved conſideration; but I know they cannot; for they are both impracticable.

Firſt, We cannot beat them out there, till we have conquered them here: for how ſhall we in Wars with them, ſpare Ships, Souldiers, &c. to do that? Now what probability there is of conquering them, is formerly declared. The *Engliſh* are reaſonably fortified and provided, and will doubtleſs be better, if they ſee danger approaching. And not only ſo, but being in good amity (as I have heard) with thoſe Nations where they reſide, they would never ſuffer our enmity to prevail ſo far againſt them. Nor thoſe Nations with whom we both Trade: for knowing how low one chapman makes the market, they will aſſiſt the weaker, rather than loſe their advantage by them.

Nor if we ſhould conquer them there, will all the ſpoils fall to our ſelves; as ſome may poſſibly think, whoſe hopes are poſtilion to the Sun, and therefore fancy things beyond the Moon; and bring ſuch booties from Eaſt to Weſt upon the wings of their windy imaginations. For inſtead of hoping to have halt, we have reaſon to fear, ſhould it be ſo, that *France* will have all the parts of the *Prey*.

5. If we be under *France*, what ſhall become of our *Fiſhery* upon the Coaſt of *England*, and thoſe multitudes of Families that depend thereon? I might be large herein from my own Obſervations, having had the humour or curioſity (call it what you pleaſe) to view all the Rivers, Harbors, and almoſt Creeks on both the oppoſite Coaſts, from *Thames* to *Tinmouth*, and from the *Elve* to *Oſtend*. And particularly *Yarmouth* and *Flambrough-head*, as the greateſt Promontories of *England*, and whereabouts there is the beſt fiſhing. But I will only ſpeak to thoſe things which concern the

the present Argument. A diligent person calculated in the Year 62 the dependants on the *Fishing-trade* (I mean not Fishers only, but also all employed about their shipping, Nets, Cask, Salt, &c. with their Attendants at Sea) and reckoned them above 400000. Yea some have made their number far greater, particularly that learned, wise, and valiant Knight Sir *Walter Rawleigh* (whom I parallel with Sir *Philip Sidney*) in his information of King *James*, reckons our Vessels that fish on the Coasts of Great *Britain* 3000 and every 20 Busses to maintain 8000, which will amount to 1200000. But this is incredible. He must either be mistaken in the number of Ships, or the proportion he alots them, or both. For upon diligent enquiry I cannot find half that number either of Ships or Men in some years last past. If he mean of the three several seasons of fishing; in Autumn for Herrings, Spring for Cod-fish, and Summer for Salmons; we shall not contest with him; nor concerning the number he says attends them, viz. 9000 other Vessels, and 150000 Men. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that I shew, that our Fishery is very considerable, and the friendship of *England* for the same, of far more consequence to us than that of *France*.

Guicciardine, a very diligent Writer, A. D. 1587 reckons the *Herring-Busses*, that fish on the *British* Coasts *at least* 700, *and some said many more*: and though he include *Flanders*, yet not the other Fisheries, as *Rawleigh* doth, and doubtless of all the Maritime Provinces of this Republick; which the Author of the *Interest of Holland* c. 5. erroniously appropriates to that Province alone, through inadvertency, that Foreigners frequently call all these United Provinces *Hollanders*, that being the principal, and all the *Spanish*, yea formerly all the 17 by the name of *Vlamens*. And not only so, but tells us the *Fishery* is increased since a third part, which I cannot credit, not only in regard that the *English*, but *French* and *Flemish* whom we used to supply for the greatest part, now fish themselves. Yea I rather think, that since our Merchandise hath so much increased, our Fishery hath decreased. *Descript. generalis Belgii.*

And what considerable profit redounds to us thereby, appears by the computation which *Guicciardine* makes very particularly, that those 700 Busses take annually 49000 Last of Herring, which he reckons at 10 l. Vl. or 60. Guldens the Last; which amounts yearly together with the other Fisheries to the following sums.

	l. Vlam.		Sterl.
Herrings	490000	or	294000
Cod-fish	166666⅔	or	100000
Salmon	66666⅔	or	40000

The usual reckoning of salt Fish that is yearly taken, and either spent or sold by *Hollanders*, if you will believe the *Interest of Holland* c. 3. is 300000 Last. So that the families that are maintained, the money that is gotten, and food that is eaten from Fishing is almost incredible.

Now

Now that it will be in *Englands* power and not in *Frances* to ſpoil us of this *Fiſhery*, or at leaſt the greateſt part thereof, I think no rational man will deny, that conſiders the only fiſhing for *Herring* in theſe parts or perhaps in the whole World, is upon the *Britiſh* Coaſt; and moſt alſo for Cod-fiſh northward of *Scotland* and on the *Dogger-ſands*, and other places where they can eaſily interrupt us. Thoſe therefore that are ſo forward for *France*, might do well to conſider, what they will do with all theſe families, or how they ſhall be maintained when they are deprived of their Trades.

Other Arguments which might here be added I ſhall not now bring into open view, but keep them as a Reſerve, in caſe our Adverſaries ſhould rally and make head againſt us, having ſufficiently rooted them (we think) by theſe five, wherewith we have already fought them.

But yet there remain ſome advantages under *England*, which we cannot expect under *France*, ſome of them more general for the Republick, and otherſome more particular for Provinces and Perſons. In the handling whereof, we ſhall deſire to uſe, now that we are got within our enemy, the ſhort and pungent dagger of *Demoſthenes*, rather than *Cicero*'s long ſworded eloquence.

Advantages under England, not to be expected under France.

1. By being under *England*, we retain and encreaſe our friendſhip with the *Empire*, *German Princes*, and *free Cities*: which are not jealous of *Englands* affecting the *Imperial Crown*, as they are of *France*: and therefore will not prejudice us under the former, as they will certainly in a little time under the latter. Nay I doubt not, but were we under *England*, they would take courage, and generally appear againſt *France*. So that we ſhould hereby greatly promote the common Intereſt of *Europe*.

2. Under *England* we might have the freedom of the *Weſt-Indie* Trade, which would be of great profit to us, many ways. Now how great a ſhare *England* hath in the *Weſt-Indies*, and how ſmall and inconſiderable *France*, is well known. Theſe having only the Iſland *Terre Neuf*, for fiſhing, and ſome of the moſt Northerly Continent, unpeopled, not cultivated, and improfitable, as may be ſeen in *de Laet*, by thoſe that know it not: part of St. *Chriſtophors*, and ſome other places of ſmall concernment, in compariſon to what the *Engliſh* profitably poſſeſs.

Deſcript. Ind. occid. L. 2.

3. By being under *England*, we might ſhare at leaſt with the *Engliſh* thoſe Plantations we have in the *W. Indies*; *Holland* in their *New Netherland*, and *Zeeland* in *Surinam*, &c. Which would be of eminent advantage for Colonies, either there or to be ſent thither; beſides the profit we might have from thoſe Plantations; as *Zeeland* (or ſome at leaſt therein) even in theſe firſt years and beginning thereof, have pretty well experienced, and know how greatly it is further improvable. Now what a ſingular benefit it is for a full and populous Common-wealth, now and then like the ſedulous Bees,

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to cast a swarm of their poorest and most laborious people, is apparent from the Histories of all Ages. And though I confess the *Dutch* are not so good Planters, as the *English*, being more used to the Water, and the other to Land: yet in regard all those *Plantations* are upon the Sea Coasts and Rivers, the *Dutch* might be used for building of Ships or Boats, Houses &c. and especially for fishing, carrying and recarrying goods by Water on the Rivers, and to and from the Ships, and in navigation; and the *English* for planting and working in the ground; and so, in mine opinion, would make an excellent temperament, and very profitable for both Nations.

4. Expences might be saved in several Conveys, and particularly of the *East India* Companies. I know very well they will have them return round about, on the back of *Ireland*, lest they should touch at any of these Northern places, especially in the Chanel, and so Trade; and will send out Ships with fresh men, and take out the Mariners that return, to prevent their trading for themselves: but yet the extraordinary Charges of our men of War might be spared. Nay the *States General* bring in these, to be diducted in the Accompt with *England*, as the occasion thereof, in their *List of damages Article the* 5. *before the last War*, A. D. 1664.

5. Such as are Rich, and weary of Trade, or love their ease, honour, or pleasure; may if we were under *England*, more easily remove thither, and be made *liege* subjects, and free *Denizens* of *England* by the *Crown*; or be *naturalized* by the *Parliament*; and so buy, possess, and inherit Lands and revenues at half the price here; and live upon their Rents as Country Gentlemen, in a cheap and pleasant Land, enjoying as great civil Liberty as any where in Christendom, and also the freedom of their Religion. Or let out their money not only at far greater interest, but also upon *hypothece* or real security. I have often thought this 20 years, whether it might not be better for *England*, to give this Liberty by Law to strangers, especially those of the Reformed Religion, and of these Countries; and of which side the interest lay betwixt us for this: Now that *England* hath so many and great Plantations in the *West Indies* for their poorer people, now that money is so plentiful, now that this Common-wealth was so increased upon them, now that the Number of Merchants is every where so multiplied, and now that Trade is beaten so low, almost in all the known parts of the World. But this would be both a large, and unnecessary digression; and I am very sensible that I have been already too long in this Argument. Yet industriously I confess, because I foresee, that many will diligently peruse this, who perhaps will negligently pass by the rest: and mine Opposites so much glorying herein, I thought best to give them full measure, and rather abound to curiositie, than be deficient in satisfying the least nicity; *Trade being the Crown of that Kingdom and this Common-wealth.*

Sect. 8. *Several other Arguments and enducements to inclineus rather for* England, *briefly mentioned. With an inference from the whole preceding discourse, that the friendship of* England *is to be prefered before that of* France.

ALthough what is said of *Religion*, *Liberty*, *Estates*, and *Trade*, be sufficient to prove this hypothetical problem? yet I shall give as over measure some other enducements for *England* briefly.

1. The different humor and genious of the *French* and *Dutch*: which is well known to those that know them both, to be far greater than between us and the *English*. Which makes not only a strangeness, but alienation of affection; begets a disgust and nauseating of each other; brings forth many contests and quarrels; and nourishes a continual discontent, uneasiness, and unquietness of life.

2. The affection which the generallity of the *English* and *Dutch* Nation have for each other. So that if the Controversies of late years, and at this present between us, had been or were refered to the body of the people in both Nations (although I well know what both their *Representatives* have done) I dare say, upon reasonable satisfaction for the mutual miscarriages, which cannot but some times happen towards each other; there never had been, nor would be War betwixt us more. And that his *Majesty*, and the *Prince of Orange* would have more Voluntiers in one day to fight the *French*, than they have in twenty to fight each other.

3. The way of *France* is only *Gentry* and *Paisantry*, the former lording it over the latter; which have allways lived more miserably, than any common people in *Europe*. In *Cæsars* time there was *nihil plebe contemptius*, as he tells us, and hath continued so as *Bodin* acknowledges, and is so at this day we all know. Whereas in *England* and these *Countries*, there is a middle sort of people, that live freely and independently, on their own Lands and Farmes, that will never endure the insolency of such Lords much less to be their slaves, and least of all to be ruined by them. L. 1. C. 10.

4. Now that the *Prince of Orange* is advanced, and his party upmost, so that the Crown of *England* may confide more in our friendship; it is not to be doubted but through his *Highness* intereſt in his Uncles, we shall better accord hereafter, when these unhappy differences are once ended.

And thus I have done with this great *Question* of the times. Sufficiently, I thinke, to satisfie any rational man; though nothing is sufficient, nor will satisfie I know, such as are either so resolvedly prejudiced against the *English* or Princes intereſt that if they can but ruin them, they matter not though they ruin both themselves and the Nation; or so partially passionate for the *French*, that they desire them, though it be to their own destruction. For all the Arguments in the World, will never prevail against passion and prejudice: It is only experience that can convince such of their error, and make them with *Damocles*, when the drawn Sword is over them, desire

to

to depart, finding they were deceived in their opinion of Happineſs.

I ſhall therefore conclude, with a brief reflection upon ſome of theſe Arguments, and the Corollary which naturally flows from them.

That ſeeing *England* and We are of the ſame Religion; Both free people and affectionated to each other; Both imbarqued in the ſame Intereſt of Trade, though in different bottoms; It not only becomes us, but is our mutual concernment, that we take heed, we daſh not one another to pieces, but fairly and Chriſtianly comply with each other, for the ſafeguard of our Religion, preſervation of the Proteſtant Intereſt, our own and others alſo Liberties, and the juſt and equitable courſe of Commerce; that ſo each Nation may happily enjoy their *Religion*, *Liberty*, *Eſtates*, and *Trade*, with Gods bleſſing on them all.

Sect. 9. *That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may ſtill remain a Republick: in regard of our own ſtrength, and our neighbours intereſt,* Englands *eſpecially, that they had better loſe* Scotland *or* Ireland, *than let the French have theſe Provinces. This War a Game at Hazard. Being engaged will go through, and Parliament probably aſſiſt therein.*

WE have hitherto diſcourſed upon the ſuppoſal of *inability to defend our ſelves*; becauſe it becomes wiſe men always, to ſuppoſe the worſt condition that may probably befall them; with the conſequences thereof; and accordingly to make proviſion, and in regard of the endleſs curioſity of mens minds, which are always reſtleſs under *miſeries*, and ſtill inquiſitive after *futurities*. We ſhall now proceed to ſhew, that we are not yet (through Gods mercy towards us) come to the extremity ſuppoſed, nor reduced to thoſe ſtraits, that we are neceſſitated to take either *French* or *Engliſh* for our Maſters; but that we may ſtill remain a Republick, if we be not awanting to our ſelves, or through paſſion or precipitancy betray our own intereſt, and caſt our ſelves into irrecoverable deſtruction. And this we ſhall make apparent, by ſhewing there is no ſufficient ground for us to deſpair, if we either *Conſider our own ſtrength, or our Neighbours Intereſt.* Let us therefore obſerve the good rule in policy, which the Poet gives,

Senec. Thyeſt.
Nemo confidat nimium ſecundis,
Nemo deſperet meliora lapſis.

Firſt lets take a view of *our own ſtrength*, and ſee what grounds of encouragement, that will yield us. Which though ſufficiently known to many, yet not ſo well to the multitude. Now the ſtrength of a Nation conſiſts eſpecially in theſe things following, which I ſhall briefly recite, and accommodate to our own *Country*.

1. The great ſtrength of a people conſiſts in the *ſituation of their Country*.

Sect. 7. Now concerning this both in the general, and this Land in particular, I have already ſpoken ſufficiently for my purpoſe; and ſhewn that all theſe Maritime Provinces, are either Iſlands or Peninſular, and very defenſible thereby; and alſo upon extremity liable to inundation, either from the Sea, or Rivers that ſurround them, or both.

2. In the Artificial Fortification of particular places; *Cities, Caſtles, Forts, Paſſes*, &c. And herein theſe Countries may contend with any Nation whatſoever, Kingdom, or Common-wealth that is of no greater circumference. For the Number of their Cities, and their regular Fortification, Art herein vying with Nature, is not to be parallel'd in the world. I need not deſcend to particulars, Thoſe that deſire ſatisfaction herein, may conſult *Guicciardine*'s deſcription of theſe Netherlands.

3. In means of defence. As ſhipping for thoſe Nations or Cities that lie upon the Sea, or great navigable Rivers, and Lakes, as theſe Provinces do, to defend their Coaſts from invaſion. And herein we are rather redundant than defective; the Number of ſhipping in *Holland* alone, being uſually accounted 20000. And warlike proviſion of Arms and Ammunition. Wherein alſo we abound: theſe Countries ever ſince they were a Common-wealth, having been the greateſt Magazine of warlike proviſions, as is well known, of any in the World.

4. In men; in regard of their Number, Courage, Skill, and Unanimity.

As to our Numbers, they are abundantly ſufficient for our defence. The *Intereſt* of *Holland* c. 8. from particulars, reckons the ſum of that Province alone 2400000. But if there be ſo many in them all, it is enow. Juſt how many is impoſſible to ſay, or near how many in ſuch a multitude is very difficult to gueſs, and harder with us than any other people, I think, in the World; in regard of the uncertainty of Seamen, the Number of Strangers and Travellers in peaceable times, and the diverſity of Religions, Jews, Papiſts, Anabaptiſts, &c. which baptiſe not their Children with us. But I know the Number of our men muſt needs be great; by the great Number of our Cities, theſe ſeveral Provinces being as it were nothing but Neſts of Cities, ſo many being no where to be found in ſo ſmall a circumference in any parts of the habitable World; by their largeneſs and multitude of houſes, which imply the Inhabitants to be many; by the greatneſs of their Trade, which is the lure that draws multitudes to them; and by the known Chriſtnings and burials of thoſe only of the Reformed Religion.

As to our courage, which at preſent ſuffers an eclipſe, there is more to be ſaid then the World is aware of. And indeed I wonder none of our Hiſtory Profeſſors, have given other Nations ſome ſatisfaction herein. I have not been without ſome thoughts of doing it my ſelf, having been a diligent obſerver how things have gone, but I want Authentick materials for ſuch a work. I could produce very many and very honourable teſtimonies.

monies, both ancient and modern of their valour, out of ſuch Writers as give the Characters of Nations, Republicks, Geographers, and eſpecially Hiſtorians *Dion*, *Cæſar*, *Tacitus*, *Suetonius*, *Florus*, *Oroſius*, &c. of old, the famous *Italians*, *Guicciardine*, *Bentivoglio* and *Strada*, with *Spaniſh*, *French*, *Engliſh* and the neighbouring Nations, even ſo many and ſuch as are ſufficient either to ſhame, or to inflame the verieſt cowards, one ſhould think, of the world into courage. But this would be too large to inſert here, and may poſſibly de done in another dreſs hereafter. Nor is the ſucceſs of *France* againſt us ſuch a wonder, as many make it, as I have formerly ſhewn. I will Sect. 7. at preſent only add, that which is proper for this place, and that is that the *French* Armies were not only ſo numerous, but alſo trained up in the School of *Mars*, and ours for the moſt part raw and unexperienced in War. As the Fox in the Fable, the firſt time he ſaw the Lion and heard him roar, trembled; the ſecond time, was leſs affraid; and the third grown wholly fearleſs of him: So it is with men, by being accuſtomed to dangers either at Sea or Land, they converſe with them familiary, and account them nothing at laſt. And therefore wiſe Commanders have always endeavoured to unlearn their Souldiers fear, by ſhewing them their enemies at Walls, Trenches, Paſſes, Rivers or other places, where they could not be come upon by them, and ſo harden and fleſh them by degrees, before they have adventured to fight them againſt old and experienced enemies. And I doubt not, but through Gods bleſſing, in a little time if the Wars continue, our Belgick Lion, will not be found ſuch a tame Lamb, and ſo eaſily torn in pieces, as our enemies may hope, and others poſſibly may imagin.

As for our skill ſuperadded to courage, there is no want, for the manner of defence we are to make. For beſides our able Commanders and Souldiers to defend the Poſts, and Paſſes abroad, all our Cities abound with Seamen, and ſuch as are skil'd to traverſe their Ordnance, and deſperate for ſallies, if need ſhould require.

Our unanimity, I confeſs, is that I moſt fear: and that when our Cities are threatned with danger, the Citizens ſhould grow mutinous, and fall together by the ears, and ſo let in their enemies to part the fray. And yet I have reaſon to think they will grow wiſer, by their hearing and knowing how their freinds are uſed by their enemies.

5. In money and food to maintain their men. And in neither of theſe, through Gods mercy, is there any want amongſt us: If we will lay out our ſelves, as we ought, for the publick. *Aitſma's Lieve* reckons the publick incoms of *Holland* alone A. 1643. at eleven Millions of our money, which is eleven hundred thouſand pounds Sterling: we calling every ten thouſand pound Sterling a tun of gold, and ever hundred thouſand a million *i. e.* of gilders. And beſides the publick incoms of every Province, every City hath their peculiar, which in ſome is very conſiderble. But if our Common Treaſuries are exhauſted in ſeveral places, it is no wonder: Yet if we

conſider the Riches of particular perſons, we have enough to hold out the War, to weary our enemies out at the laſt, as muſt as they do us at the preſent. I will not now ſtand to ſhew the calculation of this, though if neceſſary, I think I can do it ſatisfactorily, comprehending the diſadvantages our enemies are under. But the late Project printed ſo often, of the *Capitals* of this Country, for raiſing and maintaining ſo numerous an Army, though the manner preſcribed prove not practicable, hath in part ſpared my pains herein.

And for food, our Cities are generally ſo well furniſhed, that if our enemies ſteal not ſupplies from us, it is well; we need neither ſeek to them, nor fight with them for ſupplying our ſelves. We have Bread Corn Fiſh and Oyl, Butter and Cheeſe in abundance. And if our liquoriſh Dames, want their delicacies a while, no great matter: they will value peace, and pay their Souldiers the better.

Now what can be added for the ſufficient defence of any Nation, to the particulars mentioned, I cannot imagin; and if my enumeration be inſufficient, I wiſh any wiſe man would ſhew wherein, and then I ſhall thank them. And therefore let us take courage to our ſelves, and not be frighted with vain fears; or ſcared with any vanting bravadoes; like that great *Rhodomontadoe* of the grand *Turk*, who when he heard of the long War ſuch a great Prince as *Spain*, made about this ſmall Country; ſaid, *that before he would have kept ſuch a pottering, about a few petty Provinces, he would have taken them, and hurled them into the Sea at once*: though his ſucceſſor kept no ſmall pottering about the ſingle City of *Candia* many years together; to which ſome of our Cities, all things conſidered, ſeem not much inferior for ſtrength: although I well know what a difference there is, betwixt the defence of one City alone without a Country, and many at once contained therein.

But though this *internal ſtrength* be ſo conſiderable, and with us of greateſt conſequence; yet this is not all; we have alſo an *external and accidental ſtrength*, by the Intereſt of our Neighbours. For this end it muſt be well conſidered, that ſome Countries and Cities, of ſmall ſtrength comparatively in themſelves, are yet very ſtrong by their ſituation among, and well ſecured by the Intereſt of other circumjacent Princes and States: who will not ſuffer, if they can poſſibly prevent it, acceſſion of ſtrength to one another, leſt their own ſcale in the ballance of powers ſhould become light and ſoon born down. What is it but this under the ſhadow of the Almighties Protection, that ſecures the ſmaller Republicks in *Italy* and the *Empire*? What *Geneva*, *Stratsburg*, *Colen*, *Hamburg* and the reſt of the free Cities, and *Hans Towns*, but this? God governing the World uſually, as both *Comines* and *Cardan* well obſerve, by the paſſions of men, in the ballancing of Powers; that when any one will break out into rage and Wars, others will oppoſe them with the like fury, and ſo keep the World a little quiet; otherwiſe the great *Nimrods*, and hunters after Dominion

nion would ſoon, if let alone, deſtroy and devour all before them.

Now if we look about us, and ſee amongſt whom our Land lies, and well conſider their intereſt; this will be very apparent in our ſelves, notwithſtanding this War that is made againſt us, that we are not devoted by any to deſtruction, but only the *French*, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

For *Spain* our next Neighbours on one hand, in the reſt of the Provinces, they know this ſo well, and are ſo ſenſible of their intereſt herein; that they not only aſſiſt us what they can; but I dare ſay were it not for *England*, would rather break with *France* than ſee us endangered. But thoſe two Crowns as I have already hinted, and ſhall more fully ſhew hereafter, muſt not, and therefore will not break.

For the Empire above us, they alſo are frighted with our fears; and if the Princes thereof had money to their might, would willingly, I doubt not, aſſiſt the *Emperor*: leſt the *Lillies* of *France* ſhould mount above the *Roman Eagle*. In the year 1574. when the States upon the death of Prince *William*, were a looking towards *France* for Protection, the Princes of the Empire ſent *Malroy* to admoniſh them, *ut à conſilio Gallici patrocinii implorandi deſiſterent, alioqui fore, ut Germani Principes tantam domui Auſtriacæ & origine & fœdere arctiis adeo cum Imperio vinculis conjunctæ factam injuriam non negligant*, as *Thuanus* tells us, *l.* 80. And if they were then jealous for *France*, what ſhall we think they are now? And if then zealous for the concernments of *Spain*, ſhall we think they will now be wholly negligent both of theirs and their own?

And *France* to be ſure will never ſee us entirely *Engliſh*: for ſo he knows, he ſhould never be able to ballance *Englands* power at Sea; which he doubtleſs both hopes and aims at, by the acceſſion of ſtrength from theſe *Netherlands*.

Nor *England* ſuffer us, if they can hinder it, to be wholly *French*; for this they know would clearly tend, in a little time to their deſtruction. This very Reaſon of State moved *Q. Elizabeth* at firſt to ſupport us againſt *Spain*, rather than to have us fall into the Arms of *France*, by their becoming our Protectors. Which that wiſe Hiſtorian *Thuanus* faithfully relates in ſeveral places. A. 1575. ſhe told *Campanach*, — *ne moleſtè ferat Philippus, ſi ipſa ſecuritatis ſuæ cauſâ Hollandiæ & Zelandiæ patrocinium ſuſcipiat, antequam Galli perpetui Anglorum hoſtes eis potiantur.* L. 60. A. 1576. *Eliſabetha verita ne aliorum ope deſtituti Belgæ, ex deſperatione fœdus nobiſcum jecerent, ſique & res ſuas Francis committerent, eos pecunia adjuvit, &c.* L. 26. A. 1577. ſhe excuſes her defence of us to *Philip* the 2. with this very Reaſon, *ne Belgæ ex deſperatione pernicio ſum non ſolum ſibi, ſed vicinis, conſilium caperent, externi Principis patrocinio ſalute commiſſa.* Meaning the *French* L. 64. And A. 1584. ſhews the emulation between the *French* and *Engliſh* herein. *Ipſi ſibi invicem ſuſpecti erant. Nam Rex veterem hoſtem Belgii acceſſione Galliæ imminentem reformidabat, & Angli noſtros Belgi-potentes minus æquos fœderi, quod Angliæ cum Burgundica domo intercedit, atque adeo commercio futuros verebantur.* L. 80. And

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is angry with the Miniſters of State in *France*, for neglecting this ſingular occaſion, of enlarging their Empire by taking theſe Provinces into the *French* protection. And to ſay the truth, this was the greateſt error in Policy by way of omiſſion, and that of *Charles* the 8. concerning the Kingdom of *Naples* of commiſſion, that I think the Crown of *France* was ever guilty of. And indeed there were many of the *Engliſh* Nation, that judged it one of the greateſt overſights that that wiſe Princeſs ever made, not to take into her hands, as ſhe was offered, the abſolut protection of theſe Provinces. But that is not ſo clear to me, nor will be ſo I think to others, who rightly conſider the circumſtances of thoſe times; for we muſt not judge by the following, wherein this Common-wealth grew up beyond all expectation, under ſuch Wars, as many feared would have been our deſtruction. But yet though ſhe refuſed for ſeveral reaſons both of Conſcience and State (mentioned by *Cambden* in her *Annals*, A. D. 1575.) yet it plainly appears by the forementioned places in *Thuanus*, that rather than the *French* ſhould, ſhe would have done it. And could ſhe have foreſeen, what we have known, I am apt to think ſhe would have adventured it; although I muſt tell you it would have been a great venture: *Spain* being both ſo potent at that time, and ſpightful againſt her, as was quickly after perceived, by the *Spaniſh Armado* in 88. and beſides the enmity of *Spain*, ſhe had thereby incur'd the envy of *France* infallibly, and was uncertain not only of ſucceſs in the War, but of what ſupport of men, and money eſpecially the *Dutch* ſhould be able to contribute, for the carrying on the War, which was eaſily foreſeen would be long and bloody.

Nor can any one think, that *England* is not ſenſible, of the danger they are in, if we be under *France*, that either conſiders the Reaſons of State, or obeſerved that which was obvious to every eye: and that is how the *Engliſh* was ſtartled at the progreſs of *France*. What poſting was made too and again? Was not the *Lord Vicount of Halliſax* haſted over, when they feared their approach to *Utrecht*? And hearing it was over, was not his *Grace the Duke of Buckingham*, the *Lord Arlington*, with ſeveral other Commiſſioners, poſted after? At which time having the honour to wait on my *Lord of Halliſax*, and telling him the Town talk of the D. of *Buckingham*, &c. coming through the Fleet, and being gone to the *Hague*; he could ſcarce credit it, having not had the leaſt notice thereof; they coming away in ſuch haſte, for fear the *French* ſhould overrun all.

And no wonder, if we conſider the Conſequences thereof for *England*, which are ſo great that they had better loſe either *Scotland*, or *Ireland*. And if any *Engliſh* think I overlaſh, I ſhall deſire them firſt carefully to compute theſe ſeveral particulars, and then cenſure.

1. The loſs that the King will have in his Cuſtoms, and the Kingdom in their Trade; which neither of thoſe Nations can compenſate.

2. The conſtant charges of maintaining a Navy, which that Kingdom muſt be at to maintain their traffick, far greater than will ſecure them againſt either of thoſe Kingdoms.

3. The

3. The great injuries they are always liable unto, from ſuch potent enemies by Sea as the *French* and *Dutch* conjoined: more than from the other by Sea and Land.

4. The Wars that are likely to fall upon them in a few years both by Sea and perhaps Land alſo; which would prove far heavier, than either of thoſe Kingdoms can make with them.

5. The hazard they run of being baffled and beat out of their Trade by ſuch a War. It is true, this is not ſo eaſie as many of the *Dutch* imagine, as I have already proved; nor yet ſo difficult, much leſs impoſſible, as perhaps ſome of the *Engliſh* may fancy.

I ſhall not now ſtand to draw theſe out of their cloſe order into an open, yet if any of the *Engliſh* think me weak in this, I have a Reſerve, which, I think, will ſufficiently ſecure me from being routed.

It will be ſaid to me why then ſhould *England* commence this War.

Truly let me ſay it freely, for I know it, that the ſcale of War very hardly caſt that of peace, and the difference was ſo ſmall, that it came upon two or three grains only. I have weighed this as exactly as I poſſibly could: firſt diſtinguiſhing pretexts from real cauſes, and then diſtinctly conſidering theſe one by one. There were theſe 5 variouſly diſcourſed of. His Majeſties deſigning to introduce the Popiſh Religion; to alter the government of thoſe Kingdoms; to revenge himſelf upon us; to advance the *Prince of Orange*; and the Intereſt of the Kingdom of *England*.

For the two firſt which made the loudeſt noiſe in ſome mens mouths, I ſoon found them frivolous; and only calumnies caſt out by his enemies at home and abroad, to make the King odious, and his People jealous. As to that of changing Religion I have formerly ſhewn, and I think ſufficiently, that he neither will, nor can if he would effect it.

As for the 2d. I conſidered the Kings years, as being paſt any ſuch youthful and vain ambition; his being deſtitute of a Child that can challenge the Crown; his former miſeries and ſufferings by War; and his wiſdom too great, to ſet upon a deſign, ſo wholly impracticable, eſpecially in *England* and *Scotland*. For by the conſtitution of his Kingdoms, though he have the *Militia* for the execution of the Laws; authority without power, being a vain ſcare-crow, and inſufficient to ſuppreſs the audacious exorbitances of the multitude: yet the people have the purſe to ballance that power, and whence then would he pay his Armies? Nor let any one ſtop me with ſaying, the Long Parliament conteſted with his Father for the *Militia*; for that was only temporary, they challenging it only for that time of the danger they apprehended in the Kingdom, and not as their conſtant right, and not belonging to the Crown; as may be ſeen by thoſe, who will rightly read their Declarations, which they publiſhed to the world concerning that War, collected and printed together by *Husbands* at *London*, 1642. And beſides this, a Parliament in being though not ſitting, which hath

ſom;

ſome kind of radical power; though not to be exerted, but when legally congregated. But ſuppoſe them diſſolved, it being in the Kings power, to do it at his pleaſure; yet hath he not the City of *London* on his back, and both Kingdoms about him to oppoſe him? eſpecially conſidering that the jealouſie of Popery would be taken into the quarrel. And what Miniſters of State durſt ſuggeſt ſuch deſigns? they know well the maxim of the *Commons* and their practice (as the great means of preſerving their freedom) is *to ruine ſuch as would infringe their Liberty*. And that they are ſo jealous of, and zealous for their rights herein, that ſome of them ſtill have the courage, and reſolution to venture their own heads, to break the necks of ſuch men and ſuch deſigns, as would prejudice their Priviledges. I have obſerved in the Hiſtories of former times, and in my own time alſo, that there were ſeldom any of the nobleſt Stags of State, how much ſoever imparked in the Kings favour, and how ſtrongly ſoever impaled with power; but if the *Commons* of *England* ſingled him out and ſet upon him, though he might hold them at an abay for ſome time, yet they ſtill hunted him down at laſt. And for the King to think of making himſelf abſolute, and govern only by an Army (like the *French* Kings) by an Army of *French* men; is ſo ridiculous, that I thought it not worthy of conſideration. Can any man in his wits, imagine his Majeſty of *England* ſo ſenſeleſs, as to give his Crown and Kingdoms to the *French* King? For that is all one with this in effect.

As for that of *Revenge*, either for *Chattam*, or the affronts mentioned in his Declaration of this War, or both: I conſidered his *Temper*, which hath ſo much *Clemency*, that it rather inclines him to *lenity* than *cruelty* and *revenge*. As is abundantly apparent, not only by paſſing, but even forcing (as I know he did, againſt ſome adicted to the latter extreme) the *Act of Indemnity* or *Oblivion*, for thoſe many and great injuries, he had ſuffered from his Subjects. And his government ſince, in conniving at the violation of ſuch Laws, as are thought ſevere in matters of Religion, and indulging liberty therein: which hath made ſome, that have ſufficiently heretofore cried up Parliaments, now run into the other extreme and cry them down as faſt; and inſtead of the Parliaments formerly, now magnifie the Kings favour and Clemency. And yet Kings and Princes are men, and men ſubject to like paſſions with others, liable to ſuggeſtions from thoſe about them, and tender of their honour as the apple of their eye. And therefore I will grant this might come in conſideration, but not ſo much, I dare ſay, as alone to make a War.

For the *Prince of Orange*, there was not only near Relation and Affection, but Intereſt alſo to be conſidered. For the *Loveſteyns* party having been ſo croſs to *England* upon his account, and the correſpondent friendſhip between us ſo uncertain, without his Headſhip; I verily believe, that if what is now done therein, had been done timouſly, it had wholly prevented this unhappy War. Yea beſides the extraordinary affection which the

the people have for the Prince, our very Bores had this Policy, and were more than ordinary zealous for his promotion, as the beſt means to procure their peace.

As to the further intereſt of the Kingdom of *England*, in regard of their Trade, and Naval expences, I have expreſſed my thoughts before in the *Preface*.

It is true, this War was always intricate, and hath proved a Game at Hazard for *England*, beyond not only theirs, I believe, but all the worlds expectation. But yet if it be ſtill notwithſtanding cautiouſly played, as they may, and ſo far as I can poſſibly diſcern, mean to play it; they can many ways come to ſave their ſtakes, at the leaſt, if not to win more than we imagine by the War: and was far fairer at firſt than *France* for winning by the game in all humane appearance, as I could manifeſt by many Arguments. But becauſe that concerns them two only, and us not at all further than our ſufferings, I ſhall wave them (at leaſt for the preſent) and proceed. For I will not hearken to the curious enquiries of thoſe who would here be asking, how I think *England* will play their game? for that let them look to it whom it concerns on all ſides, as doubtleſs they will; for me to expreſs my private thoughts, might do more hurt than good, which is the only thing I aim at: and what I think the iſſue will be, I ſhall declare hereafter in my *Conjectures*.

But here it will be asked, ſeeing it is *Englands* intereſt that we fall not into the hands of *France*, and that the Prince is now promoted, will they not make peace with us this Winter?

I muſt needs ſay, I fear they will not, except we ſhould give them ſuch terms, as I ſee we ſhall not; we thinking our condition far better, and they thinking it far worſe, than really it is. For the cauſe of this, as of moſt Wars, is complex, as I have ſhewn; ſo that though two of thoſe I aſſigned may be paſt, yet the 3d of the Kingdoms intereſt, not. They are already too far ingaged in the War, and with *France*. The Kings Honour is at the ſtake, and the Kingdoms expectation of another iſſue than the laſt War. And beſides all theſe, how can any wiſe man imagine, now that they are engaged with *France*, and have an advantage againſt us, as well as a Hazard from *France*; that if they know how to ſecure themſelves againſt the latter (as I ſuppoſe they do) they will let go the former? For we muſt needs think they will be at a certainty on one ſide or the other; and not part with *France's* friendſhip, till they be ſure of our ſatisfaction. What it is they demand, or how rightly, is not now our deſign to diſcourſe, but only matter of Intereſt all along. And yet I can eaſily foreſee that the danger of our becoming *French*, will be a ſingular advantage to us, as an inducement to them, for a more eaſie compliance with us. But at preſent I ſee no probability of Peace, but that they will go through with the War: or continue it ſo long, till they have tryed their utmoſt to obtain their ends.

I know there are many wiſe men amongſt us, that think the King can-

not carry on this War: as there was that thought he could not begin it. The former they find themſelves deceived in, and will be ſo in the latter alſo. I have diſcourſed this with ſeveral in Government, who argue that the King hath not money of himſelf to go through with the War, and that he will not convene the Parliament, or if he do they will not ſupply him. I grant the firſt, but deny the others. For if we rightly conſider their deſign, the Parliament muſt meet, and the repreſentation that will be made thereof, and the conſtitution of the Parliament, they will grant him ſupplies; though perhaps not with that facility, that they did it with in the former War. And therefore let us neither flatter nor deceive our ſelves with vain hopes herein; but rather ſeek timely to accommodate differences, before their preparations in the Spring; for I fear the longer we delay, and the worſe it will be with us.

Sect. 10. *Compliance with England the only means of the Commonwealths continuation.*

HAving thus declared the condition that we are in, and that there is no probability of peace; we come now to ſhew the conſequences thereof; and what is to be done by us, to preſerve our ſelves from ruine and deſtruction. And here to my underſtanding one of theſe three things muſt neceſſarily follow: That we muſt either continue the War againſt them both; or comply with them both; or with one of them alone if poſſibly we can. We ſhall firſt declare our thoughts concerning theſe briefly, and then ſhew with which we both may and muſt comply.

1. Then whether we ſhould continue the War againſt them both. And herein would we do, as we might and ſhould; it may be this were better, than to comply with either of them, eſpecially if they will impoſe upon us unreaſonable conditions, and much better than to comply with them both. We have ſtrength enough, through Gods bleſſing, to withſtand them (as I have already manifeſted) if we have but courage, and unanimity; and the former of theſe will be got by degrees, as I have ſaid, and our own intereſt, and preſervation ſhould perſwade us into the latter. But truly let me ſay it freely, I ſee ſuch a wearineſs in many of the War; ſuch an unwillingneſs to lay out our ſelves, as our Anceſtors did formerly, for the good of the publick; ſuch a ſelfiſh temper, every one ſeeking to preſerve his particular intereſt, and neglecting the good of the Community; and ſuch a lothneſs to adventure our lives and eſtates in a War; that I ſee little probability of preſerving our ſelves, and much leſs of prevalency againſt our Enemies. So that if this War continue I fear theſe Provinces will become a prey to them both. For though neither *France* will ſuffer *England*, nor *England France* to have them all, as I have ſhewn; yet they will part and ſhare them betwixt them, except we prevent it by a compliance

pliance. And what a miſerable condition we ſhall then be in, even worſe than if we were under either of them, I have formerly declared. Seeing then we are ſo degenerate, and become like *Iſſachar*, which his Father ſtiles a *Strong Aſs*, and ſays of him, that *He ſaw that reſt was good, and the land that it was pleaſant; and bowed his ſhoulder to bear, and became a ſervant unto tribute:* we muſt either take courage and be unanimous, valiantly fighting it out with our enemies; or for the preſent be contented with this character and condition. Will we then fight for our *Religion, Liberty, Country, Families, Eſtates, Trade*? or will we not? If the former, let me encourage all in the words of *Joab* that great General and brave Souldier wherewith he encouraged the *Iſraelites*, when he had his enemies before and behind him, *Be of good courage, and let us play the men for our people and for the Cities of our God: and the Lord do that which ſeemeth him good.* But if the reſt be ſo *good*, and *the Land ſo pleaſant* to us, that we will rather *bow our ſhoulders, and become ſervants*, than ſhew our faces in the field to fight with our enemies, let us ſee what *Maſter* we ſhould chuſe, and agree with him upon the beſt terms we can.

Gen. 49. 14, 15.

2 *Sam.* 10. 12.

2. Therefore, ſhall we comply with both our enemies? ſurely if reaſon, and what we can give, will ſatisfie them; every wiſe man will ſay *Yes*, that we may enjoy the many bleſſings God hath given us in peace. But if they will have ſuch *Cities*, ſuch *vaſt ſums of money*, and ſuch *Conditions*, as we cannot give them, except we be ruined thereby; who will not ſay, *No*. We muſt therefore conſider if there be no other way practicable, to ſave our ſelves, from the devouring Sword of our Enemies.

3. There is no way therefore left us, but to comply with one of our Enemies, if we can poſſibly; that ſo we may ballance the others power, and either compel him to a peace, or be enabled to continue the War. If any one know any other way, I heartily wiſh he would ſhew it, as I think he is bound to do one way or other; for every one ought to contribute his beſt aſſiſtance, even by the principles of ſelf-preſervation. And *Solomon* tells us, *There was a poor wiſe man, who by his wiſdom delivered the City, though no man remembred him*, and infers thence, *that wiſdom is better than ſtrength, though the poor mans wiſdom is deſpiſed, and his words are not heard.* Yet ſurely notwithſtanding that poor man did but do his duty; though he was but poorly requited for his pains.

Eccleſ. 9. 15, 16.

But I believe moſt will grant the way is good, but impracticable, in regard of the League betwixt the two Crowns, and that they will not treat aſunder, &c. Well then, let us proceed to conſider theſe things a little, and ſee whether we cannot level theſe mountains of difficulties that are before us, and make our way become plain and paſſable.

1. With which of theſe our Enemies we ſhould chuſe to comply, I think I have made ſufficiently apparent; in ſhewing it our *Intereſt* rather to be under *England* than *France*, and to have peace and correſpondent friendſhip for our Sea-traffick, with the former rather than with the latter, if we

cannot have it from them both. And I am sure this was the wisdom of our Ancestors, who in their low condition A.D. 1575. deliberating into whose Protection they should give themselves over, first declared the Empire, and the competition coming between the Crowns of *England* and *France* prefer'd the former upon many and weighty considerations, related by their Historians; and very many of our own, which are so well known I need not mention them; and *Boxhornius* the Author of the *Disquisitiones Politicæ*. *The civil Wars of* France; *the inveterate feud betwixt* French *and* Dutch, *those especially that live upon the Confines of both Countries*; *the hard yoke of the* French *Government*; *the levity of that Nation*; *its liablness to be invaded by the* Spanish; *the incommodiousness of their Ports for our Ships and Navigation*; made them averse to *France*. And on the contrary, *The reformed Religion of the* English; *their greater likeness with us in genious and language*; *the nearness of the Country*; *the multitude of their Ports*; *their commodiousness for our Commerce*; *the multiplicity of the* English *Manifactures and Commodities*; *the Country not easily invaded*; *strong and potent by Sea and Land*; *not frequently imbroyled in civil Wars*; *a free People*; *the Government temperate, and not burthensom with exactions*; *and the Interest of the* English *Nation, which if these Countries were conquered, would scarce be able to resist the Conqueror*; clearly enclined them for *England*. You see then that reasons of State, direct us to the same choice, which our Ancestors heretofore wisely made.

Cambden Annales Elisabethæ A. 1575. Thuanus l. 60. Casus 20.

2. Seeing then we must chuse *England*, not only for the Common Interest of the Protestant Religion, but for our own greatest both religious, and civil concernments. We shall now remove those obstructions that seem to block up our way to Compliance.

It is objected that the two Crowns are in a League, that neither will treat without the other, and how can we then comply with *England* alone?

I confess if all Statesmen were *Aristides*'s, the Argument might be strong. For he having heard by command of the *Athenian Senate*, *Themistocles*'s design of burning their enimies Fleet, made report, *that it was very profitable, but no ways honest*, upon which it was rejected. Or if they were all *Stoicks*, and held that *honesty*, *equity*, and *utility* were all one, and with good old *Socrates* cursed those that first separated these, as learned men tell us. But we see it is far otherwise now in the World; and that the *Peripateticks* doctrine that *honestum* and *utile* are really distinguished, is every where prevalent, and no where more, than amongst *Politicians*; which hath occasioned that known saying, *that all States are Atheists*. I do not approve any, and much less so high uncharitableness; but this I will say, that as the world goes now, *all States must be considered as Gamesters*. And what if I should say, that neither of the Courts are so strait laced in their Consciences, but were they assured from us of such conditions as they require, they would let the other go and get theirs as they could? Nay what if I should say, there may be none iniquity in this? If I should, I think I can prove it, for if in mutual covenants, either side do that, which is a breach; it is folly

Plutarch. in vita Aristid.

Plutarch. l. 4. Sympos. Cicer. 3. Offic. & 1. de Leg.

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to think, that the innocent ſhould be bound, and the peccant party free, which they may know, though others do not, as it is clear in the ſtrongeſt covenant, that is in the World, I mean that of Wedlock. I do not ſay that this is ſo betwixt them, but I ſay it may be ſo though we do not know it, ſo that either of them in ſuch caſe, may conclude with us. And I am ſure it is no diſhoneſty on our part.

But it will here be ſaid, they will not.

Do not tell me that, I know they either of them will. And if any one asks me, how? and if I be of their Cabinet Council? I ſhall only ſmile, perceiving they do not know me. I am far from that, or having ever to do with Kings or States in that kind, or pragmatically trinketing with State affairs, it being a Rule which I live by, *never to ask great men mercy.* Common favour and juſtice I deſire of men, but mercy only of my God. And yet I know this very well, and I will tell you how, and that is from their *Intereſt*; which is the compaſs, by which all States-men ſteer their courſe, and may be diſcerned by a skilful paſſenger, although he ſit not at the helm. If any man be ſo ignorant of the affairs of the World, as to think that States-men trouble their heads with the *Scool-mens quiddities*, and *hæcieties*, or their conſciences with *Caſuiſticall nicities*, as a late *German Divine* that puts the caſe, whether we ſhould pray *Vader onſe*, or *Onſe Vader*, and learnedly concludes that cuſtom muſt carry it; let him enjoy his opinion, it is very charitable, and can do no hurt. But yet I may ſay, that for above 20 years I have obſerved, that the cuſtom of the World carries it with them, and have known few, I had almoſt ſaid none, of the ſtricteſt Sect of the *Phariſees*; though I have ſome, and my charity obliges me to hope there are many, that ſeriouſly mind the *weightier things of the Law, juſtice, righteouſnes, temperance, and the World to come.*

Now that this is the Intereſt of both the Kings, rather to deal with us apart, than jointly, as well as ours, I could many ways make apparent. But ſeeing it is our intereſt to chuſe *England* we ſhall prove only that it is theirs to comply with us; omitting that of *France*, as ſuperfluous to our purpoſe.

1. They know they cannot wholly conquer us themſelves. Not only in regard of our own ſtrength, of which I haven ſpoken before, but the *French*, which are in the Country already, and if they were not, would never permit it, as I have formerly ſhown ſufficiently. Nay I dare ſay, they never deſigned any ſuch thing, becauſe they know it is impracticable: that being always true of the Greeks, ἀδύνατα ὑ βουλοῦ or things impoſſible come not into conſideration. I doubt not but they both intend and hope to have their ſhare, what ever it is that is agreed upon between the two Crowns, in caſe of Conqueſt; but that they ſhould have the whole, could never ſo much as be dreamt of by them.

2. They know alſo that it is their intereſt, never to ſuffer *France* to have all, no nor any of theſe Maritime Provinces. If he have ſome of the ſu-

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perior, that is the utmoſt their intereſt can permit. Nay indeed he is nearer theſe inferior, than that will allow, if they could help it, but that's now paſt. What vaſt diſadvantage it will be to the *Engliſh*, to let *France* have footing upon our Coaſts, and ſo come to cope with them at Sea, I have formerly ſhown: and I know they are very ſenſible of it; and therefore may well infer a willingneſs on their parts to a compliance.

3. The *Prince of Orange* his intereſt being alſo theirs, cannot but ſway ſomething with them. For if it had been Gods will, thoſe Kingdoms had continued in peace, and the ſucceſſion of the Royal reign uninterrupted there, and the *Orange* family continued alive and in power here, I perſwade my ſelf we ſhould never have warred with one another; ſo I doubt not, if it pleaſe God to preſerve his Highneſs, that they may confide more in our friendſhip, than they could formerly, he will be a happy Inſtrument of a better underſtanding between the Nations, when theſe unhappy quarrels come once to be compoſed; becauſe this is their intereſt as well as ours, and it is intereſt that rules and reigns in the World.

And thus I have ſhewn you that we *may*, I ſhall now ſhew briefly that we *muſt comply* with them, or without a miracle of mercy we are ruined.

1. Becauſe if the War continues, and we be too weak to make ſtrong reſiſtance, ſo that our enemies prevail; they will ſhare the Country betwixt them, and then we fall into the worſt condition, that can poſſibly befal us. It is true, I foreſee that ſeveral particular Perſons may ſave themſelves and their eſtates, by friends on the one ſide or the other; but I ſpeak of the community; and it is well if the hopes many have of that, make them not more negligent for this. There are two famous Republicks in *Italy*, *Venice* and *Genoa*; and what is the cauſe of the formers flouriſhing ſo much more than the latter, which was anciently both their better and their Maſter? but this, that the *Venetians* are more intent upon the Publick, and the *Genoeſe* upon their private concernments: whereby they become obnoxious not only to many factions among themſelves, but alſo to oppreſſions from their Neighbours. I could ſay more herein of our ſelves, than I ſhall at preſent, in regard it might create more jealouſies (which are already too many) of thoſe that are, or at leaſt have been, in Government amongſt us. But though I will accuſe none, yet I muſt needs ſay, that I aſcribe a great part of our preſent miſeries to this *Genoan* practice; and heartily wiſh, this prove not fatal to us at laſt.

2. Becauſe if we be not ſenſeleſs we may clearly ſee, that *France's* deſign is abſolutely to conquer us: whereas *England* ſeeks only (to uſe their expreſſion) their own ſecurity. And therefore in my Logick the inference is plain, that we had better part with ſomething, than loſe all, as we are like to do, if we come not to a compliance with *England*. To make theſe apparent to any wiſe man, would be the lighting a Torch to the Sun. Although I know the quite contrary is caſt out among us by the friends of *France*, who would perſwade us, that the *French* ſeek only to humble

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us, and the *Engliſh* to conquer us. But we know the minding of men, is but ſhooting at random, and that he that means to come near the truth, muſt have his eye upon the *mark of intereſt*, which cannot lye, as men do frequently for it. If any be ſo fooliſh, as to be enchanted with ſuch *Syrens* ſongs, as are daily ſung amongſt us; and have more regard to publick news, than the intereſt of Nations; they may go on, I cannot hinder them: but let me tell them, that I fear they will find at laſt, the Poets fiction a real truth; and if they ſtear their own courſe, meet with the Seamens fate in the Fable, be ſung a ſleep for a time, that ſo they may be afterwards, with greater facility drowned and devoured.

3. Becauſe there is no other way or humane means left us (ſo far as I can diſcern) of the Common-wealths continuation. And this is the concluſion that follows clearly from the premiſes. For if we be unable to withſtand them both, or ſatisfie them both, we muſt either break their confederacy, and have the help of one of them, or the Republick will be ruined.

It will here be demanded, ſeeing it is both *Englands* intereſt and our own to accord, why do we not then come to a compliance.

I will tell you why. Becauſe we judge our Condition better, and they judge it worſe, than really it is; and therefore ſtand upon greater terms, than we will give them. We think things will go better with us in time, and they think they will grow worſe. We flatter our ſelves with vain hopes, and rely upon *Brandenburgs* Aſſiſtance, *Spains* breaking with our enemies, the *Parliament of Englands* not ſupplying that King to carry on the War, and the like, when they know the quite contrary in all humane appearance. or perhaps we are afraid to irritate *France*, if we ſhould make overtures to *England*; and *England* will not give ſuch an umbrage of jealouſie to *France*, as to tamper with us, except they be firſt aſſured from us of ſatisfaction. But cannot the effecting this be put into the hands of his *Highneſs* and a few others as it was lately, to be privately tranſacted by them? Here then it is that the ſhooe pinches, We are a popular State, the people ſtill think, till an enemy comes, they can defend themſelves, and therefore our Governors dare not adventure to tender *England* ſuch ſatisfaction, as (for ought I ſee) they will have, leſt they either ſhould not be able to perform it, or if they do, ſhould loſe themſelves with the people. And therefore I foreſee, the War will be continued, till we be reduced to that condition, that we ſhall be neceſſitated to give them both their demands, by publick tranſaction, or at leaſt that way break with one of them. And on this foundation, I ſhall now proceed, to gueſs at that which I think is moſt likely to befal us.

Sect. II *Conjectures of future affairs. The motions of the ensuing Summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Republick, probably* England *may get a Bridle to curb us,* France *the Sadle to ride us,* Colen *a supernumerary girth,* Munster *a boss of the Crupper. Our condition deplored and consolated. A caution for* England, *and the* Orange *family. The Authors fears of what will at last befal us. The* Spanish *Netherlands a dying. The friendship of* Englaud *and* France *sick at heart, and cannot live long. That of* Spain *and* England *sound at heart, and will recover.*

ALthough I have sometimes spent almost whole nights at gazing on the Stars, and could perhaps erect an Astrological Scheme as well as another; yet I never used that way, nor never shall for guessing at *futurities*; because I know it is vain to think, we cam spell Gods providence, by their mystical hieroglyphick. Yet let me say it without vanity, I do believe I have made as many conjectures, concerning Kingdoms, States and particular places, as any man of my quality in *Europe*: not by any enthusiastick spirit of prophecy, or by Astrology from the Stars; but reasons of State, their interest, and the fundamental maxims of their Government; sometimes out of curiosity only, and sometimes for other ends, but such as are honest I assure you, for none are either better or worse by it, but only my brothers and my self. The reason why I adventure to do this publickly now, is that I may awaken us out of our security, and that we may look about us, and see if possibly we can prevent those things, which it is very probable are coming upon us. Only I desire to do it modestly, as it becomes every *Christian*; and neither on the one hand to pretend to that certainty, as if we were of Gods Council; no on the other hand to fall under *Christs* rebuke for *not discerning the signs of the times*, which are both theological and political, but I am now only treating of the latter, and to that I shall confine my discourse. *Matth.16.*

Now that we may be quickned to defend our selves, comply with *England*, and free the *Spanish Netherlands* from their fears, and our selves from the neighbourhood of the *French* there, (this being one Reason of State, why we formerly made peace with *Spain*, lest we should be in continual danger of annoyance from *France*) and also render their maintaining their Conquests among us more difficult, by their being kept unconnected with that Kingdom: I shall now proceed to the *Conjectures* I have made, not with an Astrological confidence, but a Christian allowance of divine providence, which strangely alters times and seasons, puls down one and sets up another, confounds the wisdom of the wise, brings to nought the counsels of *Achitophels*, and turns the great designs and preparations for War, into a happy compliance, and peace as he pleases; and all in infinite wisdom, though we cannot discern it, the knowledge of Gods

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providence even when paſt or preſent, and much more when future, being to *David*, and therfore far more to us. *Too wonderfull for us, ſo high that we cannot attaine unto it, and ſo deepe in the great waters, that the footſteps thereof are not to be traced and knowne.* So that we may well ſay, as of old, *Dei ſapientia, & hominum ſtultitia regunt mundum.* Pſal. 139. Pſal. 77.

Firſt then, if we awake out of our ſecurity, and looke up in the morning of the yeare, we muſt needs conclude of *foule weather* the enſuing Summer, *the skie is ſo red*, that we may eaſily perceive it portends blood, and the loweſt region *is ſo lowring*, that we may eaſily *diſcerne* that a tempeſtuous ſtorme is a gathering; except we be ſo beſotted, as the tooliſh *Jewes* of old, with ſecurity, *that we cannot diſcerne, as Chriſt tells them, the ſignes of the times.* Can all *Europe* allmoſt be arming, and we a ſleepe in the Bed of Security, dreaming of Peace? Beſides the incredible preparations of *France*, is not *England*, *Sweadland*, and all our Neighbors allmoſt up and at worke; and can we thinke they would be at that coſt for a Comedy of Peace? have we not all the reaſon in the World, to thinke it will be to us, a Tragedy of War? Let others enjoy their opinion, and not take the alarme, till they ſee *Hanibal ad portas*; for my part, I muſt needs profes, I cannot, from what I obſerve, but conclude, that the affaires of the enſuing Summer, are like to be great, and the motions thereof quick, and ſuch as will highly concerne us in theſe Countreys.

As to this Republick, which hath at this time theſe four declared Enimies, *England*, *France*, *Colen*, and *Munſter*; I ſhall briefly ſpeake my thoughts, with reference to them all.

England probably will get, *a bridle to curb us.* I have ſhewne in the *Preface*, what they account the *Intreſt* of the Kingdome: We ſee notwithſtanding the *Prince of Orange* his promotion, they ſtill purſue the War; and muſt we not then conclude, that they ſeeke ſome thing further? Whether they will by Sea attacque our Coaſts, or by marching their Armie about over Land, is not for me to determine; much les what particular places below they may fall upon, or what ſucces they may have. Yet I conclude they will have ſome hanke or other upon our Navall power, one way or other, before they make Peace with us; otherwiſe they will continue the War the following Summer, to try their utmoſt to get, that which we will not give them.

France that is allready got into the Sadle, will there ſit and ride us; though we flatter our ſelves, we ſhall by one means or other, ſhake him out of it, and off our backs. Truly I cannot but wonder often times, to heare what vaine hopes men expres and there's no contradicting them; (allthough ſome times I cannot conteine my ſelfe from ſmiling, or ſhakeing my head) that *France* muſt be content with one or two of our Cities which we can beſt ſpare, and with a confidence allmoſt as large, as if they was ready to run away, or reſolved to march out and quit thoſe Cities they have, at our pleaſure. As if the *French* were ſuch fooles, to be at that vaſt expence, great paines, even the King himſelfe perſonally, and have

such advantage upon us, and quit the same for a thing of nothing? For my part, I am affraid they will rather get more, then lose that they have gotten already. And I know, their designe is, to get all at last. It is true, if we comply with *England*, and so strengthen our selves by them and *Spaine*, we may thereby hope either to obteine better conditions by Treaty, or compel them thereunto by Force. But I am speaking of the state of the War, as now it stands.

Colen, that pretends to some of those Cities which we held about the *Rhyne*, that are now in the power and possession of the *French*, may possibly for his paines, and permission of their passage, *&c.* get some *supernumerary girth*, one place or other that may be of no great concernment to *France*, either for their designes upon us or the Empire, and must be contented therewith. And perhaps for some time his Counsellors may have their Pensions continued from *France*.

Munster, that is mercinary and fights for Money, will get a bos off the crupper; *French Lewis*'s made and minted of *Dutch Ducats*. For elective *Princes*, as *Bishops*, that are onely for life, seek more to enrich themselves, then to enlarge their Territories, as those doe that are hereditary.

And this is likely, so far as I can see, to prove our condition; except Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς appeare in the Tragedy, or God Almighty by some wonderfull providence, make a change in the Scene of this War. Which, I confess, is very deplorable, which way soever we look; and we are not so sensible of it now, as we shall be hereafter. I had thought here to have sit downe a little with a lamentation, but I have been so large already, that I shall wholly wave it for the present.

And yet *it is a bad wind that blows no good*, we may make this advantage of our miseries, so long as we remain amidst our enimies, when a Peace is once concluded; that we may hold them both fair to us, and so secure our selves a little more in quiet, then we perhaps think, by being ready to close with either, to the great prejudice of the other.

And therefore let me freely insert this important and necessary Caution for *England*, *That they take heed they do not overdo their work*; and so far irritate this Republick, that out of a present prejudice and passion, and also desperation of their future quietness from them, they call in the *French*, to be revenged of them, though it be to their own ruine.

I know many are jealous, that this whole War is onely to make the *Prince of Orange* a *Monarch*, and the two Crowns will have no more to do with the States; although I profess, I am far from thinking, that those two Kings and Kingdoms would be at all this expence of blood and treasure for that end onely, and doe believe that if that would set us in our former condition, it would soone be assented unto, not onely by the multitude, but the wisest men amongst us, who know the extraordinary abilities and great capacities of his Highness. Therefore let me say it freely without offence, either of Him or his Enimies, that I perceive many lay this for a

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fundamental maxim, *Better a Prince that hath power to defend us, then one whom we muſt onely defend.* And except my eye-ſight fail me, ſome are faſt at work in preparing materials to build thereon. A word is enough to the wiſe, and therefore I will ſay no more.

Nay I will not diſſemble my further fears, That if *France* keeps thoſe places on the South Sea, and ſhould get others lower, either in *Holland* or *Frieſlands*, as may capacitate him to incommodate their Trade, though we ſhould have a peace for ſome time with him, we ſhall fall into his hands at laſt. For the *French* are already ſo near us on every ſide, that they hover over us, as a Hawk over the prey, watching onely an opportunity, how they may graſp us in their talons.

If any ſhall here aske me, Why may we not then as well now become *French?*

I alſo ſhall aske ſuch one Queſtion, which when they ſatisfie me in, I alſo ſhall them. You know certainly you muſt die at laſt, (whereas here is onely uncertaine fears) and yet when you are ſick, why do you take Phyſick and uſe means for recovery? Is it not becauſe you deſire to live as long as you can? Doe you not account him a mad man, that will caſt away his life, although he muſt loſe it at the laſt? And rightly, becauſe who knows what God may doe, and whether he may not recover him, though the diſeaſe be deſperate?

Having ſpoke our thoughts concerning theſe united, we ſhall now ſpeak of the *Spaniſh* Provinces. I have as much ſmattering skill in Phyſick, I confeſs, as would ſerve me to make *Charon* a fraight of old Wives; yet am I far from being arrived at the confidence, which I have obſerved in *Urinal-Doctors.* And yet for once, I will adventure to try the little skill I have, with thoſe *State-Mountebanks*, that are ſo ſecure concerning the *Spaniſh Netherlands.* For my part, I have ſhak't their Water again and again, and can find nothing but ſymptoms of death. I ſhall onely premiſe that I ſhall not with an Emperical confidence tell you the time: Kingdoms and States, as well as private perſons, ſometimes languiſh out rather then live their laſt. But that they are ſo ſick, that I ſee no hopes of their recovery if this War continues. And I will tell you my feares for the enſuing Summer.

1. The incredible preparations that *France* makes this Winter, both of Men and Money, as if they would ſet all at ſtake for carrying on the following Summers Wars.

2. The Empire's Army is overmatcht with *Turens.* They know, that we are not in a capacity to recover the Cities we have loſt, and that they cannot conquer thoſe that remaine; ſo that their Armies cannot be deſigned either for ſtrengthning their owne Garriſons, or forcing of ours. Except they will ſpend a Summers Expedition upon ſome inconſiderable out Garriſons, which I cannot imagin.

3. I have looked round about in *Europe*, where this ſtorme ſhould fall,

and can see no place it hovers over, except those Provinces, and our selves.

4. I consider the eminent advantage *France* hath at present by their friendship with *England*; which I feare he will take.

5. Allthough I doe not thinke *France* will prevaile by all his endeavors with *England* to breake with *Spaine*; yet I thinke *England* will either be employed in doing their owne worke, or not so quickly breake with *France*, to stop his carriere in over-running those *Netherlands*.

6 We shall either have the Wars continue, or a Peace. If the former as they are, though *England* helps not therein, (for they profes in their Declaration to maintaine the Treaty at *Aken*) yea, though they would hinder it, yet I doe not see how they can practically, if they have not prevented it beforehand by their Treaty; nor we to be sure the Wars continuing. If a Peace be concluded, we shall be forced to forsake them; this being the main ground of the quarrel. For if we would have helped *France* to have ruind them, we might have been quiet for some time at least; but because we had rather quench, then set our neighbors house on fire, lest ours follow in the flames: *France* hath fallen upon us, and shall we not then thinke that he will cudgell us into such conditions? It is true indeed, if *England* and we come to understand one another, and our joynt intrest better; we may succor them for some time; but that's not my supposal, of the Wars continuing as they are, which in that case implies a strange complication of diseases, which to me, who knows not their Treaty, seems incurable.

7. And where else they should have assistance to save them, if *France* will fall upon them, I see not. For the Empire cannot, it is well if they can save themselves. *Spaine* is at a great distance. May make perhaps some diversion in *Catalonia*, or some small from *Millan*, *&c.* But whats that to save those Provinces?

8. We must therefore consider if they can stand on their owne legs, so as to withstand their enimies power, and not to be throwne downe thereby. And here we shall find the number of *Spanish* inconsiderable; the *Dutch* very wavering and uncertaine: Some Popish Zealots thinking *France* can best carry on their designes; others betwixt hopes and feares, wishing they might see an issue; and others plainely despairing of resistance, desiring they were over. Their Cities great and untenable, severall of them requiring allmost as many to man them well, as they have *Spanish* in the Countrey. If they can make good *Bruxels*, *Antwerp*, *Namur*, and *Oostend*, for some time, to see if the affaires of *Europe* may not alter, it is all I expect. But what shall become of the whole Countrey, and the rest of the Cities, *Bruges*, *Mechlin*, *Gant*, *Lovaine*, *&c.* Some of them as large as most Cities in *Europe*. Three Noblemen *An.* 1427. (as *Guicciardine* tells us) with great charges, had five of the greatest Cities on this side the Alpes measured, and found but 18 Rods or Perches difference. Of which *Lovaine* and *Gant*, the greatest; *Paris* (within the Walls) and *Liege* alike; *Colen* the least. But neglecting to mention the just measure, *Guicciardine* tells us they are

Descriptio Lovani.

are 6 *Italian* miles within, and above 8 without the walls. And though this be enough, yet I muſt needs thinke them more. For having had the curioſity to meaſure one of them for all, I found it upon a warme walking within the Walls, three full hours by my watch. And beſides this, *Paris* and *Liege* are moſt populous, *Colen* next, but theſe of the *Netherlands* leaſt, ſo that I leave any rationall man to judge what number of men they require to maintaine them, for I will not now ſtand to make that calculation. Now if he takes theſe two great Cities, he is in the heart of *Brabant* and *Flanders*, ſo that all the reſt will fall of themſelves. I conclude therfore, that except the treaty between *France* and *England* ſecure them, which is unknowne to me; or that God in his all-wiſe Providence, make ſome wonderfull chang in the ſcene of affairs in Europe, the *Spaniſh Netherlands* are loſt. Having therefore thus tolled their paſſing bell, we will leave them to Gods mercy, and the King of *France*'s clemency, and haſt us out of them to *France* and *England*.

And here many perhaps will thinke me litle better than madd, to croſs the current opinion of Chriſtendom; when I ſay that the *Friendſhip of France and England is ſick at heart, and cannot live long*; and the contrary of that betwene *England* and *Spaine*. But I matter not that, other men have their way of making their meaſures, and I have mine. And indeed I thought to have communicated it, but this worke having allready exceeded my intentions, and that would be a great digreſſion, I would onely tell you my grounds or reaſons for the preſent why I thinke ſo, and may happily make a particular diſcourſe of the other hereafter.

How *France* and *England* came to be ſo great friends as to agree to commence, and carry on a War thus far againſt us, is not now mine enquiry; but to ſhew there is no ſuch ground to diſpaire of compliance with *England*, notwithſtanding their preſent league with *France*, is my deſigne. And for this end I ſhall firſt ſhew that though this friendſhip is faire outwardly, each for their own ends; yet that it is not ſo cordiall and firme, as many amongſt us feare it is. And to ſay the truth, the conſideration hereof, was the firſt dawning of hopes I had, for the Proteſtant Intreſt, and the good of theſe Countries. Now allthough I could mention ſome more private expoſtulations, and perhaps ſome of their Articles, allthough I could by no means, ever procure from either ſide, the knowledge of them all: yet I thinke it not fit to mention theſe, but ſuch things onely as are publick, and others as well as my ſelf may know, if they uſe their eye-ſight, and obſervation.

Let us then omitting all ſecrets and myſteries of State, which yet are the beſt grounds to make a judgement, when certainely knowne; we will onely mention ſuch things as are publickly apparent, but being not conſidered in ſubordination to Reaſons of State, were unuſefull to the moſt, for the end I have obſerved them.

When all *Europe* ſtood in doubt what *England* would doe, and all men on their

their tiptoes with expectation; to see whether War or Peace, betwixt that Kingdome and these Countries: upon the *Smyrna's* Fleet returne, the doubts of many were then decided. The Saturday morning early after the fight, the *Fiscale* sent his footman to tell me they had fought, with some generalls thereof, and that the Fleet was before the Land: I must confes, I stood amazed at *Holmes's* furious folly, who had orders onely to bring them up, not to commence a War, the Declaration thereof being not published; allthough to those that would not submit to such orders, it was all one in effect, though not in formalities, which are the greatest plea, that I know of, that the *English* have for that Action. Upon this I began to consider the Reasons of State as to *England*, both domestick and forreign; For I reasoned thus, if this friendship be so firme that *England* will goe through with *France* in all their great designes, I must make other measures then I had formerly done. But still finding all Reasons of State against this, and those jealousies of changing *Religion* and the *Government* in those Kingdoms frivolous, (as I have demonstrated) I found allso thereby stronger grounds of hope for the Protestant Religion and the common Intrest of *Europe*; and that it was onely a temporary friendship, out of some particular peake, or designe against these Provinces, which would have an end when satisfaction therein was given to that Crowne. Whilst I am busy in ballancing all the Reasons of State for those Kingdoms, and likewise for their Intrest abroad as comprehensively as I could, the Protestants Intrest, the Triple Alliance, the greatnes of *France*, the danger of *England &c.* comes the *English* Declaration of War to mine hands, but without a particular date, contrary to practise, but wisely to colour what *Holmes* had done. Which having diligently perused, what I desired first to see, I found last to my great satisfaction, and that is that they would *support the peace made at Aix la Chappelle*, (or *Aken*) *and notwithstanding the prosecution of this War, will maintaine the true intent and scope of the said Treaty, and that in all their Alliances which they have or shall make in the progres of this War, they have and will take care, to preserve the ends thereof inviolable unles provoked to the contrary.* Whereby I was fully confirmed in my former opinion, so that I will now proceed to relate such things which have publickly past in the management of this War, that are sufficient I thinke to enduce those that are unprejudiced, though perhaps not to convince the obstinate, to be of the same opinion with my selfe, and that the friendship of *England* and *France* is not so firme as they have feared. Premising that though all States as Gamesters must and will be cautious in their playing their parts, yet there appeared still more then ordinary jealousies of each others friendship all along, in the management of this War.

1. It is observeable that though *France* is the Principall in the War, yet they were so diffident of *England*, that they would have them first to begin it, that so they might see them certainly engaged against us.

2. When they are both engaged, they trust not one another, without great

great *Hoſtages* as it were on both ſides; the *French* Squadron of Ships with the *Engliſh* and the *Duke of Monmouth* with the body of an Army with the *French*.

3. That body of the *Engliſh*, which doubtles ſhould have remained together under their owne generall Officers conjoyned with the *French* Armie; we know was not truſted by the *French* ſo to doe, but were mingled here and there, under the principall command of the *French* Generalls.

4. The Fleet wherein the *Engliſh* had the principall ſhare of power and command, onely faced ours at firſt in point of Honour; yet attacqued them not, though they had the wind, whereby they might eaſily have done it at their pleaſure, and alſo to their Advantage; but ſtood over againe to the *Engliſh* coaſt. Which fooles thought was want of valour, but wiſe men will judge it reaſon of State, that they might ſtay and obſerve what ſucces the *French* had by Land. And had not we fallen upon them, for Reaſons of State in thoſe circumſtances and Government of theſe Provines, that are well knowne, I thinke they would have done, as litle as they could for *France*; to have fought us to this day.

5. After that fight, though they knew ſeverall of our Ships were laid up, and ſome thouſands of men called out of the Fleet, yet notwithſtanding all the Summer after for many weeks, they attempted nothing againſt us with their Fleet. Intending doubtles to doe their owne worke, as they then ſaw *France* did theirs.

6. How the *Engliſh* were ſtartled, at the *French*'s coming to *Utrecht* was very apparent, which we have formerly mentioned.

7. Why might not *England*, as well as the reſt of the World, thinke that *Weſel*, *Rijnberg*, *Skenker-ſconſe*, and the reſt of our ſtrong out Garriſons might give the *French* ſufficient worke? and the *French* on the contrary, who had laid their traines before hand, know that when they came to fire them, there was no feare they would mis, and they ſhould faile of having thoſe places? Yea why may they not deſigne by this meanes to breake both our powers ſo by Sea, that they may riſe up to contend with either of us? I am ſure theſe things are very uſuall with Princes and States, and examples of this kind are infinite. Why may we not then thinke that *England* might hereby deſigne to breake *France*'s power by Land; and *France Englands* power and ours alſo by Sea? How often theſe two Crowns have played ſuch like games with one another formerly; when *England* had footing in *France*, is apparent from the Hiſtories of both Nations. But we will ſpeake of that which more nearly concerns our ſelves, and within our own knowledge. In our firſt War with *England* I obſerved, what influence *Don Alonzo*, the Reſident for *Spaine* at *London*, had, to fomet thoſe jealouſies that that Common-weakh had of this, that it was the Kings cauſe, which this Republick by meanes of the *Orange* Family had eſpouſes, and what aſſiſtance *Spaine*, (which firſt publickly acknowledged that Common-weath) would afford them, &c. And when we were both engaged,

gaged, how the *Spaniſh* drew their Forces towards our Frontiers, as if they alſo would fall upon us; and when we declined, withdrew them againe, to encourage us both to continue the War. And in our ſecond War, if *France* had not a great hand both in contriving and continuing it, wiſemen are much deceived, and the French miſrepreſented to the World. By what inducements they perſwaded both ſides to a willingnes to that War, I liſt not mention, nor is there much neceſſity thereof, they being ſo well knowne to ſeverall of both Nations. What a hand they had in its continuation, we may eaſily perceive, if we recollect but what paſſed therein. When the *Engliſh* in the firſt Battel had beaten us, *France* being onely a *Spectator* to ballance *England*, becomes our Second; and *Monſieur*, the Kings onely Brother, and his Lady, *Englands* onely Siſter, were not permitted to uſe any publick expreſſions of joy by Bonefires, or otherwiſe for their Brother the *Duke of Yorks* Victory over *Opdam*. Their Fleet under *de Duke of Banford* ſhall come to our aſſiſtance, which occaſiond the dividing of the *Engliſhe's*, by which meanes and *Monks* precipitancy (who would needs fight contrary to the advice of the cheif and beſt Commanders in the Fleet, as *Aſcough* told us in the *Hague*) the *Engliſh* are beaten by us. And to boye up *England* againe, a private League is made betweene the two Crownes, as I have formerly declared from an honourable Author. So that theſe tricks of State are uſuall, though not diſcerned by every eye; nor dare I cenſure them allwayes for ſinfull, except I ſee manifeſtly foule play, becauſe I know not the Reaſons of State, which are the Grounds of their proceedings.

Having thus ſhewne, and I thinke ſufficiently, *that the friendſhip of* England *and* France *is ſick at heart*; I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, *that it cannot live long*; but if *France* goes on, *will and muſt die quickly*.

1. *Englands* intreſt will perſwade them to this, which they cannot but diſcerne clearly prompts them to put a ſtop to *France's* progres. If any think that they are ſo blinded with Paſſion, That to be revenged of us, they will ruin themſelves: I am not of their opinion, for many Reaſons, which I think I am cleare in; allthough I ſhall not mention them now, but onely appeale to the iſſue, whether they or I be in the darke and deceived.

2. The many tricks that *France* playes them, ſome whereof I have hinted, and ſeverall others might be mentioned, That I know they have attempted, but been diſappointed in; cannot but alienate the *Engliſh* from them.

3. A Treaty being the game (as I have ſaid) we ſhall play at, (which the ſooner and better for us) I foreſee plainly, that ſuch Cards will be played, as will make it apparent, that the Pack was neither fairly ſhuffled nor delt, and that the *French* meane to play at *la bete* with us both; and if we continue to play, ſhall come to *loſeing loadam* at laſt: So that though the *French* have more of *Clubs* and *Spades* in their hands, by which they hope to win the *Diamonds*, we ſhall have more of the *Hearts* between us; and ſo perhaps ſave ſome of our ſtock at the ſtake.

4. If *England* come to receive ſatisfaction, the ſpirit of the Nation will turne

turne the ſcales. For ſuppoſe that ſhould be now, that *Comines* tells us was heretofore, (which yet is ſooner ſaid than proved) yet we muſt needs thinke that if *France* deales unfairely with them; they will not onely have a faire occaſion to deſert them, but the King and his Court, the Parliament and People will be more irritated againſt them, then they are now againſt us, (as is uſuall in ſuch caſes) and be readier to joyne with us and fall upon them, then they were to joyne with them againſt us, for the conſervation both of their Religious and Civil Concernements. *Lib. 6. c. 2*

5. The Neceſſity of keeping up the ballance between *France* and *Spaine*, will neceſſitate *England* to breake with *France*, or at leaſt hold them to keepe more within their bounds, as we ſhall more fully ſhew hereafter.

6. Nay the very defence of theſe Countries, which we thinke they ſeeke to ruine, will cauſe them either to bring *France* to a peace with us, or themſelves to help to defend us againſt them. For they will never ſuffer *France* to have them all, no nor the greateſt part of theſe maritime Provinces, nor the ſtrongeſt as *Holland*, if they can poſſibly hinder it, though they may permit them ſome part of the Superior, for having themſelves a ſhare of the Inferior, as I have formerly ſhewne. So that our *intreſt* is ſo far *Englands*, and is the greateſt ſecurity we have, next to Gods protection, and our owne ſtrength, that we ſhall not be wholly overrun and brought under the *French*. Yea, this is ſo highly their concernement, that I perſwade my ſelfe, if all the ſtrength of the 3 Kingdoms under the Crowne of *England*, and all the power of *Spaine* with them, can hinder it, *France* ſhall never gaine them; or if he doe, never quietly poſſes them.

And theſe things I thinke are ſufficient, to free us from our fooliſh feares of *England*; and to perſwade us to a compliance with them, ſeeing we are both ſo greatly concerned to comply.

We ſhall now proceed to ſhew the quite contrary of the friendſhip between *Spaine* and *England*, that *it is ſound at heart, and will recover*. Wherein we need not be ſo large, becauſe that which ſhews that the friendſhip of *France* and *England* muſt die, proves that of *England* and *Spaine* will live.

That this friendſhip is ſound on the ſide of *Spaine*, none queſtions; this being the great motive, (though not the onely I confeſs) that hath kept them from breaking with *France*.

And that it is allſo ſo on the ſide of *England*, I thinke is as cleare to thoſe that conſiders.

1. Their declared intention of maintaining the Treaty at *Aix la Chapelle* (or *Aken*) in their Declaration of this War.

2. Allthough a proviſionall clauſe, *unles provoked to the contrary*, in the cloſe thereof, gives them a latitude of breaking with *Spaine*; yet notwithſtanding they have been provoked ſeverall wayes by them, as all know that have obſerved the War, yet they will not breake with them we ſee; which is a cleare demonſtration their friendſhip is firmer then we imagine.

3. The importunities of *France*, which we know have been great, that

England would engage with them against *Spaine* allso, hitherto we see, have prevailed nothing therein.

4. The assurance we know *England* hath given the Court of *Spaine*, both there and at *Bruxels*, concerning the *Spanish Netherlands*, makes us not doubt of their intentions; although we doe of *France*'s, by reason both of their preparations and opportunities, as we have formerly shewne. But if *France* should fall upon them, as we have reason to feare; that will prove both our Assertions the stronglier, making the friendship of *England* and *France* die immediately, and that of *Spaine* and *England* quickly recover. And if this save not those Provinces for the present, there's nothing (so far as I see) under Heaven that can, as I have formerly said.

We perceive then the pulse of this friendship beates both strong and orderly enough, to secure us from all feares of its dying; lets visit the patient once more, and we shall find no further need of such *Physitians* advise, as the Author of *la France Politique*, in his *Avis important à l'Angleterre*, *pag.* 471. and that the distemper was onely a fit or two of an Ague the last Spring, and therefore so far from being dangerous, that it may prove rather physicall according to the Proverb, *An Ague in the Spring, is Physick for a King*: And that the Body Politick of *Spaine* in their friendship with *England* is recovering, as well as the King of *Spaine* personally is recovered.

1. If we consider the Common intrest of *Europe* wherein the *English* not onely are, but allso profes themselves concerned. And for this I need not any other proofe, but the *Triple Alliance* *, and the *Declaration of this War*, both which whosoever reads, must needs acknowledge this for truth.

* *Jan.* 23. 1668.

2. The great Intrest of Trade which the *English* have in the *Spanish* Dominions. The very effects the Merchants had standing out there, were computed at the beginning of this War, at sixteen Millions. And can we thinke the King will easily forgoe his Customs, and the Kingdome their Commerce with those Dominions? Which in my calculation, is equall with that they have with all *Europe* besides.

3. We know that they have lately made a peace in the *West Indies*, and how peremptory they are in the observance thereof; so that the Governor of *Jamaica* upon complaints of him, was sent prisoner to *London*, clapt up in the *Tower*, *&c.* And shall we thinke then, that they will breake into War at home?

4. *England* cannot but be sensible of the greatnes of *France*, and cannot be so senseles, but they must needs thinke, that it is their concernement that he grow not so great, that he become their Master allso at last? And the whole World knowes that *Spaine* not onely hath been now for many yeares the ballance for them; but still must be so upon the Continent, or none: The Princes of the Empire being now so divided between the *Imperiall* and *French Crowne*. What wise man therefore can thinke now that *Spaine* declines, but that the *Empire* and *England* are highly concernd to support them? And shall we thinke then that in stead of this, either should help forwards their downfall? For my part, were there no other reason of state,

but

but this, I should not fear *England's* breaking with *Spaine*; and especially now that they see what progres *France* hath made amongst us.

5. This hath been a Fundamental Maxim in the Governement of *England*, to keep the ballance even betwixt the two Crownes of *Spaine* and *France*, ever since *Lewis* the Elevenths time, who seised on *Burgundy*, which was formerly the usual Confederate with *England* against *France*. In place whereof *Austria* first, and after *Spaine* obteining the rest of the Provinces that were under *Charles*, last *Duke of Burgundy*, by marriage of his daughter; *England* after still had an eye to them in reference to *France*. And when the Civil Wars in these Provinces broke out, and *England* was jealous of *France's* being our Protector: Q. *Elisabeth* would not permit it, still having respect to the *House of Burgundy*, as *Thuanus* and *Cambden* in the forecited places shew.

And thus you have my *Conjectures*, with such Reasons of State whereon they are grounded as are publick, and may therefore be publ shed: I having industriously declined, all reflections on private Transactions, Treaties, and Articles whatsoever, that so no side may have any just occasion of being offended with my writing.

Sect. 12. *France's Ambition. Growing greatnes. The causes thereof. We and England in the fault. The Common Intrest of Europe to oppose France particularly declared of the Empire, Spaine, England, Denmarke, and this Republick and Hans Townes. Yea of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzerland. The ballance of Europe to be kept even, and by whom.*

TO those that know the World, *the ambition of* France cannot be unknown. Lets but look a litle about us, and we shall see the *French Intrest* is every where driven on. To set this forth in its right colors, would require Volums rather then Pages. We shall therfore doe as the Painter, that instead of drawing the Giant at length, drew onely his Thumb; or as *Geographers* that set forth great Countreys in small Maps. And for this we shall not looke far backwards to former times, but onely our owne, since *France* recovered of those strong Convulsions, by the Civil Wars and Dissentions in *Mazarines* time, in the minority of his present *Majesty*. And we shall find sufficient, to awaken the most part of Princes and States in *Europe*, to looke to themselves. The Invasion of the *Spanish Netherlands*; the taking the *French Comte* (though after restored to the *Spanish*) and *Lorreigne*, which they still keepe; the engageing a strong party of the *Electors*, and Princes of the *Empire* for their Intrest; the worke they have made in *Poland* and *Hungary*, that that Crowne might be at their disposal, and this diverted; their taking the *Swede* off the Triple Alliance, and obliging him to give the Emperor worke in *Germany*, and *Brandenburgh* in *Prussia*, with a great sum of Money; some say and Print allso 60 Tun of Gold, or 600000 l. ster-

ling; the endeavours they have uſed with *Portugal* to give *Spaine* a diverſion, though that Kingdom is not in a capacity to ſerve their deſignes; the worke allſo they have made in *Italy*; their intreſting themſelves in all Treaties allmoſt in *Europe*; the Penſions they allow to Miniſters of State in moſt Princes Courts, and many other wayes they take to enlarge their Empire. Thoſe that are deſirous to ſee their deſignes, may conſult the late Author of *La France Politique ou ſes deſſeins executez & à executer.* And eſpecially the ingenious diſcours of the *Baron of Iſola*, in's *Bouclier d'Eſtat & de Juſtice* Article 6. where he ſhows *France*'s aſpiring to the *Univerſal Monarchy*, and by what maxims and means, they advance apace towards it; and as their ambition is great, ſo their pretentions are boundles. Who knows not how they pretend, not onely to the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, but the whole *Empire? Des juſtes pretentions du Roy ſur l'Empire, par le Sieur Aubery Advocat au Parliament, & aux conſeils du Roy.* Printed at *Paris* 1667. And there are *Aubery*'s, or at leaſt Advocates enow in *Paris*, to draw up pretenſions to the Crowne of *England*; and ſo of one Kingdome and State after another, according as their Swords ſhall be able to purſue them.

And indeed ſuch is the growing greatnes of that Kingdome, that it is become formidable to all *Europe*. I need not inſiſt on this, the World is ſuffricientely ſenſible of it; but it may be worth our pains to enquire into the cauſes thereof.

France formerly had ſeverall boundaries to their Ambition, which by degrees they have broken downe. Severall *Dukes*, on the one ſide that of *Normandie*, and the *Engliſh* after who for 400 years together *latè dominati ſunt in Gallia*; till *Charles* the 7. his time; and that of *Bretagnie*, till *Charles* the 8 gained it to the Crowne of *France*, by the marriage of *Anne*, Daughter of *Francis* the 2. the laſt Duke thereof; and on the other ſide the Dukes of *Bungundie*, till *Lewis* the 11. who after the death of *Charles* the laſt Duke ſlaine at the Battell of *Nancey*, ſeized thereon, and united it to the Crowne of *France*. Theſe three Potentates kept the French Kings continually under, by their Confederations and Wars againſt that Kingdome. Which Bands, they having once broke, they became at liberty to get more elbow-room in the World; and become the largeſt, compacteſt, and ſtrongeſt Kingdom of *Europe*, were it not that their owne inteſtine Diviſions, and frequent Civil Wars hath often weakned them.

Comines, l. 6. c. 3.

After *France* had arrived at this greatnes, the following Kings *Charles* the 8. *Lewis* the 12. and *Francis* the firſt, fruitleſly ſpent the Kingdoms ſtrength in their Wars in *Italy*; till *Francis* and *Charles* the 5. became competitors for the *Empire*, and *Spaine* and *France* a fit match for each other in power. Since which time ſuch mighty conteſts have been betwixt thoſe two Kingdoms, as have filled all *Europe* with terror and amazement, and all Hiſtorians with their Actions. But how *France* hath ſo far prevailed, as we ſee at preſent, is partly by our owne, and partly by the *Engliſh* fault; we by Commiſſion, and they by Omiſſion, as we ſhall (with what brevity

vity we can) make apparent, in regard it may be uſefull to us both.

During the reigne of *Charles* the 5. and *Francis* aforeſaid, the Reformation of Religion begun, which occaſioned great alterations to the Kingdom of *France*, and to the Kings of *Spaine* in theſe *Low Countries*. Wherein the Crowne of *Spaine* continued to proſecute their intreſt, in breaking downe the power of *France* by all means poſſible, and eſpecially by joyning with the *Guiſian faction* which ſtiled themſelves the *Holy League*, under pretenſe of oppoſing the *Proteſtants*. Thoſe great conteſts which the ſeverall factions in *France* clothed with the glorious mantle of Religion, are well knowne to thoſe that are converſant in their Hiſtories, and are particularly declared by many; but beſt in my judgement, on the Proteſtants ſide by *Beza*, the Author (though not named) of thoſe 15 Bookes, he ſtiles *Commentariorum de Statu Religionis & Reip. in Regno Galliæ, ſub Henrico. 2. Franciſo 2. Carolo 9. & Henrico 3.* And on the Papiſts by *Davila* in his excellent Hiſtorie of the *Civil Wars of France*. In which Conteſts, in the Reigns of the four forementioned Kings, the Succeſſors of *Francis* the 1, and in the times of *Henry* the 4. who ſucceded them; the *Proteſtants* (called there *Hugonots*) got into their Poſſeſſion, above 300 Garriſons and Forts in that Kingdome.

On the otherhand *France* was not aſleep, or awanting to proſecute their intreſt, in fomenting, promoting, and carrying on thoſe diviſions in theſe *Low Countries*; to breake downe the power of *Spaine*, into whoſe hands they had fallen by marriage (as we have ſaid) and to remove the obſtacle, which theſe Provinces conſtantly were, to their advancing their deſignes. For which end they continually aſſiſted us, and whilſt they pretended to fight our Battells; at our charges they really fought their owne. And leſt the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſo nearly allied to *Spaine*, ſhould afford them further aſſiſtance, they ingage *Sweden* to invade the *Empire*, and give the *Emperor* worke at home, allowing A. D. 1631. *Guſtavus Adolphus* 300000 Franks for levying an Army, and a Million yearly for paying them, (every Frank being two Shillings ſterling) as in the years 1625. and 1635. they fathering all the Empire did on *Spaine*, engaged us allſo in more firme and conſtant Leagues againſt them. This being the true State of thoſe times betwen thoſe two Crownes; we therein thus doubly miſcarried, and erred both in our Civil and Religious Intreſt.

Firſt in that we thought we could never bring *Spaine* low enough, nor aſſiſt *France* ſufficiently againſt them. In this blind zeale we went a great deale too far, though nothing the length that *France* deſired: For had we liſtned to their ſuggeſtions, we had to this day continued our Wars with *Spaine*, and ſo have done their worke for them. What arts *France* uſed to diſſwade us from peace with *Spaine*, may be ſeen in their Hiſtorian *Priol*, as well as our owne, concerning the Treaty of *Munſter*. But the States ſeeing the ſucceſſes of *France*, of whoſe greatnes they now at laſt, and indeed too late, became jealous; to which they were the more awakened, by the *French* approaches towards us in *Flanders*, and taking of *Dunkirke*, it being

De Rebus Gallicis, L. 10.

being their owne proverb *Aye le Francois pour ton Amy, non pas pour ton voisin?* they resolve to take the opportunity which was put into their hands by *Spaine*; who despairing of peace with *France*, sought nothing more then to take off their confederates, the *Swede*, and these united *Provinces* especially, by concluding a peace with us, and procuring one allso between the *Empire* and *Sweden*. For knowing their owne weaknes, and great worke on their hands, by the revolt of *Portugall*, Rebellion in *Catalonia*, the doubtfull condition of *Naples*, the frequent losses they had received, and their want of men and money to war every where; they offerd us equall conditions; and we privately without the knowledge either of the *French* Plenipotentiaries, or the Mediators (*Chigie* from the Pope, and *Contaren* from the State of *Venice*) except them at last, and a peace is made betwixt us at *Munster*, January 30. 1648. and quickly after between the *Empire* and *Sweden* at *Osnaburg* August the 6. in the same yeare. By which meanes *Spaine* was freed from our Wars, had opportunity of Prosecuting theirs against *Portugall*, and of creating *France* trouble at home by joyning with the *Condean* fact on, in the greatnes of *Mazarine*, and the minoritie of his present Majesty. This peace so stuck on the Cardinals stomack, that neither He nor that Kingdome have ever digested it: but becaus we would not war for them any longer, resolved they would war against us at last: though if we had not done that too long, they had never done this so successfully.

Secondly we help forward *France*'s greatnes and our owne destruction, by helping to destroy the Protestant Intrest in that Kingdome. For as *France* had the power of *Spaine* to keep them in on every side; so they had allso a curb of the Protestants at home, to check them in their exorbitant designes. Who from the beginning of the Reformation under *Francis* the first, *Henry* the 2*d*, and *Francis* the 2*d* had growne to that strength and greatnes, that they grew formidable to the Crowne of *France*. And notwithstanding the Massacre of *Merindel* and *Chabries* A. D. 1545. and the 8 several civill Wars that was made against them, (by *Charles* the 9, and 3 by *Henry* the 3) the great Massacre at *Paris* 1572. yet God so blest them and multiplied them, that in the yeare 1560 there was reckoned above 1250 Churches of them, and by their severall capitulations with the two forementioned Kings at the end of their civill Wars, and the Connivance of *Henry* the 4 formerly Head of their party, they got 300 at least Garrisons and forts for their defense, which he used to call, *the Commonwealth of Rochel*, that and *Montauban* being their principall places of strength. From whom they obteined severall immunities, but especially that of the liberty of their Religion; which he confirmed to them by the ratification of the severall concessions of his Predecessors in the *Edict of Nantes*, 1598, passed in the Parliament of *Paris* February the 25 in the following yeare. Allthough the promulgation thereof, out of respect to *Cardinal Medices* was deferd, till March the 2. 1599. Which he then vehe-

vehemently preſt, begining his ſpeech with a ſtrange prodigie that had fallen out betwixt Himſelfe and the Duke of *Guiſe* 26 yeares before, who being about 10 play at tables in the preſence of many Nobles, there appeard drops of blood, which though once and againe wiped off, yet new ſtill were perceived, and none knew whence; there being not any in the roome that bled; which he then declared for a ſad omen of much blood, that ſhould be ſhed betwixt them two, which having accordingly happend to his great grief, he deſired to take away all further occaſions of their civill Wars by publiſhing that edict &c. which may be ſeen in Thuanus. *Lib.* 122. This great King by name and merit, having fought 140 battels and skirmiſhes with his owne hands, beleagured 300 Cities and forts, was no ſooner ſtaine by the dagger of that Raſcally villaine *Ravillac*, in the midſt of his greateſt glory and deſignes; But his Son and Succeſſor *Lewis* the 13. confirmes the ſame, May the 22. 1610. wherein he acknowledges that, *Experience having taught the Kings his Predeceſſors that the fury and violence of Armes had not onely been unprofitable to draw their ſubjects to the Romane Church, but was rather hurtfull: which made them have recourſe by a more happy Counſel, to mildnes, granting them the exerciſe of the Reformed Religion they profeſſed: in whoſe imitation his father (Henry the 4) had made the Edict of Nantes, to reconcile all his loving ſubjects: the obſervation whereof, had ſetled and aſſured quiet amongſt them, which had ever ſince continued without interruption.* And declares that *though that Edict be perpetual and irrevocable, and by that meanes hath no need to be confirmed by any new declarations; yet to the end his ſubjects may be aſſured of his love and intention to have the ſaid Edict inviolably kept (being made for the good and quiet of his ſubjects) therefore it is ordained by him with the advice of the Queen Regent, Princes of the blood &c. that the ſame be kept inviolably; and thoſe that ſhall infringe it, ſeverely puniſhed, as troublers of the publick peace of the Kingdome, &c.* Yet notwithſtanding all this, the King being provoked by them, is induced, much againſt his inclination, to War againſt them whom he declared Rebels 1621. and tooke many of their cautionary Townes from them, yet this was at laſt compoſed, and they reſerved *Rochel* and ſeverall other places ſtill for their defence. But afterwards, at the inſtigation of *Cardinal Richelieu*, (not out of any zeale for his Religion being called the *Hugonot Cardinal*, but of Policy to free *France* from their feares of the Proteſtant party at home) with much regret the King makes War againſt them againe 1625. and ſent to the States for Twenty ſayle of Men of War according to the late Treaty, which was aſſented unto, though with great reluctancy, and they was ſent under Admiral *Hauthain*; which were eſpecially inſtrumentall of ruining the Proteſtants power at Sea, and of *Rochel* afterwards, and conſequently all the power that party had left under the Duke of *Rohan*, with nere 50 places for their Protection: All their Cautionary Townes being diſmantled, and they having no other ſhelter, but the ſhaddow of the *Almighty*, and their Kings clemency left them to flie unto for their defence. So that as I wiſh we had otherwiſe imployed our power, ſo I pray

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(as *Schookius* * in our first War with *England*, *Deum rogo, filiis & nepotibus non imputet, quæ a parentibus facta fuerunt*) that God may not lay this sin to our charge. The Protestants having thus made their latt will and Testament, whereby the Crowne became sole heir and executor of all they had, *Lewis* the last thereby became the greatest Monarch since *Charles the Great*; his predecessors having reduced the many Provinces dismemberd from *France* by *Hugh Capet* into one entire body, and he all the parts thereof to the entire subjection of the Crowne; and that Kingdome at liberty to look abroad, and carry on their designes where they please, having for this end gained 3 keys to their neighbor Kingdoms, *Pignerol* to enter *Italy*; *Brisack* *Germany*, and *Perpignan* *Spaine*.

* *Imperium maritimum*, c. 27.

We have seene how we have gon against our intrest in overdoing our worke; lets now see how *England* have been no les guilty, in not doing their duty; wherein they have not onely been greatly awanting to themselves, but more to the Protestant intrest in *Europe*.

The Protestants in *France* having by *Armes*, *Treaties*, *Concessions*, and *Confirmations* of severall Kings, obteined that strength which we have declared: There could be nothing more clearly the intrest of all those of the Reformed Religion, and especially their Neighbors then to support them in their just rights; Which Queen *Elizabeth* and her Council so well understood, that though she had assisted these Provinces both with money and men considerably, whereby she had drawne upon her a War with *Spaine* which was very costly to her, and allso occasioned the Rebellion in *Ireland*, which to reduce stood Her and her Kingdom of *England* in 4 yeares time no les, if we take *Morisons* accompt, then 1198000 L. Sterling: yet she neglects not to supply *Henry* of *Navar* against the *Guisian* league and faction for the support of the Protestants, with 101560 franks for the Baron of of *Donna* to raise an Army in *Germany*, A. D. 1587. for his service: and 71165 besides 20000 she spent in sending 4000 men under the conduct and command of the *Lord Willoughby* A. 1589. and 33333 to levy an Army under the Prince of *Anhalt*, for the service, and as much money she lent *Navar* himselfe, the following yeare 1590 and continually upon all occasions supported him and the intrest of the Reformed Religion in those Kingdoms, so that she was publickly prayed for by the *Hugonots* as their *Protectoresse*.

Camdeni Annales 1590.

No sooner was this great Princesse dead, whose glory yet will never dye, (being accounted by her very enemies the *Guisians*, the most glorious that ever swayed Scepter, *glorioſiſſima, & omnium quæ unquam ſceptrum geſtarunt, fœliciſſima fœmina*, as Thuanus tells us, adding many great elogiums of her, and concluding *none ever was or will be like her of that sex*:) and *King James* called in, to succeed in that Crowne: but the *French*, though they had underhand opposed the conjunction of those two Kingdoms all they could, having still made use of *Scotland* formerly in their Wars with *England* for a diversion to them, by setting them upon entring that Kingdom

Lib. 129.

dom at the back doore betwixt them; and as loath allso that such an acceſſion of power ſhould accrew to their old enemies the *Engliſh*; yet now they are the firſt that come with a ſplendid Embaſſage, to welcome him to his new Crownes. This King, if he had had as much of the Lions courage, as he had of the foxes cunning and Kingcraft as he called it; how happy had it bene both for his owne family, and his Kingdoms! But as he was the occaſion of the ſad diſaſters that happend to both, as is ſhewne not only by the Hiſtorians, but particular Authors in the *Engliſh* tongue, ſo I ſhall now briefly ſhew how he occaſioned many and great irreparable loſſes to the Proteſtant intreſt abroad, eſpecially by his puſillanimity. *Ruſhworth Welden. Osburne, &c.*

How he perſwaded this Republick to a 12 yeares Truce with *Spaine*, and how prejudiciall it was to theſe Provinces, is well knowne. How earneſtly he was preſt to aſſiſt his ſon the *Palſgrave*, both by forreigne Princes abroad, and his Parliaments at home, I need not mention: nor how he ſpent more in Embaſſies, their traines and Treaties, then would have done his worke with men of Armes and traines of Artillery. I ſhall onely ſpeake of that relating to the *French Proteſtants*, as the proper ſubject of my diſcourſe.

When *Lewis* the 13 ſet upon reducing the Cautionary Townes which the Proteſtants had in his Kingdome, by the grants of ſeverall Kings (as we have ſaid) and the diſtreſſed fought to the Crowne of *England* for Reliefe: K. *James* according to his uſuall cuſtom, onely imployes Embaſſadors, the Lord *Herbert* once and againe; whom the *French* delayd with words, till they had done their worke. For knowing King *James*'s temper too well, *Luynes* the High Conſtable of *France*, being appointed to give *Herbert* audience, firſt ſets a Gentleman of the Reformed Religion behind the hangings, that being an eare-witneſs of what paſt, might relate to the Reformiſts, what ſmall grounds of hope they had, of having ſuccors from the Crowne of *England*; and then inſtead of hearkning to his Embaſſage, in a moſt inſolent manner affronted both his Maſter and himſelf with menaces: which when he could not brooke, but roundly replyed, *His Maſter then knew what he had to doe*, and offered the Conſtable who was chollerick thereat, the ſatisfaction of his Sword; the *French* Embaſſador miſrepreſents what paſt to K. *James*, and procures *Herbert* to be called home, and the *Earle of Carlile* is ſent in his place, to as little purpoſe as before. Nor was this the worſt, for the *Duke of Guiſe* obteined 8 *Engliſh* ſayle of men of War to joyne with him againſt the *Rochellers* and them of the Religion to diſtres them by Sea, as the Count of *Soiſſons* did by Land (for which the *Duke of Buckingham* was after queſtioned in Parliament) and thus the greateſt part of the Proteſtants power was broke downe, and had been wholy, but that the *French* had not then time by reaſon of the *Spaniſh* worke in the *Valtolin*; ſo that a peace was skind over for a ſmall time, till they had leiſure to open the wound againe, and make the poore Patients bleed their laſt. Theſe things cauſed great complaints of *England* every where amongſt them of the Reformed Religion, and occaſioned *Deodate*'s ſaying, *that King* *Howels Hiſt. of Lewis 13. A. 1621.*

James's sins of omission, were greater then all his Predeceſſors sins of Commiſſion.

Though the pacification was publiſhed at *Montpellier*, yet *Richelieu* being made *Miniſter of State* and chief Director of affaires in *France*, A. 1624; he made it his firſt worke to go on with the deſigne of deſtroying the Proteſtants power in that Kingdome; and though the King was againſt it at firſt, yet the Cardinal carried it on at laſt, ſo that afterwards he ſaid, *He had taken Rochel in ſpight of three Kings*, meaning his owne *England* and *Spaine*. For the accompliſhing this worke, the Eagle-eyed *Richelieu* foreſeeing that *England* and theſe *States* might ſtand in his way and obſtruct him, he reſolves to charme us both to a compliance. For which end *France* makes a ſtricter league with theſe *United Provinces*, affords us 1600000 franks yearly for the two next following, to be repaid the two next years after our peace with *Spain*, agrees for ſhips for their ſervice, &c. And for *England*, though they knew K. *James* would not diſturb their deſignes, yet not knowing what the *Prince of Wales* might doe, there were meanes uſed to ingage him, by a Match with *Henriette* the onely Daughter then unmarried of *Henry* the 4. K. *Iames* who was deſirous to match his onely ſon Conſiderably, had for 9 or 10 years beene Courting of *Spaine* to this purpoſe, that ſo with one he might have the *Palatinate* reſtored to the *Palsgrave*; and the *Prince of Wales*, having paſt through *France* incognito into *Spaine*, to make love perſonally to the *Infanta*, and ſee with his owne eyes if fame belied not her beauty; and being there ſtill delayed, but not denyed (the *Spaniſh* deſiring to ſee all the Daughters of *France* firſt matcht, to prevent an alliance betwixt *England* and that Kingdome) and the buſines of the *Palatinate* ſtill kept in ſuſpence; he is commanded home by his Father K. *James*. But having ſeen the Lady *Henriette* at a maske, in his paſſage through *France*, under the notion of an *Engliſh* Gentleman, and being taken with her beauty, more then the *Infanta's*; overtures are made of a Marriage with her, and though ſome in the *French Council*, were rather for her matching to *Lorraigne* (that ſo thoſe Territories might be gained to *France*, which had been long troubleſom to them) yet this reaſon of State, of obliging him not to interrupt their deſigne of ruining the Proteſtants, and prevent his marrying with *Spaine* prevailed, and in 9 moneths time a Match is concluded.

Richelieu thinking *France* ſecure of theſe two they moſt feared; falls to worke to reduce the *Hugonots* Cautionary Townes. Upon which *Soubeze* and *Blankart* goe for *England* to implore K. *Charles* (his Father K. *Iames* being then dead) his aſſiſtance. This good King thinks himſelfe obliged in conſcience and honour, notwithſtanding his marriage with the King of *France's* ſiſter, to ſupport them. And indeed ſo he was, for the Ambaſſadors and Agents of the Crowne of *England*, had become *Caution* to thoſe of the Religion, for the King of *France's* performance with them. He therfore ſends 150 ſayle of ſhips and an Army of 10000 men; under the Command of the *Duke of Buckingham*, to take off that odium which was upon him in *England*, for what was formerly done under K. *Iames*. Who publiſhed

bliſhed a *Manifeſto* in the K. of *Englands* name July the 21. 1627. declaring that though there were other grounds ſufficient for a War, as the abuſe of the *Engliſh* Merchants, their ſhips and goods ſeized on, and the extraordinary equipping for Sea in *France*; yet that the ſole cauſe of the War, was the *Crowne of France* s not performing of Articles with thoſe of the Reformed Religion. This expedition, and the cauſes of its miſcarriage, is writ by a learned pen*, and well knowne from the moderne Hiſtories of both Kingdoms. The *French* and *Engliſh* both proceed, the former in carrying on, the latter to prevent if poſſible, their deſignes. For which end K. *Charles* ſent the Earle of *Denbigh* with another Fleet, which was able to effect nothing; and the Earle of *Linzey* with the laſt (*Buckingham* being aſſaſinated by *Felton* the day before he was to embarke) But before *Linzey* came, ſuch ſtupendous workes were raiſed (of which *Bertius* hath writ a particular booke) and ſo palliſadoed, that the Cardinall ſent to the *Engliſh Admirall*, that he ſhould have a paſport with 6 of his ableſt Commanders, to come a ſhore and view the works, and if they thought *Rochel* relievable, he would raiſe the ſiege, without fighting a ſtroake. The *Engliſh* thus coming too late loſt *Rochel*, upon which followed the Duke of *Rohan* and the reſt of the Reformiſts compliance, the diſmantling of their remaining Garriſons (above 40 whereof *Mantauban* was the laſt) and a peace with *England*, and thoſe of the Reformed Religion in *France*.

* *Expeditio in Ream Inſulam. authore Edovardo Herbert Barone de Cherbury.*

Since which time what mighty deſignes have been contrived, and carried on by the two Cardinalls, *Richelieu* and *Mazarine*, for that Kingdome abroad, whoſe plots they are ſtill purſuing; is not unknowne to thoſe that are curiouſly inquiſitive. How the former wrought the revolt of *Portugal*, the Rebellion in *Catalonia*, the carrying on the Wars in theſe Countries, to bring downe *Spaine*; ſet on foot and fomented the diſtractions of Great *Britaigne*, firſt by the *Scots*, and afterwards by other means, to give *England* worke at home: tamperd with *Walleſteyne* for betraying the Imperiall Army, for whoſe death he moſt paſſionately wept, failing thereby of his hopes, of *France*'s ſpeedy comeing to the *Empire*: engaged *Sweden* to ſerve their ends in *Germany*; tooke *Pignerol* to keep *Italy* in aw: *Lorraigne* is taken; the *Dukes of Savoy*, *Mantua*, and *Modena* are wholly at *France*'s ſervice: and the Princes Electors, eſpecially the Eccleſiaſticall, rather courting the favour of that Crown, then the Imperiall This was the true State of *France*, at the death of *Richelieu* in 42 and the King his Maſter, who quickly followed him, May 14. 1643. the ſame day of the yeare his father died, and wherein he was Crowned. Which I have beene the larger in, firſt becauſe tis for the moſt part the ſame now, and in ſeverall things greater than then, eſpecially by their alliance with *England*, and ſucceſs againſt theſe and the *Spaniſh Netherlands*: and 2. that it might appeare, how far they have overgrowne *Spaine* in power, that ſo the world may be awakend, and ſee to lop off their ſuperfluous bowes, leſt they grow in time like *Nebuchadnezars* tree, ſo great that they overſhadow us all.

For *Mazarine* ſucceeding *Richelieu* as Miniſter of State, who was his onely Scholler that proved his paralel, to which two Clergy-men let me ſay it, for it is a truth (though I know the Laity may ſtomack it) *France owes their preſent greatnes*; the firſt 5 yeares after till 48 that tumultuous Nation was never wiſelier governed in the non-age of their Soveraigne: and though in the next luſtre or five yeares following till 53, they had ſome aguiſh fits that ſhaked them in their civill wars, yet they ſoone recovered thereof, and have ever ſince growne ſtronger and ſtronger. So that it was high time for the Neighbour Nations no longer to dance after the fidle of *France*. And the States ſaw this, and therefore made peace, as I have ſaid; but *England* herein offended againe, and prevaricated in the common intreſt of *Europe*. Let me ſhew how briefly, becauſe it may ſatisfie perhaps the curioſity of ſome that have wondred at it, as much as my ſelfe, in regard they have been ignorant of the true grounds thereof.

When *Cromwel* the *Hanibal* of the *Engliſh Common-wealth*, and immortal enimie and Terror to *Rome*, came to have the power of thoſe three Kingdoms in his hands; he ſaw it neceſſary to engage thoſe Nations and imploy his Armies in a forreigne War; for without an Army he could not maintaine the power he had got, and without imploying them he could not quietly enjoy it (Armies being like raiſed ſpirits, that muſt be imployed, or elſe they fall foule upon him that raiſed them) and beſides this neceſſity of intreſt, his own inclination ſtrongly carried him, and perhaps ſome extravagant hopes, to pull downe the *Pope*; for he once ſaid to *Lambert*, *were I as young as you, I ſhould not doubt to knock at the gates of Rome before I died*. *Spaine* and *France* both courted him, knowing what mettal his ſword was made of, and his *Iron-ſides* wore; of which competition he made his advantage, obteining ſuch conditions of *France*, as were a wonder to all, that underſtood the maxims of their Government. That which moſt inclined him to the *French*, was that he judged *Spaine* and *Anſtria* the two ſtrongeſt *Hornes of Antichriſt*, whoſe fall was come as one of his Prophets (whom I could name) inſpired him, and that *France* might be brought to renounce *Rome*; intending withall to get ſuch places in *Flanders* and over againſt the coaſt of *England*, that he might keep the *Dutch* in aw, and with a few of his Ships command a toll for the paſſage in the Channel, as the *Dane* did in the *Sound*. A League therefore is made with *France*, March 23. 1657 for a yeare, and renewed the next, by *Lockard* his Ambaſſador, who for his parts and ſagacity was ſo acceptable to *Mazarine*, that he had more acces to him, and buſines with him, then all the Ambaſſadors at *Paris* beſides. Theſe two *Cromwel*, and the *Cardinal* the ſtronglier to carry on their deſignes, take in the King of *Sweden* for a third into their confederacy (*Chriſtina* having reſigned that Crowne, and wandring about like a blazing Comet) and theſe three Leagued together made the *Triumvirate* of thoſe times.

Sweden was to pluck the plumes of the *Roman Eagle*, when he had clipt the wings of his Neighbours, that they might not fly upon the prey he left behind.

behind. Wherein *Oliver* ſo concerned himſelf, that when the *Dane* had got the *Dutch* for his ſecond, he ſent *Montague* to boye up *Swedens* ſinking intreſt in the *Sound:* and they were ſo neere an engagement, that they had certainly fought, had not the *Engliſh* eſpied an Advice-Yacht coming towards them, which bringing them newes of the *Protectors* death, they hoyſt up ſailes, and returnd home.

France was to pull downe *Spaine* by Land, with his own forces, and ſuch as the Protector could ſpare. Which *Lockard* the Embaſſador there commanded. Who having beene more uſed to fight in the field, then play the pioneers with their ſpades, were not ſo much eſteemed at firſt by the *French*: till the fight with *Don John of Auſtria's* Army which came to relieve *Dunkirke*, wherein they behaved themſelves with that gallantry, that *Don John* cryed out he *was beat by raging wild beaſts rather then men*; and that great Soldjer the *Prince of Conde* hath often ſaid ſince, *that he never ſaw the like action, as was that day performed by the Engliſh* Shortly after *Dunkerke* yielded, and was put into the *Engliſh* hands.

The Protector was to bring downe *Spaine* by Sea, which *he ſaid he would do, or he and his ſhould live on bread and water.* Intending allſo to carrie on the deſigne, which *Sidney*, *Rawleigh* and ſeveral of the wiſeſt men of thoſe times under *Q. Elizabeth* preſt, and that was to beat the *Spaniſh* out of the *Indies*; but as ſhe had too many irons in the fire to carry on that worke, ſo how he miſcarried in it, is ſufficiently knowne. And indeed he had broke *Spaines* Naval power much more then he did, allthough he did a great deale at *Tenerif* and elſewhere, had it not been for a ſmall accident that happend, which was this. Admirall *Blake*, who ſtill principled his ſeamen in thoſe Confuſions and frequent Revolutions of Governement, *that the Fleet ſerved no Parties nor Perſons, but the Engliſh Nation*; having brought ſome of his great ſhips before *Tunis*, batterd down the Caſtle and compeld them to his termes; for which extraordinary ſervice he expected the reward of gratitude at leaſt: In ſtead thereof, by his next Advice from *England* he hath a pardon ſent him, for endangering the Fleet in ſuch an attempt without order, &c. Which ſo ſtuck on the ſtomack of that ſtout and ſturdy *Steick*, that afterwards the *Spaniſh* Fleet coming on the maine Ocean off *Cadiz*; He reading his Commiſſion, and finding it onely for fighting them in the *Mediterranean*, would not fall on them, though the Commanders Sollicited him, promiſed to anſwer it for him, &c. onely was willing to fight if the *Spanjards* begun; but though the *Engliſh* provoked them to it, and affronted them all they could, yet the wary *Spanjard* was wiſer then to ingage, and ſo ſaved themſelves; at which *Oliver* ſtormed not a litle, but *Blake* cared not much, the *Admirall* heereby crying quits with the Generall.

Thus you ſee what great things a little blind zeale may doe. And indeed it is not ſo much to be admired at in him, he having had ſuch an *enthuſiaſticall heat*, as all know, that knew him well; nor can we wonder ſo much, if his head ſometimes run round, who was ſo continually wrapt up in

ſuch

such whirlepooles of affaires, as he was perpetually plunged in: though to miscarry in so great a concernment for the Protestant Intrest, was a capitall crime in him above all others; who designing to pul down the *Pope*, * by bringing downe *Spaine*, set up *France* to ruine the *Protestants* throughout Christendome. Thus *Ludit in humanis divina potentia rebus!*

* *Grotius de jure bel. & pac. l. 2. c. 22. voluntatem implendi vaticinia, sine Dei, mandato, non esse causam belli.*

But these three lived not long to goe on with these designes, and indeed it was well for the world they did not. *Oliver* went first, at which *Mazarine*, was secretly glad, saying when the newes was brought him as he was at play, *there's then a fortunate foole gon.* But this was but to trample upon a dead lion, whom he so ridiculously feared before, that his greatest Confidents made themselves privately merry therewith. Knowing how uncivily for this, he put the King of *England* out of *France*; and the Duke of *Yorke* allso notwithstanding his service, and the Cavalries acclamations of *vive's* to him, and curses of the *Cardinal*: Yea how after his death he feared his shaddow, for in the *Isle of Fesant* 59 at the interview of the two Kings and their Courts, where the marriage was made, and peace concluded betwixt them, (which *Mazarine* had reserved for his owne glory) and the King of great *Britaine* being there received by *Lewis de Haro* at first with the height of a *Spanish* complement in the depth of the mire, and treated after with all civility: yet the *Cardinal*, though courted by the *Duke of Ormond*, durst not speake with him, for feare of *Lockard* that was present at the Treatie. But though the crafty Cardinal was no coward, yet thus feare-full, and timorously was he cautious for Him, whom I know he hated above all Mortals, and that Common-wealth above all people in the world; as I can many wayes make apparent, if it was of any importance to the publick.

But to be briefe, *Olivers* other two *Consorts* followed after him quickly, and these three Conquerors, being cut of by death, who kept all Christendome in aw whilst they lived, the world had a little quiet, till *France* got a horseback again in *Flanders*.

But betwixt and that time was that great change in *England* by the wonderfull providence of God in the restoration of his Majesty, by which meanes the *French* got *Dunkirke* again into their hands, and were thereby capacitated, the better to carry on their worke against these Countries. At which the *French* made themselves merry, and some say abusively, by having *Dunkirke* drawn with a purse hanging over it: The *English* stormed, and some swore *Oliver would have sold his great nose, rather then Dunkerke.* Yea this still sticks on many of their stomachs; I remember at my last being in *England* in 66, and seeing *Clarenden House*; and wondring a little why it was situated so neer the roade, which made it both unfree, and molested with dust; and critising upon some other things, the Oratory especially, that the Chancelor that was the eldest Son of the Church of *England*, should make his Chappel, as a wag writ of *Emanuel Colledge's*, so *awry*: *Just North and South, yea verily*: when I came above on the leads I was so pleased with the

the pleaſantnes of the proſpect, that I thought for that it might compare with any Houſe I had ſeen, knowing no place in *England* except above *Greenwich*, that I thought comparable to it, upon which the domeſtick had the confidence, perceiving me a ſtranger, to tell me I could not thence ſee *Dunkirke*; for the Commonality had Chriſtened it, and made *Dunkirke* the Godfather, calling the Houſe after its name. But though I confeſs it was againſt the Common Intreſt of *Europe*, that it ſhould fall to the *French* againe; yet whether it was againſt the Intreſt of the King of *England*, and that Kingdome, is not ſo cleare to me. I will onely ſay this, that I know a perſon hath weighed that ſo well, that I ſhall carry this challenge for him, That if any Gentleman, *Engliſh* or *French*, pleaſes fairely to ſtate this Queſtion *in hypotheſi*, according to the circumſtances of thoſe times, let him take which ſide thereof he pleaſes, and uſe what weapons he will (and I think thats very faire) and he ſhall not want an *Antagoniſt*, that ſhall fight him fairely, whether he pleaſes to appeare in *Roman buf*, or in his halfe ſhirt made of his owne mothers language, upon the publick Theater of the World. And truly his deſigne is ſo honeſt, I dare be his Compurgator, and being a litle acquainted with it, I ſhall tell you briefly: It is to let men ſee, how hard it is ſometimes to diſcerne on which ſide the true intreſt of State lies, (there being ſo many circumſtances conſiderable, which often in the Scale of Policy, weigh heavier then that which by-ſtanders think the maine) and therby allſo to check the ſawcines of every ſhopkeeper, who like the litle *Spaniſh Dons*, will be cenſuring Princes Counſels, and condemning Miniſters of State, though they are ignorant of the grounds of their Actions, and much more of that which is true policy.

Having thus ſhewne the true State of *France*, and its continuall growing greatnes downe to the times of his preſent Majeſty, who hath not onely got *Dunkirke*, regained *Lorraigne*, conquered a great part of *Flanders* from the *Spaniſh* but three Provinces allſo entirely from the States: It will clearely follow to be the Common Intreſt of *Europe* to oppoſe *France* in their future progreſs, except they meane to follow our fate.

I had thought to have been larger heerein then I ſhall, in regard my paines is heerein in part prevented, by the Authour of la *France Politique* from page 470 to 525. or the end: And having been ſo long allready, I may happily hereafter, diſcourſe this more largely in another language. I ſhall therefore be brief in that which remaines.

The *Empire*, though greatly concerned, (the *French* being not onely nigh them, but among them, and having got ſuch places of the *Rhyne*, capacitated to pas over all at their pleaſure) yet ſeeme a ſleepe, and are therefore to be rouſed; and if no words will doe it, yet let the alarmes of War raiſe them, and the ſtrength of their enimies make them combine, leſt fighting ſingly, they be all foiled. I ſhall not ſtand to particularize, but ſurely the *Duke of Newburgh* and *Prince of Liege* that have been moſt guilty in letting

ting the *French* have paſſage through, and quarter in their Countries; will have the firſt cauſe to repent, except they meane to ſell them to the Crowne of *France*: which yet may happily beat them downe in price, now they are ſo impoveriſhed by them. For though *Gulick* belonging to *Newburg* be ſtrong, the Caſtle eſpecially (which was the Patterne to that of *Antwerp*) yet it is on dry ground, eaſily approachable, and in a champaigne Country and not relievable from a ſiege. And if that ſmall City once be taken, all that pleaſant corne Country may cry out,

Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebit,
Barbarus has ſegetes!

And though *Liege* (or *Luyke*) be great and populous, and the deſperateſt people in all times, that I know in *Europe*; yet *vana eſt ſine viribus ira*, the City hath ſuch hills overhanging it, that it is neither ſtrong by its ſituation, nor can hope of relief if they ſhould be diſtreſſed, except it be by a confederacy from others; and if this ſingle City be loſt, all their Country will be ſo quickly.

Yea not onely thoſe on this ſide the *Rhijne*, but even all the reſt will quickly find, that if the wings of the *Roman Eagle* be clipt, and prove too ſhort to ſhaddow her young Ones; they will ſoone become a prey to the power of *France*, and will be throwne out of their neſts as ſpurious, if they cannot ſtedfaſtly behold the riſing ſun, and will not receive their warmth from his beames.

Spaine is ſenſible enough of their concernments, knowing that not onely their *Netherlands*, but their *Indies* and *Italy* lie at the ſtake: for if *France* be Maſter of all theſe *Provinces*, they will ſoone be ſo of the *Indies* alſo; and the *Dutch* fetch thence, the *Spaniſh* Gold for the *French Crowne*; and the *Lilies of France*, be the Royall flower, in all their Gardens both in *Italia* and *Sicilia*.

England, though now their Confederate, cannot but know what danger they are in for their Trade; which is the beſt jewel in that Crowne, and the greateſt darling of that Kingdome. And therefore it is high time ſurely, that the Soveraigne ſtraiten not his intereſt at home, by eſpouſing any particular party; nor the ſubjects quarrel about Ceremonies, when the ſubſtance of Religion is ſo endangered; that ſo they may timouſly looke abroad, before it be too late and all be loſt; and his Majeſty in due time retire from *France*, and make himſelf and ſucceſſors (as is much deſired) the Head of all the Proteſtant party in *Europe*.

Denmark ſurely knows, that if the *Empire* fall they cannot ſtand: but muſt loſe both their toll in the *Sound*, and what by Land the *French* pleaſes.

This *Republick* of all others is moſt immediately concerned, for he is blind that ſees not, whatever ſome may flatter themſelves, that the *French* intend nothing leſs then reducing of us to their obedience.

And when this is done, and they advance upwards in the Empire; what are *Stratsburg*, *Colen*, *Aken*, *Breme*, *Hamburg*, and the reſt of the *Hanſe Townes*,

Townes, and free Cities, but as so many morsels, easily eaten up and devoured?

Yea their constant friends and Allies may looke to themselves.

Sweden how they will save their *Bishoprick of Breme*, *Pomeren*, and what lies on this side the *Baltick*: and how they will sell their Copper, which is the Staple commodity of their owne Countrey. And in stead of the *French* Crownes, which is now their usuall money amongst them; when that Kingdome hath no more neede of their service; they may carry their owne Copper coyne on their backs to pay a collation, or laden a horse when they travel, to pay for 2 or 3 good nights lodging.

Savoy knows he is at *France*'s mercy, and therefore dances after their pipe, endeavouring to save himselfe by his devotion. But they may remember the Lamb in the Fable, who when the Wolf above quarreld him, because he troubled the water; answered that could not be so, in regard it descended to him, not from him; the Wolf then said, he had reviled him 6 months before, to which the Lamb replying, he was not then borne. But thy Father then did saith He, and that's cause enough for the sons suffering.

For *Switzerland*, though their mountaines and Poverty may secure perhaps their Countrey: yet what shall secure their liberty, which consists in an equality amongst them? or what shall secure the Religion of the *Protestant Cantons*? or the good pay which the *Popish* have long had, for their service in the Wars of *France*? They must then be content with what they can get, or be turned to graze on their owne mountaines.

And thus you see what necessity there is that the *French* be kept within bounds: and consequently that the ballance of *Europe*, be both brought and held in a greater equality. For intrests changing continually with the revolution of times; and Kingdoms and Commonwealths, Cities and places, having their youth strength and old age, as well as particular persons: If lesser Powers combine not together, they singly become like the smaller fishes, easily swallowed up and devoured by the greater. Thus the league between the King of *Naples*, Duke of *Millain* and *Florence* A. D. 1480. *Lib.* 1. secured *Italy* against the power of the *Venetians*; and the Confederacy of the *Italians* at *Venice* in 95, preserved them from being all ruind by the *French* under *Charles* the 8, who had in a small time conquered severall, and got the Kingdome of *Naples* he came for: as that wise Historian *Guicciardine* *Lib.* 2. shews, in his excellent Historie of the Wars of *Italie*.

Nor let any thinke to obstruct my passage with saying, *that Wars to bring downe the growing greatnes of others are unlawfull.*

For though very many both *Lawiers* and *Historians* are of the opinion they are, as may be seene in *Gentilis*, and some *Divines* allso, yea the whole Colledge of *Sorben* gave their determination for this, and the *Learned Bacon* * saies plainely that the contrary opinion is not to be received, and many other moderne Authors concur heerein, besides the many Precedents of States that have made preventive Wars, as the *Lacedemonians* against the *Athenians*

De jure belli l. 1. *c.* 14.

* *Essay* (or *serme fidelis*) 19.

Athenians of old, and many especially of later times; and the Arguments for it are not contemptible: yet notwithstanding I am rather of *Grotius*'s opinion, that neither our owne feares and jealousies, nor the growing greatnes of others, are sufficient causes of warring against them.

De jure Belli & pac. l. 2. c. 1. §. 17. & c. 22. §. 2.

But indeed neither of these is the cause we plead, but the following, which we will maintaine *jure gentium* or by the law of Nations to be just and equitable.

1. Let any Kingdome or Common-wealth grow as great, as they can by Gods blessing; yet so long as they keep themselves, within the bounds of justice and equity with others; there is no just cause of breaking downe their power by War. For jealousie that we may thereby suffer, is no sufficient ground for us to fight them. It being with publick as wel as private safety, as Physitians say it is with our health, tollerably well, but never absolute and perfect. And therefore against such force as we may feare, we must trust the Providence of God, and use lawfull meanes cautiously to prevent dangers; our Saviour having taught all Christians to use *the wisdome of the Serpent with the innocencie of the dove*, and cursed be they that seperates, what Christ hath joyned together.

2. When Neighbor Nations see the growing power of any, whence they have just cause of jealousie: they ought to combine together, that so they may prevent the dangers they feare. And if any of the Confederates be unjustly invaded, they have all a just cause of War against the Agressor.

Guicciardine's Hist. of Ital. l. 1. As the *Italians* being jealous of the *Venetians* Power, leagued themselves for their owne defence, so that though the Republick of Venice was too strong for any of them singly, yet being far too weake for them all, was kept within bounds, and they thereby wisely secured themselves.

3. When any Potentate that is stronger then his Neighbors aggresses any of them, the rest ought to Confederate; and if his cause be just compell him to accept of due satisfaction, and if he will not, his cause then becoming unjust, and much more if it was so originally, to make War against him. As the *Italians* did against the *French*, when they under *Charles* the 8 were invaded. And the *Triple Alliance* of late, when the same nation had taken the *County of Burgundie*, commonly called the *French Comté*, and invaded *Flanders*, both which belong to the Crowne of *Spaine*. Thus our *Neighbors* allso should now allie with us, in point of honest intrest; that so we may reduce *France* to keepe within bounds, lest we should all be ruind by them.

I shall make these things plaine by familiar example. The ballancing of Nations is like to that of boats: they that by an even *poize*, might all sit safe in a boate on a rough Sea, by the rising up of some are all in danger to be drowned. In such case therefore the company perceiving, a quarrel likely to arise amongst some of them, must either agree before hand to keepe them quiet; or if the contest come suddenly, afterwards resolve together, to compel those that are injurious, to keepe their place; and if they

they will not, throw them over-board. And this ballancing of powers, I ſhall defend by the Fundamentall Law of Nature *ſelfe-preſervation*, and from the Law of Nations, as well as from the Word of God, and back the ſame by many approved examples; if any one hath a mind to conteſt with me heerein.

Lets ſee a litle *how*, and *by whom*, ſtronger powers muſt be ballanced, and I ſhall give a releaſe to your patience.

1. By the Confederacy of weaker Nations that are their Neighbors, and are in danger thereby of being overcome, as we have allready ſhewne.

2. Or by a Neutrall Nation that reſerve themſelves free, to league with the weaker, when they ſee them injured by the ſtronger powers. And this was the Ancient policy of *England*, ſince *France* and *Spaine* became the two great ballances in *Europe*. Which (as I have ſaid) begun to be ſo under *Charles* the 5, and *Francis* the firſt, whom *Henry* the 8 of *England* ſtill kept even, as the many Hiſtories of thoſe times ſhew, as well as other writers of State affaires, engraving this motto upon his Gold, *Cui adhæreo, præeſt*. From this maxim of State Q. *Elizabeth*, allſo his Daughter, firſt aſſiſted *Henry* the 4, which *Mornay* ſtrongly pleaded to *Walſingham*; and after when *France* was growne great, aſſiſted theſe Provinces, leſt they ſhould fall into the hands of *France*; as we have before ſhewne out of the beſt Hiſtorians of thoſe times, *Thuanus* and *Cambden*, the latter whereof after his declaring this reaſon of State in the place formentioned A. 1575, afterwards ſhews how this noble Heroine ſate as the honourable Arbitratrix, (holding the ballance in her hands) between *Spaine*, *France*, and theſe *Low Countries*.

Memoires de Ribier T.1. l.2. p.347. Memoires de du Pleſſis. Memoire du Duc de Sulli, T.2. c.4. p.14. Ambaſſades du Cardinal Oſſat part. 1. p.180. Annales Eliz. A.1577.

Sect. 13. *The Concluſion of the whole Diſcourſe.*

I Have now done, and it is high time, having been much larger then I intended at firſt; allthough not ſo large by far, as I found, being once entred upon the Argument, I might be. And yet, I hope, it will not be tedious to the Reader. In regard of the novelty of the matter, which though daily diſcourſt of by many, yet never writ of by any. And in regard of the uſefulnes thereof. For though old men are apt to dote upon the brats of their brain, as well as their body: Yet, if I be not deceived, this Diſcourſe, may through Gods bleſſing, prove inſtrumentall in begetting a better underſtanding between both Nations, (for which end I have publiſhed it in both Languages) by ſhewing them their concernments, it being the *Chariot of Intreſt* which all Princes and States *Jehu-like* furiouſly drive; and allſo ſerve to cleare up ſome State Controverſies, that are not eaſily diſcerned by vulgar eyes, to diſcover the former and preſent ſtate of affaires amongſt us, and moſt parts of *Europe*, and give a proſpect through this intricate, darke, and cloudy War, with what hopes we may have concerning its iſſue: And beſides theſe things, I thinke the clearnes of ſtile, which I have uſed to deliver my minde in, may make it les nautious to ſome, who are apt to mind the ſwadling cloths more then the Child.

I know mediation betwixt men in passion is a very thankles office; and that the freedome I have used, will both please and displease many sorts of men on all sides; but yet when mens passions are allayed, I doe not doubt but they will thinke better of the honest designes of the Author. And yet I have endeavoured to give as little offence as I could possibly to any; but if any notwithstanding count me their enimie, because I tell them the truth, I cannot helpe it: for I never accounted them worthy to write, that are byast with feare, or favour and flattery. Yea, I perswade my selfe, that there is not any ingenuous man, or brave Gentleman even of the *French* Nation, whose designes I cheifly oppose; but they will acknowledge it lawfull for an enimie, to fight them with a pen as well as a pike, and that I am a very civil Adversary, having both fairely fought them, and with their owne weapons, having made use of their Authors, and not ours, throughout my discourse.

I shall not now throw downe the gantlet and make a challenge, yet if any undertake to refute me concerning the intrest of these Countries, which I thinke worthy answering, I shall not faile to doe it. As for my *Conjectures*, I both account and call them *probable*, and therfore being not positive and dogmaticall in them, I leave them with their Reasons to the Reader to judge. But if some passionate person thinks with railing at the *French*, *English*, or the Author hereof, and carping at some particulars to refute me; I shall tell them before hand I was never bred, to give any one ill language, and shall onely answer them with silence and contempt. Or if any well meaning scholler that hath read perhaps honest *Keckermans*, or some others learned *Systema Politicum*; I shall onely smile in my sleeve, having allwayes accounted Booke policy alone, mere pedantry; and allthough no man valew's learning more then my selfe, yet he must know men as well as bookes, and the world well, that will write of these things. Yet if any will bring Reasons of State, and clearely delivered, as I thinke I have done, and fairely ventilate my opinion, I shall promise him as faire an Answer, for *truth never feared a faire tryall.*

POSTSCRIPT.

IT is necessary that I tell you, this worke hath been long in the birth. I had drawne up my thoughts on this subject the last yeare, and sent my Papers into Holland *to print; but my honest friends unacquainted with the Artifice of Governement,* to nourish hopes in the greatest dangers (*Hope being the miserable mans God, as well as the presumptuous mans Devil*) *sent me word, of nothing but peace, yet kept my Papers through curiosity, till I was forced to send my servant for them. And having got them, and contracted with a Printer here, He was called out for a Soldier, and goe he must, and therefore the worke must stand. In the meane time two sorts of Papers came to mine hands,* The Appeale; *which, though his designe, in reference to* England, *be different from mine, yet in reference to* France, *being much the same, I let pas for the present; and the* Chancelor of England's *speech, with his* Defenda est Carthago, *which whilst my Printer after his returne home is printing off this, I examined, according to the Rules of* Christian Charity, Common Equity, *and* State Policy; *but that being too large, I reserve it for an* Appendix. *In the meane time, though it be late before this comes forth* (*the Moneth of April* 73.) *yet I hope better late then never; and though no Printer will undertake it, because it is Paradoxical to the common opinion of Peace, yet I have put it into the publick Treasury for good, at my owne charge in both Languages; and though it cost me* 100 l. *and none consider me, or to use* Solomons *phrase,* Remember that poore man, *in any kind, not so much as to enquire after him, or returne him thanks; yet it shall not repent me for the good of both Nations, for which I intend it, and to whom I wish a happy peace, and all prosperity.*

FINIS.

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